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viiPreface
The interaction of economic agents is at the heart of any economic analysis. Achievements
in game theory and contract theory over the last decades have provided powerful tools
and methods that enabled a rigourous analysis of the optimality of behavior, incentives
and contracts. Many of these analyses rested upon the assumption of a so-called ”homo
oeconomicus“, i.e., an economic agent that is exclusively motivated by his very own fate,
but neglects anything and everybody around him. While models based on this assumption
have yielded enormously strong predictions, evidence emerged where observed behavior
was clearly at odds with theoretically optimal behavior and hinted at a ”non-selﬁsh“ de-
cision maker who cares also for his social environment. In retrospection it may come as a
small surprise - particularly to non-economists - that the economic science has for a long
time been losing sight of the fact that the well-being or the utility of an economic agent
not only depends on what accrues to him or her, but also on what accrues to others in a
(possibly common) interaction. The importance of this human characteristic gave birth
to a ﬁeld of economic research which incorporates this dissertation, namely the study of
other-regarding concerns, i.e., the formalization and testing of models as well as the pro-
vision of empirical evidence that encompass a ”social“ element in the preference structure
of an economic agent.
Up to date, there are two distinct ways other-regarding concerns have found their way
into economic theory. Pioneered by the works of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), economic agents are assumed to have some sort of preferences for a
payoﬀ distribution by comparing their outcome to the outcomes of others with a general
notion of disliking unequal or ”unfair“ allocations. These models remain to a large extent
agnostic about how outcomes are actually achieved but focus on the ﬁnal distribution of
outcomes. A diﬀerent way to incorporate notions of concerns for others into the decision
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making process has been formalized by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) who concentrate on the intentions behind actions and rely on notions of kindness
and reciprocity to explain an economic agent’s non-selﬁsh behavior.
The presence of other-regarding concerns has brought up new challenges particularly for
the study of incentives, since the optimality of an incentive scheme under the self-interest
model may vanish when an economic agent also takes into account a counterpart’s inten-
tions or the consequences for the other’s outcome.1 As an example, non-selﬁsh preferences
have been shown to act as a remedy against contractual incompleteness under moral haz-
ard which has important consequences for labor markets. In the gift-exchange framework,
a principal’s optimal contract oﬀer under selﬁsh preferences may lead to an ineﬃcient out-
come when it is perceived as unfair by an agent with non-selﬁsh concerns and reciprocated
with rejection or shirking. Optimal incentives in the sense that they yield eﬃcient or de-
sired outcomes may therefore be very diﬀerent for agents with non-selﬁsh preferences than
for selﬁsh ones.
The parsimonious representation of models of other-regarding concerns has contributed
greatly to the possibility to test them with empirical data, however, they leave consider-
able degrees of freedom towards the environment and the circumstances of a decision. E.g.
the reference group in the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) can not be unambiguously be
determined in every situation, or to what extent an action is considered as ”kind“ in the
model of Rabin (1993) varies with the circumstances of the decision. The environment of
a decision determines to a great degree the predictive power of models of other-regarding
preferences and the desired eﬀect of incentives. From the study of these models, it is
not clear where they precisely apply and if diﬀerent institutional environments amplify or
reduce concerns for others. The presence of competition as an example may under certain
conditions completely eliminate the eﬀects of social preferences.
The main contribution of this dissertation is therefore to provide evidence how other-
regarding concerns translate into behavior when the environment changes and the circum-
stances of decisions are altered. A further contribution relates to the well-documented
heterogeneity of other-regarding concerns in the population and to what extent this has to
be taken into account for the design of appropriate incentives. The strength of models in
1For an assessment of the impact of non-selﬁsh preferences on general equilibrium outcomes, see e.g.
Dufwenberg et al. (2011).
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this ﬁeld for predictions and policy implications crucially depends on a profound knowl-
edge of under what conditions other-regarding concerns play which precise role. Next to
fostering an understanding of real world phenomena, it is the purpose of all chapters in
this dissertation to provide evidence about how to set the behaviorally optimal incentives
when facing economic agents that are not solely driven by selﬁsh motives.
Theoretical achievements in the ﬁeld of social preferences have been paralleled by the
development of experimental methods in economics. Laboratory studies appear particu-
larly useful given the high degree of control they provide in contrast to standard empirical
analyses. For the study of the interaction of incentives and other-regarding concerns, labo-
ratory experiments act complementary to the development of empirical methods (amongst
them ﬁeld experiments) and theoretical models by providing a way to come up with clean
empirical evidence and the possibility to test competing theories against each other or
reﬁne theoretical analyses e.g. in the presence of multiple equilibria. As well-documented
in the history of natural sciences, experiments can also be explorative in nature and can
thus be sources of unexpected discovery that subsequently inspire new ways of thinking
and foster the development of new theories. All four chapters in this dissertation use the
experimental method to provide evidence about instances where other-regarding concerns
shape outcomes and interact with the incentives under which experimental subjects take
their decisions.
The ﬁrst two chapters are embedded in the ﬁeld of experimental labor markets and use
the gift-exchange game as a workhorse of the analysis. The third chapter is closely linked
to the prior chapter through accounting for individual heterogeneity and its consequences,
but does this in a public goods setting. In chapter four, concerns for others are looked at
in the ﬁeld of choices under risk, a ﬁeld where social preferences have only started to be
accounted for recently. All four chapters contribute to assess experimentally how other-
regarding preferences translate into changing and competitive environments and focus
on the interaction of incentives and the underlying (possibly heterogeneous) preference
structure of individuals.
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The ﬁrst chapter, which is joint work with Martin Kocher, focuses on the existence of
the so-called ”fair-employment-hypothesis“ on labor markets which stipulates that ﬁrms
employ workers even if it is not proﬁtable for them in the short run and refuse to use
unemployment as a disciplining device when they suﬀer from a negative productivity
shock.
Many studies have conﬁrmed the well-known fair-wage hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982), i.e., a
robust positive relationship between the wage and non-enforceable eﬀort on labor markets
characterized by moral hazard. However, none of these studies has accounted for the
ﬂuctuations from demand or productivity shocks and their eﬀects on the robustness of
gift-exchange outcomes. In the presence of a negative productivity shock a ﬁrm may not
be able to pay the same levels of wages, such that a static interpretation between wages
and eﬀorts at one point in time has severe limitations. The idea behind this chapter is
therefore to test the dynamic counterpart of the fair-wage hypothesis where reciprocity
stretches over to behavior across periods. To do so, we pay particular importance to
the concept of relational contracts, i.e., the possibility for ﬁrms and workers to engage
endogenously in long-term relationships to see how robust these relationships are in the
presence of labor market ﬂuctuations that aﬀect ﬁrms.
In the design of the experiment, we extend the framework of Brown et al. (2004) by
the existence of commonly known productivity shocks to ﬁrms where in a one-sided
auction ﬁrms submit public or private wage oﬀers and workers - identiﬁable through
an identiﬁcation number - can accept posted contract oﬀers. There is excess supply of
workers and ﬁrms are restricted to hire a maximum of one worker.
Our results indicate that reputational mechanisms between ﬁrms and workers help to
prevent unemployment or even a market breakdown in recessions and conﬁrm gift-
exchange to be a robust phenomenon also under unstable productivity levels. When
the economy enters a recession, ﬁrms cut wages signiﬁcantly but workers reduce eﬀort
levels only marginally such that a new wage-eﬀort relation emerges in periods of low
productivity. There is evidence for intertemporal reciprocity between ﬁrms and workers
in the sense that relationships with high levels of eﬀort in the past are characterized by
a stronger decrease in wages when the economy enters a recession compared to newly
formed ﬁrm-worker pairs. We interpret this ﬁnding through an increased ﬂexibility of
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the labor market inside the ﬁrm through relational contracts that is absent when hiring
a new worker from outside the ﬁrm. In contrast to stable conditions of productivity,
however, we identify a series of frictions in the contracting behavior on a labor market
with varying productivity where eﬃciency is also lowest.
In two control treatments, reputation building is made impossible through allocating
worker IDs randomly every round and wages are exogenously ﬁxed to isolate the impact
of reputation mechanisms and intentions behind the wage level in presence of productivity
shocks. We ﬁnd that reputation mechanisms are crucial to sustain high employment levels
in recessions and that ﬁxing the wage level has a surprisingly positive eﬀect on market
eﬃciency especially in recessions. We explain the latter ﬁnding through reciprocity
between being oﬀered a job itself (rather than the wage level) and eﬀort levels as well as
through subjects caring strongly about the surplus split.
We furthermore extend our analysis to a setting where ﬁrms are allowed to hire a second
worker at a lower marginal productivity. Firms can now decide whether they reduce
wages for their entire workforce or lay a low-performing worker oﬀ when hit by a reces-
sion, see also Bewley (1999). Wages are either ﬂexible or exogenously ﬁxed according
to the treatment. We ﬁnd that when ﬁrms are not able to reduce wages in a recession,
this produces a strongly cyclical employment pattern with close to full employment in
booms, but a signiﬁcantly reduced workforce in recessions. Under ﬂexible wages we do
not observe any cyclicality in employment, since ﬁrms buﬀer shocks through lower wages,
which is accepted by workers.
Our study is subjecting the results from the prior experimental literature on labor
markets to a rigorous test as to what behavioral patterns survive and emerge when
introducing ﬂuctuations or - more generally - when adding more realistic features. The
results underline the importance of dynamic considerations for individuals who have
some sort of other-regarding concerns and foster our understanding of the incentives on
markets in an incomplete contract environment.
In a joint project with Florian Englmaier and Joachim Winter, which constitutes chapter
two, we analyze the impact of available information about worker characteristics again
in a gift-exchange setting. We address the question how - and if at all - worker charac-
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teristics are able to predict behavior in a subsequent moral hazard situation and whether
information about worker traits is used by ﬁrms when writing contracts. In contrast to
much of the experimental literature on labor markets that focuses on the enforcement of
incomplete contracts, our study is among the ﬁrst to shed light on the adverse selection
element in the process of entering the labor market. Given the well-documented hetero-
geneity of individuals with respect to their skill set and their preferences, we examine
how this heterogeneity is taken into account by labor market participants and how it
shapes ﬁnal outcomes in interactions characterized by non-enforceable eﬀort.
We design an experiment where we elicit in a ﬁrst part two dimensions of a worker’s
characteristics that we consider to be important for the worker’s eﬀort decision in a
subsequent gift-exchange game. We focus on the worker’s productivity in a real-eﬀort
task and the behavior in a binary trust game as a proxy for social preferences and make
this information accessible to employers. In the second part of the experiment, ﬁrms
can condition their wage oﬀers on the information they have about workers before ﬁrms
and workers interact in a standard gift-exchange framework. In a one-shot setting, we
explicitly exclude the possibility to build up a reputation and hence concentrate on the
pure eﬀect of information from sources that are exogenous to the relationship in contrast
to studies where information about worker types arises endogenously within a ﬁrm-worker
relation.
Our results indicate that ﬁrms pay wage premia to workers with a high productivity
and high trustworthiness measure. Gift-exchange is robust in our real-eﬀort task across
all types of workers, but turns out to be strongest for trustworthy workers. Firms use
the information about workers to tailor incentive schemes and to make use of comple-
mentarities between wage levels and worker types. From the eﬀort choices, we ﬁnd
that optimal wages are highest for workers that combine both traits (productivity and
trustworthiness) which lead to maximal proﬁts for ﬁrms. Only in the interaction with
trustworthy workers an increase in the wage produces signiﬁcantly higher proﬁts for ﬁrms.
In a control treatment, we show that subtle diﬀerences in the presentation of information
about productivity (switching from a binary measure to a continuous measure) have
non-negligible eﬀects for outcomes and produce diﬀerent endogenously generated wage
distributions.
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We explain our ﬁndings by the importance of diﬀerent levels of complementarities be-
tween incentives and worker types. A wage increase has a diﬀerent eﬀect on workers
with high or low degrees of productivity or other-regarding concerns yielding diﬀerent
wage-eﬀort relations for worker types. The results suggest that worker heterogeneity
particularly with respect to trustworthiness has to be taken into account when setting the
right incentives in gift-exchange situations. Information about the contracting partner
shows up as a vital ingredient in the contract writing phase. Our analysis underlines the
importance of available worker information since it allows ﬁrms to control the interaction
between worker heterogeneity and the solution to the moral hazard problem.
The third contribution of this dissertation also highlights the importance of heterogeneity
of other-regarding preferences, but this time with respect to tournament incentives in a
social dilemma. Tournament incentives are widely used - explicitly or implicitly - in orga-
nizations to elicit additional eﬀort from agents or when individual eﬀort is prohibitively
costly to monitor and cannot be easily observed in contrast to ﬁnal output. Social
dilemmas constitute an important class of situations where contributions to a common
pool have positive externalities on other group members. Hence, individually rational
and socially eﬃcient behavior diverges. The eﬀect of competition between teams in social
dilemma situations has been well-documented. However, many tournament incentives
in organizations work at the individual level such that an individual tournament in a
social dilemma creates a trade-oﬀ: Contributions to the public good have a greater
positive externality on others as they improve others’ chances of a tournament prize,
but decrease the own individual likelihood of obtaining the prize. Prominent examples
within organizations include e.g. promotions at the individual level while working in a
team. The question that I address in this chapter is how diﬀerent types of subjects react
diﬀerently to the introduction of tournament competition in a social dilemma framework.
Pertaining to the design of the experiment, all subjects are classiﬁed according to the con-
ditional contribution exercise by Fischbacher et al. (2001). In a public goods framework,
I subsequently expose subjects to tournament incentives at the individual level such that
there is an exogenously ﬁxed prize for a subject if the proceeds from cooperation within
a group exceed those of a competitor under identical incentives in a diﬀerent group. In a
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ﬁrst experiment, subjects interact repeatedly in a partner setting to allow for reputation
and strategic behavior over time and prizes are awarded on the basis of cumulative
earnings. In a second experiment, the prize is awarded on the basis of behavior in a
one-shot game using the strategy method to see how competition aﬀects the classiﬁcation
of subjects into types.
The results suggest that in the repeated setting, competition destroys the incentives
for freeriders to build up a strategic reputation of being a cooperative ”type“. Subjects
classiﬁed as conditional cooperators are unaﬀected by the presence of competition. In
the absence of reputational concerns in a one-shot setting, there is evidence that in the
presence of competition some subjects cease to act as conditional cooperators altogether
such that the measured proportion of freeriders is signiﬁcantly higher under competition
compared to the baseline treatment. This conﬁrms the argument that other-regarding
concerns stop to play a role when individuals lose control over the ﬁnal allocation of
payoﬀs which is caused by competition.
The study is among the ﬁrst to provide evidence for a diﬀerential impact of an exogenous
treatment variation on diﬀerent types of subjects which warrants a careful interpretation
of treatment eﬀects. The results furthermore have important consequences for the impact
of a change of the institutional environment on observed individual behavior and naturally
for setting the right incentives when one is willing to induce a desired behavior. The same
incentive may have very diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent types identiﬁed, which underlines
the importance of availability of information about types for the contract designer. Since
randomization of subjects into treatments takes place, the observed eﬀects constitute a
strict lower bound of the diﬀerential eﬀect from the competitive incentive on diﬀerent
types of agents. The presence of selection or sorting of diﬀerent types into diﬀerent
incentive schemes will amplify the variance of outcomes from the implementation of the
same incentive scheme for diﬀerent types.
In the last chapter, which is joint work with Julius Pahlke and Ferdinand Vieider, we
focus on the interaction of other-regarding preferences and individual risk attitudes to
see how the latter are aﬀected when the decision maker decides not only for herself but
for another person as well. To date, risk preferences have been studied predominantly in
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a context of individual decision making. We argue that the consequences of a substantial
part of decisions taken under risk in real world situations aﬀect not only the decision
maker himself but also other persons and are hence taken under responsibility for oth-
ers. Examples include parents taking decisions for their kids or managers for an entire
company and thus their shareholders. Any diﬀerences found between individual risk
preferences and risk preferences under responsibility will undermine the predictability
of decisions from the knowledge acquired about risky decision taken individually. Given
that decisions under responsibility constitute an important class of decision situations -
and indeed one that in its economic importance may even surpass individual decisions -
we present evidence on diﬀerences between the two and hence provide important insights
for descriptive as well as prescriptive policy purposes.
In a between subjects design we compare lottery decisions observed in an individual
treatment, i.e., a decision maker’s choice only aﬀects her own income, with those made in
a responsibility treatment, i.e., a decision maker’s choice aﬀects her own income as well
as the income of an anonymous recipient in exactly the same way. With perfect income
matching for the decision maker and her recipient, we explicitly exclude preferences over
outcome distributions and inequality concerns to have an impact on the decision under
risk in the responsibility treatment. If the decision maker accommodates any presumed
preferences of the recipient or when following some social norm, the own payoﬀs are
aﬀected in the same way and she will incur an actual cost compared to a decision
taken only on her own account or only for somebody else. Therefore, our ﬁndings are a
conservative measure and constitute only the lower bound on the eﬀects of responsibility
on risk preferences that we aim to investigate.
Given the systematic diﬀerences of risk preferences over probability and outcome spaces,
we expose in a ﬁrst experiment subjects to simple lottery choices that are either in the
gain domain, the loss domain and the mixed domain including gains and losses holding
the probabilities constant at 50%. In a second experiment, we extend the analysis to
diﬀerent probability levels.
We conﬁrm the intuition that being responsible for somebody else’s payoﬀs increases risk
aversion for gains, while in the loss domain we ﬁnd increased risk seeking in our ﬁrst
experiment. In the second experiment, we replicate the ﬁnding of increased risk aversion
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for large probabilities of a gain, while for small probabilities we ﬁnd an increase of risk
seeking under conditions of responsibility. These ﬁndings discredit the hypothesis of a
unilateral cautious shift through taking over responsibility for somebody else, but indicate
that the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory is accentuated in
our responsibility treatment.
Our results suggest that risky decisions under responsibility diﬀer signiﬁcantly from indi-
vidual choices under risk, which appear to be reinforced by the presence of responsibility
for others. These ﬁndings have important policy implications for the design of optimal
contracts as the identiﬁed patterns under responsibility may be seen as suboptimal from
a risk neutral principal’s point of view.
All four chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and include their own introductions
and appendices such that they can be read independently. The respective appendices






Good times, bad times, you know I had my share. (Led Zeppelin)
1.1 Introduction
In their seminal papers, Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) postulate a
positive relationship between non-contractible work eﬀort and wage. If such a relationship
exists, it may be optimal for employers to pay wages that are above the market-clearing
level. Numerous laboratory experiments, using the gift-exchange game to assess the exis-
tence of a fair wage-eﬀort relationship, established that with incomplete contracts average
wages indeed exceed the marginal product of labor (Fehr et al., 1993, 1998a,b; Fehr and
Falk, 1999). While gift-exchange is not robust under all conditions in the ﬁeld (Gneezy
and List, 2006), it still seems to be a widespread phenomenon on real labor markets
(Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Kube et al., 2010).1
This chapter investigates experimentally whether the static fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis
0
This chapter is based on joint work with Martin Kocher.
1Excellent overviews of the literature are provided by Fehr and Gächter (2000), Cooper and Kagel
(2009), and Charness and Kuhn (2011).
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has a dynamic sister, the ’fair employment hypothesis’. Extending the original fair wage-
eﬀort hypothesis, the fair employment hypothesis stipulates that, in an incomplete con-
tracts setup, ﬁrms keep workers employed after negative productivity shocks (in times
of economic distress for the ﬁrm) in order to induce them to behave (more) reciprocally.
Reciprocity or gift-exchange in a setting with alternating high potential proﬁts (simply
denoted ’good times’ in the following) and low potential proﬁts or even losses (henceforth
’bad times’) can be established through additional channels than the ones that are avail-
able in a static setting. In the static fair wage-eﬀort relationship kindness is signaled by
higher than minimal wages and higher than minimal eﬀort levels. With alternating good
and bad times, kindness can also be indicated by keeping a worker employed in bad times
or by speciﬁc inter-temporal patterns of wage oﬀers, respectively wages, as well as eﬀort
levels. Whether such inter-temporal forms of gift-exchange exist, to what extent they can
be put to work, and under which prerequisites they are beneﬁcial for ﬁrms and workers,
is at the heart of this chapter.
We model an incomplete contracts environment (Brown et al., 2004) with ﬁrms (princi-
pals) and workers (agents). Firms oﬀer contracts consisting of a wage and a non-binding
desired eﬀort level to workers on a labor market. Workers can accept contract oﬀers and,
if they accept, have to choose an eﬀort level, with a cost-of-eﬀort function that is con-
vex in eﬀort. The higher the eﬀort level, the more beneﬁcial it is for the ﬁrm. In order
to induce alternating periods of high potential proﬁt and low potential proﬁts, we add
market-wide and symmetric negative productivity shocks to this standard setup. The
productivity shocks can be viewed as an analogy for the cyclical nature of the economy.
More precisely, we analyze gift-exchange in phases with high and low levels of eﬀort and
productivity. Hitherto, almost all gift-exchange experiments have implemented stable
economic conditions. Our design provides both comparative static results for diﬀerent
productivity levels as control treatments and real dynamics. In addition to the produc-
tivity shocks, our experiment exogenously varies in a systematic way (i) the maximal size
of the ﬁrm (i.e., how many workers a ﬁrm can employ in a given period), (ii) the level
of wage rigidity, and (iii) the possibility for both interacting parties, ﬁrms and workers,
to form reputation over time, because the impact of the three dimensions could interact
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with the variation in productivity levels.2
Our extension of the basic gift-exchange setup allows us to answer several research ques-
tions that have not been addressed so far in the literature. First, we are able to analyze
how negative productivity shocks aﬀect reciprocity among ﬁrms and workers as well as
unemployment rates on the labor market. In most treatments, our experimental design
implies full employment in good times and full unemployment in bad times, when us-
ing standard assumptions. Our results, on the contrary, indicate that the existence of
(inter-temporal) gift-exchange can overcome the dire implications of negative productiv-
ity shocks, and unemployment in excess of the natural rate (due to excess supply of labor
on the market by construction of our setup) is very small in bad times. Wages and eﬀort
levels are signiﬁcantly higher than predicted by standard theory, but they respond to the
productivity shocks. In bad times, wages drop sharply without inducing a strong negative
reaction of worker’s eﬀort levels. For given wage levels, employees voluntarily work much
harder in bad times than in good times.
In a second step, we assess the driving forces behind our main results. Unemployment in
bad times could remain low because of the wage ﬂexibility ﬁrms have in our setup. How-
ever, even if the introduction of wage rigidity3 makes gift-exchange between ﬁrms and
workers more diﬃcult, unemployment is non-existent such that wage ﬂexibility is not the
main driver of our results. Gift-exchange is surprisingly robust over time with rigid wages.
In a similar vein, the elimination of the option to form long-term relationships, i.e., to in-
vest in reputation, reduces employment levels, but to a much lesser extent than expected.
Reciprocity is still strong enough to sustain a considerable number of completed contracts
between ﬁrms and workers in bad times. Moreover, rigid wages lead to a higher overall
market eﬃciency than ﬂexible wages. With ﬂexible wages ﬁrms tend to lower wages to an
extent that reduces overall market eﬃciency in bad times. From the comparison of our
results from the markets with and without reputation mechanisms, we can conclude that
it is not the disciplining eﬀect from the threat of becoming unemployed in bad times that
2In the following we will for the sake of succinctness always refer to the labor market analogy of the
gift-exchange game. Our setting also captures the (potential long-term) relationship between a buyer
and a seller that interact under incomplete contract conditions, when the seller can choose the quality
of the provided good after the payment was made. For instance, in business-to-business relationships
productivity shocks in the way we model them might inﬂuence the relationship between the buyer and
the seller.
3Our setup is similar to Charness (2004), who also eliminates all wage-related reciprocity.
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induces workers to work harder in bad times, because without reputation in a repeated
interaction there is no such threat. It is the worker’s kind reaction on the kind action by
ﬁrms to oﬀer them a contract in times in which the proﬁt prospect for ﬁrms is bad that
drives our main results.
A third contribution of this chapter is the study of the micro-mechanisms that help ﬁrms
and workers overcome bad times through inter-temporal gift-exchange. We ﬁnd evidence
for workers exerting higher eﬀort levels in bad times, when they experienced a higher
wage-eﬀort relation in the past. Furthermore, we identify relational contracts as a means
of making the labor market inside the ﬁrm more ﬂexible, with the existing workforce
accepting wage cuts in bad times, facilitating the emergence of long-term relationships.
In contrast, the labor market outside the ﬁrm for hiring new workers is characterized by
a higher degree of wage rigidity during bad times.
Our experimental design is also inspired by Bewley (1999), whose starting point was
the observation of rigid wages, see also Blinder and Choi (1990) and Campbell III and
Kamlani (1997) in recessions. The persistent occurrence of rigid wages are in contrast
to standard economic theory. Complementing his empirical results from unstructured
interviews with a large number of, primarily, human resource managers in the Northeast
of the United States, our experiment allows to analyze to what extent and, potentially,
under what circumstances wage rigidity is bad and how the availability of reputation
mechanisms (i.e., the development of endogenous relational contracts) inﬂuences (labor)
markets in times of economic distress.4 As already mentioned, our results indicate that
with incomplete contracts, wages are not rigid and that exogenously implemented wage
rigidity is not causing considerable unemployment. However, one of the main arguments
in Bewley (1999)’s book is that employers prefer to lay oﬀ workers in times of economic
distress in order to get ’the problem out of the door’. Such a motive cannot be captured
in our one-ﬁrm-one-worker setting. The fourth contribution of this chapter is therefore to
experimentally implement a multiple worker setting that is able to provide an empirical
test of the motive. More speciﬁcally, we implement additional experimental treatments
in which ﬁrms can employ more than one worker, and the second worker exhibits a lower
4Bewley (1999) distinguishes between ’primary-’ and a ’secondary-sector’ jobs that diﬀer with respect
to the possibility of developing a reputation as a ﬁrm or worker. It is exactly this distinction that is also
important in our experiment.
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productivity than the ﬁrst one. These treatments allow us to assess the trade-oﬀ between
wage and employment policies of the ﬁrm. Even though we observe more unemployment
in this multiple worker setting, the level of unemployment is still much lower than ex-
pected theoretically. Depending on the degree of exogenous wage rigidity, ﬁrms use both
the employment and wage levels to counter a productivity shock.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: After a short overview of the re-
lated literature in section 1.2, we outline the experimental design, describe the laboratory
protocol, and discuss the theoretical predictions in section 1.3. Section 1.4 provides the
experimental results for our main treatments. In section 1.5, we extend our main treat-
ments to a multiple worker setting. Finally, section 1.6 discusses our results and concludes
the chapter.
1.2 Related Literature
Contractual incompleteness is an omnipresent characteristic on many markets, and it has
been studied extensively in economics. Often, obligations of market participants are only
speciﬁable or deliberately speciﬁed imprecisely, and relations are inﬂuenced by informal
rules or unwritten norms. It is hard or even impossible for third parties to enforce such
relational or implicit contracts because, typically, outsiders are unable to verify whether
contractual obligations have been met. In the context of labor markets it is obvious
that, even if many agreements are very explicit about the compensation that accrues to
a worker, they are imprecise when it comes to specify the tasks and obligations a worker
has to accomplish. As a consequence, potential incentive problems arise. The theoret-
ical literature oﬀers several ways to overcome the moral hazard created by contractual
incompleteness. In the context of labor markets, there are theories that focus on the
disciplining version of the eﬃciency wage hypothesis (Gintis, 1976; Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984; Bowles, 1985) as well as the above-mentioned fairness versions of the eﬃciency wage
hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990).5 In addition, theoretical models that
formalize the role of reputation and implicit contracts in repeated interactions on labor
5Fairness models such as Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
Charness and Rabin (2002), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) provide similar predictions as the
fairness versions of the eﬃciency wage hypothesis.
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markets have been developed to capture the incentive eﬀects arising from self-enforcing
non-written ﬁrm-worker agreements (Bull, 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989, 1993,
1998; Baker et al., 2002; Levin, 2003; MacLeod, 2003; Fuchs, 2007).
Empirical assessments are especially desirable in the context of contractual incomplete-
ness because many models in the theoretical literature exhibit multiple equilibria.6 Based
on their earlier work, Brown et al. (2004) provide evidence that long-term relationships
between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement.
Low eﬀort is penalized by the termination of the relationship, which is a powerful contract
enforcement device. If third-party enforcement is not available, markets are split up into
bilateral long-term interactions that are sustained through reputation mechanisms.
Adding cyclical ups and downs in the form of productivity shocks to the setting is not only
interesting in itself, because they can be viewed as an analogy for real business cycles,
but it also helps to assess the anatomy of reciprocity and the determinants of the eﬀects
that allow for a bilateralization of interactions.7 For instance, one of our main results
– the low levels of unemployment even in bad times, alongside relatively high earnings
of workers – together with the comparison of the results from exogenously implemented
rigid wages and ﬂexible wages indicate strongly that fairness theories are able to explain
the data to a better degree than disciplining theories.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to address the research questions arising
from cyclical market instability on reciprocity in the laboratory. Most closely related to
this chapter is a study by Linardi and Camerer (2010), who subject relational contracts to
stochastic interruptions where ﬁrms cannot hire workers for three periods after being hit
by an idiosyncratic shock. Despite the random shocks they ﬁnd ﬁrm-worker relationships
to be robust. Gerhards and Heinz (2011) run a two-period gift-exchange game with a
positive probability of an ”economic crisis“ to realize in the second period. Even though
the setup is quite diﬀerent from ours, the reduction in wages and the stability of eﬀort
levels in bad times that we ﬁnd is replicated in their study. Other features of the labor
market that are relevant in the context of our study and their eﬀect on experimental gift-
6In the following, we are discussing only a very small fraction of the whole empirical/experimental
literature. The surveys mentioned in footnote 1 provide an excellent overview.
7Albeit of diﬀerent length and character, cyclical patterns are a persistent phenomenon on many
markets such as, for instance, labor and capital markets (Lucas, 1977; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Long
and Plosser, 1983; Hansen, 1985).
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exchange outcomes have been studied more extensively, e.g. minimum wage laws by Falk
et al. (2006). Their main result is that minimum wages have a persistent impact on work-
ers’ reservation wages and fairness perceptions by creating entitlement eﬀects. Brandts
and Charness (2004) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between markets with excess sup-
ply of labor or excess supply of ﬁrms, but they are also able to document that minimum
wages have a negative eﬀect on eﬀort provision and, thus, overall market eﬃciency, even
though the eﬀect is small. Falk et al. (2008) ﬁnd strong negative eﬀects of dismissal
barriers implemented as the obligation to hire workers for several consecutive periods at
initially agreed wages; an eﬀect that is oﬀset by introducing non-enforceable bonus pay-
ments that ﬁrms can pay after observing actual eﬀort levels. The role of unemployment
as a disciplinary device is analyzed by Brown et al. (2011), who ﬁnd that unemployment
is indeed not a necessary device to motivate workers to provide above-minimum eﬀort
levels on markets with excess demand for labor.
There is also a nascent literature on the eﬀects of social comparison on the wage-eﬀort
relation in experimental gift-exchange games with multiple workers that is relevant in the
context of our treatments in which ﬁrms can employ more than one worker (see, e.g.,
Maximiano et al. (2007), Mittone and Ploner (2009), Abeler et al. (2010), Gächter and
Thöni (2010), Kocher et al. (2010), Angelova et al. (2011), Gächter et al. (2011)). We
will discuss the relevant literature directly in section 1.5.
1.3 Model, Experimental Design, and Theoretical
Predictions
1.3.1 The Basic Model and Productivity Shocks
We use a simple gift-exchange environment (similar to Brown et al. (2004)), consisting of
two stages per period. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms can make binding contract oﬀers {w, ˜ e} to
workers, with w denoting the wage and ˜ e the desired eﬀort level.8 Workers that accept a
contract have to exert eﬀort e in the second stage. Eﬀort determines the employer’s beneﬁt
8We make interchangeable use of the terms ’ﬁrm’ and ’employer’ henceforth. Along the lines of
Cabrales and Charness (2003), we will refer to the ﬁrm as being female and the worker as being male.
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βB(e) at some cost to the worker ζC(e). We make the following standard assumptions
regarding the functional forms: (i) B0(e) > 0,B00(e) ≤ 0, and (ii) C(0) = 0,C0(e) >
0,C00(e) > 0. In the experiment, the ﬁrst stage is a trading period of 180 seconds in which
employers can make contract oﬀers either publicly on a posted oﬀer market or privately
to a speciﬁc worker, a feature introduced into the literature by Kirchsteiger et al. (2001).
Contracts were restricted to the range {w ∈ {0,1,...,100}, ˜ e ∈ {1,2,...,10}}. Workers can
accept any standing contract oﬀer during the trading period, and if one does, he exerts
(costly) eﬀort e ∈ {1,2,...,10}, where ˜ e is non-binding (i.e., contracts are incomplete).
The cost-of-eﬀort function that we use is shown in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Cost of Eﬀort
e 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c(e) 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18
Each ﬁrm can hire at most one worker, and each worker can be hired by only one ﬁrm.





pt · e − w if a contract was concluded
0 otherwise





w − c(e) if a contract was concluded
bunemp otherwise
Employers can make as many oﬀers as they want during a trading period, as long as
none of them is accepted. After a worker has accepted a contract of a speciﬁc ﬁrm, all
standing contract oﬀers of this ﬁrm are automatically deleted. Public oﬀers are public to
all other ﬁrms and all workers on a market. At any time in the trading phase all market
participants know which ﬁrms and which workers have already concluded a contract.9
9See Figures A1.12 and A1.13 in appendix A1.6 for screenshots of the computer screens used in the
experiment.
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After the worker’s eﬀort choice, both one’s own proﬁt as well as the decisions and proﬁt
of one’s trading partner in the respective period are displayed, and a new period begins.
At the beginning of each period, all workers are unemployed. The experiment lasts for 15
periods, and all participants keep the same role throughout an experimental session.
The productivity parameter of the ﬁrm, pt, is used to implement market-wide produc-
tivity shocks.10 We decided to apply the most basic form of productivity instability one
can think of, with two levels of pt and common knowledge of their occurrence for all
subjects right from the start of the experiment, according to Table 1.2. The two levels of
pt, pt = 10 and pt = 5, are denoted good times (GT) and bad times (BT), respectively.
Remember that we are interested in the incentive and potential disciplining eﬀects of eco-
nomic ﬂuctuations. In order to be able to focus purely on them, we deliberately eliminate
any kind of uncertainty and any noise from the order, timing and size of the productivity
shocks. The simpliﬁcation buys us a high level of control over the experimental setup.
Productivity shocks apply market-wide to all employers symmetrically.
Table 1.2: Productivity Parameter of the Firm in GTBT
period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
pt 10 10 10 5 5 5 10 10 10 5 5 5 10 10 10
Our laboratory markets consist of twelve subjects each, with ﬁve ﬁrms and seven workers.
We thus follow the standard in the literature of implementing excess supply of labor.
Unemployed workers receive a ﬁxed unemployment beneﬁt of 6 experimental currency
units. Even in BT, maximal eﬀort is eﬃcient, since the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort (pt=5)
still exceeds the highest marginal cost (∆cmax = 3). Furthermore, the incentives for
workers are unaﬀected by the condition of the economy as only ﬁrms’ proﬁts depend on
pt. The contracted wage serves exclusively as a distributional device, splitting up the
surplus between the ﬁrm and the worker, but it has no direct impact on eﬃciency.
10It can be interpreted in terms of demand ﬂuctuations, variations in prices over time, or other
exogenous shocks to proﬁts.
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1.3.2 Experimental Treatments and Laboratory Protocol
We implement an unbalanced 3x2x2 factorial design with the following factors: (i) pro-
ductivity levels, (ii) wage ﬂexibility, and (iii) reputation. Productivity levels can either
be varying over time according to Table 1.2 (Treatment GTBT), or be ﬁxed over the 15
periods on the high level pt = 10 (Treatment FGT for ’ﬁxed good times’), and ﬁxed over
the 15 periods on the low level pt = 5 (Treatment FBT for ’ﬁxed bad times’). Treatments
FGT and FBT can be interpreted as control treatments for GTBT.11 Treatments GTBT,
FGT and FBT are implemented with ﬂexible wages and with ﬁxed IDs over the course
of the experiment, i.e., we allow for reputation formation.12 Treatment GTBT is also
implemented with the wage level ﬁxed at w = 30 in order to capture the possible eﬀects
of wage rigidity (Treatment GTBT_FIX) and with changing IDs over time in order to
make reputation formation impossible (Treatment GTBT_RI for ’random ID’).13
The experiment was conducted computerized using the software package zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) at the MELESSA laboratory of the University of Munich in 2009. Par-
ticipants were randomly recruited from the undergraduate population of the University
with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). No subject participated in more than one ses-
sion. Upon arrival, students were seated at computer screens divided by blinds. The
instructions were distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. They were framed
in neutral terms (e.g., employers were called ’type A’, the wage was denoted ’transfer’,
and so on).14 Before the ﬁrst period, subjects were assigned their roles. They kept their
roles throughout the entire experiment. Yet, subjects were completely anonymous in all
treatments. After 15 periods the experiment ended, and participants were paid the sum
of their earnings in private. A typical session took less than two hours, including instruc-
11FGT is close to a replication of one of the treatments in Brown et al. (2004), with a diﬀerent size
of the market and a couple of other smaller diﬀerences. Our results for this treatment are indeed very
similar to those in Brown et al. (2004).
12All subjects in all treatments were given a documentation sheet in which they were asked to take
note of outcomes (wage, eﬀort, proﬁts, ID of transaction partner) in every period in order to help them
track the history of interactions. We did not require subjects to ﬁll out these documentation sheets, but
told them it could be useful for their decisions. Almost all subjects took great care in following what
happened during the experiment and ﬁlled out the sheets throughout the entire experiment.
13The level of the ﬁxed wage, w, in GTBT_FIX was chosen after GTBT was conducted. See details
regarding the choice of w in the results section.
14The experimental instructions to the FGT, GTBT, and FBT treatments can be found in appendix
A1.7. Others are available on request.
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tions and payment.
All 372 participants were endowed with an initial endowment of 400 points. Experimental
currency units in the experiment (called ’points’ in the instructions) were converted to
Euro at the pre-announced exchange rate of 0.10 €/point in all treatments. Table 1.3
shows the number of markets (with twelve subjects each) for each treatment as well as
the average earnings in each treatment.
Table 1.3: Treatment Overview
Flexible Wages Fixed Wages
Reputation No Reputation Reputation No Reputation
(GTBT_RI) (GTBT_FIX)
FGT 5 markets (35.7e) - - -
GTBT 6 markets (24.6e) 8 markets (18.5e) 6 markets (28.3e) -
FBT 6 markets (19.6e) - - -
Treatment overview with number of experimental markets and average earnings per subject in parenthe-
ses.
1.3.3 Predictions and Hypotheses
Standard Predictions: Selﬁsh Players
Assuming payoﬀ maximization, risk neutrality, and common knowledge, there is only
one subgame perfect equilibrium of the ﬁnitely repeated game: Workers in each period
exert minimal eﬀort levels and, anticipating this, ﬁrms oﬀer contracts {w = 6, ˜ e}, with
wages that are equal to their outside option (i.e., the unemployment beneﬁt of 6 points
in the experiment).15 In FGT each ﬁrm will employ a worker and reap all the rent
from the interaction (i.e., 4 points). Two workers on the market remain unemployed by
construction of our design. In FBT, it is easy to see that the outside option is more
attractive for workers than the wage that ﬁrms are able to oﬀer (w = 5). Thus, no ﬁrm
will engage in trade, and all workers will be unemployed. The same holds for GTBT_FIX,
because the ﬁxed wage w = 30 is much too high to allow market exchange in equilibrium.
15The desired eﬀort level is cheap talk. We, moreover, assume that workers that are indiﬀerent accept
the contract.
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In GTBT and GTBT_RI ﬁrms will employ workers in periods of GT for the contract
{w = 6, ˜ e} (i.e., in periods 1 − 3, 7 − 9, and 13 − 15) and not employ any workers in
periods of BT (i.e., in periods 4 − 6, and 10 − 12).
Hypothesis 1.1 (Employment) There will be full employment16 in treatment FGT and
in good times in treatments GTBT and GTBT_RI. There will be full unemployment
in treatments FBT and GTBT_FIX as well as in bad times of treatments GTBT and
GTBT_RI.
Hypothesis 1.2 (Wages, eﬀort, eﬃciency) All workers – if employed – will be em-
ployed at {w = 6, ˜ e} and will exert minimal eﬀort levels. Eﬃciency is minimal.
Alternative Predictions: Non-Selﬁsh Players
If decision makers are fair-minded (not entirely selﬁsh) or if the fraction of fair-minded
subjects on the market is suﬃciently large, incomplete contracts in gift-exchange rela-
tions can be enforced through reciprocal behavior. One way to analyze the eﬀects of the
presence of fair-minded subjects is to assume that workers compare their proﬁts with
those of their employers. A tractable model that incorporates this idea is the model of
inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). However, there is a plethora of (Bayesian)
Nash equilibria when one applies the model to our setup. Rather than characterizing
the entire set of equilibria, we just aim to illustrate in a stylized way how contractual
incompleteness and our treatment variables interact in determining fairness contracts
and unemployment, in the presence of fair-minded subjects.
More speciﬁcally, assume that a fraction 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of workers has egalitarian preferences
such that they are assumed to fulﬁll the contract oﬀered to them, as long as they are
oﬀered at least the equal split of the surplus being generated by the transaction (see
also Fehr et al. (2007)).17 If they are oﬀered less than the equal split, workers accept
16This is a slight abuse of the term. We disregard the two workers that are unemployed in our setting
by design.
17We do not rule out that ﬁrms also exhibit fairness preferences, but since workers are always reacting
to contracts oﬀers by ﬁrms with their eﬀort decisions, the workers’ preferences over outcomes are crucial
for the transaction. Adding fairness preferences of ﬁrms would complicate the analysis and provide little
additional insight. Restricting our analysis to only two types of players might be a simpliﬁcation that
does not always seems to be warranted by the data (see Dittrich and Ziegelmayer (2010)), but it is useful
to derive clear-cut predictions.
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the contract but even fair-minded workers shirk by providing the minimum level of
eﬀort as their equity fairness norm had been violated. The remaining fraction (1 − γ)
of workers is purely selﬁsh and would shirk in a one-shot interaction. The utility func-
tion of a fair-minded worker (suppressing individual and time indices) can be expressed by




w − c(e) if w − c(˜ e) < 1
2[pGT,1w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
w − c(e) − k max[˜ e − e;0] if w − c(˜ e) ≥ 1
2[pGT,1w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
(1.1)
where the cost-of-eﬀort function is c(·), pGT,1w indicates the productivity parameter of the
ﬁrm in good times and k is a fairness parameter which ensures that a fair-minded worker
chooses the desired eﬀort level ˜ e as long as he obtains (at least) half of the net surplus
from the contract. In order to guarantee this, we furthermore assume that k > maxc0(e)
such that e = ˜ e is indeed optimal, since the fairness costs associated with choosing a lower
level of eﬀort than desired in the contract outweigh the material beneﬁt from a lower eﬀort
level. Utility functions for bad times are constructed analogously.18
We assume further that ﬁrms are risk neutral and maximize their expected monetary
payoﬀs. We solve the game by backward induction. In the last period of the experiment
T, a ﬁrm can either oﬀer a ’fair’ (’trust’) contract that equalizes payoﬀs between the ﬁrm
and the worker characterized above or oﬀer workers their outside option in the form of a
contract according to the standard predictions (henceforth, the ’standard’ contract). This
contract has to account for the level of the unemployment beneﬁt of 6, i.e., ﬁrms have to
oﬀer at least a wage of 6 in order to induce workers to accept.
Table 1.4 gives an overview of the predictions derived in appendix A1.1 for the last period
of each of our ﬁve treatments. It contains the predicted contracts [w, ˜ e] and the minimal
proportion of fair-minded workers γ∗ to make sharing the surplus an optimal strategy
for ﬁrms and workers in the diﬀerent treatments and/or the GT- and BT-phases within
the GTBT treatments. Since there is no last period with BT in the game-theoretic sense
in GTBT and in GTBT_FIX (both end with GT; only GTBT_RI has ﬁnal BT-periods
in the game-theoretic sense because of the random ID draws every period), we put BT-
18More details can be found in appendix A1.1.
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predictions for GTBT and for GTBT_FIX in curly brackets. They are irrelevant for
deriving theoretical predictions for our setup.
Table 1.4: Theoretical Predictions
Flexible Wages Fixed Wages
Reputation No Reputation Reputation No Reputation
(GTBT_RI) (GTBT_FIX)
FGT [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] - - -
if γ∗ ≥ 0.59 - - -
GTBT In GT: [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] In GT: [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] In GT: [w, ˜ e] = [30,5] -
if γ∗ ≥ 0.59 if γ∗ ≥ 0.59 if γ∗ ≥ 0.50 -
{In BT: [w, ˜ e] = [34,10] In BT: [w, ˜ e] = [34,10] {In BT: [w, ˜ e] = [30,9] -
if γ∗ ≥ 0.64} if γ∗ ≥ 0.64 if γ∗ ≥ 0.63} -
FBT [w, ˜ e] = [34,10] - - -
if γ∗ ≥ 0.64 - - -
Theoretical predictions for the ﬁnal period with fair-minded workers
Generally speaking, if γ ≤ γ∗, a ﬁrm is better oﬀ oﬀering the ’standard’ contract in the last
period. Otherwise, in all but the ﬁnal period, the ﬁrm will employ a policy of contingent
contract renewal in treatments FGT, FBT, GTBT and GTBT_FIX, i.e., re-employ the
worker if he exerted the desired eﬀort level and dismiss him if he shirked. A fair worker
will accept any oﬀer that shares the surplus equally, and selﬁsh workers will cooperate
if future rents from cooperating exceed the gains from shirking. This is clearly the case,
such that selﬁsh workers prefer to cooperate in the pre-ﬁnal period and reveal their type
only in the last period when they shirk. The mechanism works analogously in good times
and in bad times, but in bad times wages are lower.19 Since the game ﬁnishes with three
periods of high productivity, the incentives for the selﬁsh types are unaﬀected by the
presence of periods of low productivity. They fulﬁll the contract and shirk only in the last
period. Optimal behavior in GTBT with ﬂexible wages therefore can be characterized by
the following two conditions depending on the value of γ:
• Condition 1: γ > γ∗
GT,1w: Firms oﬀer the ’fair’ contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] in GT
and [w, ˜ e] = [34,10] in BT. The contract is accepted by all workers who exert the
desired eﬀort level in all but the ﬁnal period. Workers earn πw
GT = 59 − 18 = 41 in
19It is interesting to note that the relatively small diﬀerence between the cut-oﬀ levels of γ between
GT and BT is a consequence of the diﬀerent outside options of ﬁrms. In GT employers can always oﬀer
w = 6, whereas in BT the outside option is employing nobody and earning nothing.
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GT and πw
BT = 34 − 18 = 16 in BT until the last period T in which fair-minded
workers earn πw
T = 59 − 18 = 41, but selﬁsh workers shirk to obtain a payoﬀ of
πw
T = 59 − 0 = 59. In all non-ﬁnal periods, ﬁrms earn π
f
GT = 10 · 10 − 59 = 41
in GT and π
f
BT = 5 · 10 − 34 = 16 in BT. In the last period, ﬁrms earn π
f
T =
γ(41) + (1 − γ)(−49) ≥ π
f
T(6,1) ∀γ > γ∗
GT,1w.
• Condition 2: γ∗
GT,1w ≥ γ: Firms oﬀer the ’standard’ contract [w, ˜ e] = [6,1] in GT
and do not make an oﬀer in BT. The contract is accepted by all workers who exert
the desired eﬀort level of 1 in all periods. Workers earn πw
GT = 6−0 = 6 in GT and
the unemployment beneﬁt b = 6 in BT. Firms earn π
f
GT = 10·1−6 = 4 in GT and
nothing in BT.
In the case of ﬁxed wages (treatment GTBT_FIX) the mechanism works identically.
Optimal contracts and cut-oﬀ levels are diﬀerent, as can be seen in Table 1.4, but the
qualitative predictions when non-selﬁsh workers are present are analogous. Most impor-
tantly under the ﬁxed wage, eﬀort levels from fair-minded types are not maximal at e = 10
but only e = 5 in good times. BT induce an increase of the eﬀort level up to e = 9.
In the absence of a reputation mechanism (treatment GTBT_RI) every period can be
treated as the ﬁnal period. Thus the contract oﬀers are identical to those in GTBT,
assuming the same level of γ across treatments, but the average eﬀort levels should be
clearly lower because selﬁsh workers will always shirk and only fair-minded workers pro-
vide eﬀort. Moreover, there is a third condition that has to be added. Condition 1 now
only holds for γ > γ∗
BT,1w, condition 2 remains unchanged. For intermediate levels of γ,
condition 3 is relevant for treatment GTBT_RI.
• Condition 3: γ∗
BT,1w > γ > γ∗
GT,1w: Firms oﬀer the ’fair’ contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10]
in GT and do not make an oﬀer in BT. In GT, the contract is accepted by all
workers where only the fair-minded workers exert the desired eﬀort level and the
selﬁsh workers shirk. Workers earn πw
GT = 59 − 18 = 41 (fair-minded) or πw
GT =
59−0 = 59 (selﬁsh) in GT and the unemployment beneﬁt b = 6 in BT. Firms earn
πf = γ(41) + (1 − γ)(−49) ≥ πf(6,1)∀γ > γ∗
GT,1w in GT and nothing in BT.
Note that ﬁrms have to rely entirely on beliefs about γ throughout the experiment in
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GTBT_RI, when they enter the oﬀer phase at the beginning of each period in GTBT_RI.
The reputation mechanism in GTBT keeps the incentives for selﬁsh workers not to shirk.
As a consequence, the eﬀects of productivity shocks could be more severe without a
reputation mechanism.
Hypothesis 1.3 (Employment) Regardless of the fraction of non-selﬁsh workers, there
will be full employment in treatment FGT and in good times in treatment GTBT as well as
in treatment GTBT_RI. In the presence of fair-minded workers, either full unemployment
or full employment can occur in treatments FBT and GTBT_FIX as well as during
bad times of treatments GTBT and GTBT_RI, depending on the fraction of non-selﬁsh
workers in the population (with diﬀerent cut-oﬀ requirements in diﬀerent treatments).
Hypothesis 1.4 (Wages, Eﬀort, Eﬃciency) In treatments FBT, FGT, GTBT and in
GTBT_RI eﬃciency should either be maximal (with suﬃciently many non-selﬁsh work-
ers) or minimal. In the presence of suﬃciently many non-selﬁsh workers, wages in treat-
ments GTBT and GTBT_RI ﬂuctuate over GT and BT, whereas eﬀort levels will always
be maximal. In contrast, in GTBT_FIX eﬀort levels (and eﬃciency) will be higher in
BT than in GT with enough non-selﬁsh workers being present.
It is important to add that the cut-oﬀ level requirements regarding the presence of non-
selﬁsh workers are very demanding. All calibration results from the literature (e.g., in Fehr
and Schmidt (1999), but also in more recent contributions) indicate that the proportion of
non-selﬁsh decision makers is clearly below the requirements for observing trust contracts.
However, we have only modeled an inequity aversion motive and not an eﬃciency motive
(Charness and Rabin, 2002) for non-selﬁsh workers. The latter is important in the context
of the gift-exchange environment, but it makes predictions messier because it adds at least
another degree of freedom for the analysis. When discussing our results, we will relate
them to potential eﬃciency concerns of workers without resorting to a formal model.
Over and above the eﬀects captured by assuming a fraction of fair-minded subjects in
our setup, the switch between GT- and BT-phases might have additional eﬀects on the
development of reciprocity. The switches between regimes could hinder the emergence of
reciprocal relationships and, thus, have a detrimental eﬀect on the endogenous emergence
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of relational contracts. Although there is no clear theoretical guidance, it seems intuitive
to expect an additional negative eﬀect of the ups and downs in productivity on reciprocity.
Whether it is signiﬁcant is an empirical question that we are able to study by comparing
the relevant periods in the GTBT treatments with treatments FGT and FBT.
1.4 Results
We begin by presenting results for the three treatments GTBT, FGT and FBT (section
1.4.1). Subsequently, our analysis for the two additional treatments GTBT_FIX and
GTBT_RI is introduced in section 1.4.2. In section 1.4.3, we provide evidence on micro-
mechanisms behind the stability of gift-exchange in the presence of productivity shocks.
1.4.1 Overview of Results of the Three Main Treatments
This section presents an overview of results regarding employment, wages, and eﬀort levels
and continues with reporting our results regarding the eﬀects of productivity shocks on
the contract nature.
Employment, Wages, Eﬀort, and Reciprocity in Good and Bad Times
Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of concluded contracts per three periods in order to make
treatments FGT and FBT comparable to treatment GTBT. Unemployment in excess of
the natural rate (i.e., the excess supply of two workers by construction of our design)
is almost non-existent. On average excess unemployment is highest in GTBT, but the
rate of 4.4% is far below the 40% predicted by making standard assumptions. Even in
the second negative productivity phase (i.e., in periods 10 − 12) in GTBT, 80 out of 90
possible employment contracts are still realized. Hypothesis 1.1 is clearly refuted.
Result 1.1 In accordance with the model taking non-selﬁsh worker behavior into account
(see Hypothesis 1.3) there are practically no eﬀects on employment levels from introducing
market-wide ﬂuctuation in economic productivity. Non-selﬁsh concerns of workers and/or
the available reputation mechanism are able to overcome negative eﬀects of BT.
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Figure 1.1: Employment Levels in FBT, GTBT, FGT
Next we look at wages and eﬀorts. Figure 1.2 displays the average levels of wages for
all three treatments. Wages are, not surprisingly, signiﬁcantly higher in treatment FGT
than in treatment FBT (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.02)20. We observe market averages
between 22 and 27 in FBT and between 27 and 49 in FGT. In both treatments they
slightly increase over time if we disregard the endgame eﬀect, and they are somewhat
below the alternative predictions based on our stylized inequity aversion model.
Treatment GTBT follows a clear cyclical pattern. In GT of GTBT, wages are signiﬁcantly
higher than in BT (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test between average wages from all GT- and
all BT-periods, p = 0.03).21 Wage decreases in BT compared to GT are considerable.
They amount to −33% in the ﬁrst BT-phase and −42% in the second BT-phase. It is
noteworthy that wage levels in the GT- and BT-phases in GTBT are always below their
corresponding levels in the treatments FGT and FBT. This is not predicted by any of
20In the following, all statistical tests use market averages as the unit of observations unless otherwise
indicated. All reported p-values are two-sided.
21If we take the diﬀerences in average wages between single GT- and BT-phases we obtain the same
results (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p < 0.05, for all six possible comparisons). Furthermore, we examine
the changes in contracted wage levels for the periods adjacent to the switch from GT to BT and from BT
to GT. Again the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-tests on average per-period wages
on the market level, p = 0.03 for all examined cases (periods 3 to 4, periods 6 to 7, periods 9 to 10,
and periods 12 to 13)), i.e., wages decline signiﬁcantly in all markets when the economy enters BT and
increase if it goes to GT.
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Figure 1.2: Average Wages in FGT, FBT, and GTBT.
the models, and it hints at an additional eﬀect of the instability on the labor market that
cannot be captured by existing models.
Result 1.2 While there is virtually no eﬀect of productivity shocks on employment levels,
wages react strongly to the shocks. Wage levels drop signiﬁcantly in BT, but recover in GT.
Average wage levels are much higher than predicted by the standard model, but somewhat
lower than our alternative predictions.
Our next look is at eﬀort levels. Workers’ eﬀort choice is neither contractible nor enforce-
able in any of our treatments, but remains observable by ﬁrms who can threaten to end
the relationship by not oﬀering a contract in the subsequent period. Figure 1.3 displays
the average actual eﬀort provided over time in the three treatments. The ﬁrst observa-
tion is that eﬀort levels are clearly higher in FBT than in FGT, even though average
wage levels were lower in FBT than in FGT. Lacking previous results, it is noteworthy
that the wage-eﬀort relationship is obviously diﬀerent for diﬀerent productivity levels
(Mann-Whitney-U-test, p < 0.01). Our main focus, however, is on the GTBT treatment.
Although one can observe ﬂuctuations in eﬀort levels over the GT- and BT-phases, they
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Figure 1.3: Average Eﬀort Levels in FGT, FBT, and GTBT
are much smaller than for wages. While wages for the ﬁrst regime switch from GT to BT
fall by 33%, eﬀort levels dip by a mere 5%. The same holds true for the second switch
(−42% in wages versus −7% in eﬀort levels). In line with the development of wages, there
is a slight upward trend in eﬀort levels in all treatments, as long as one disregards the last
period. Again, the GTBT-treatment’s eﬀort levels are below the corresponding levels in
the GT- and the BT-treatments, indicating an eﬀect of the instability of productivity per
se.22 Eﬀort level predictions are clearly above the predictions from Hypothesis 1.2 and
clearly below the predictions from Hypothesis 1.4.23
Result 1.3 Despite the strong drop in wages when negative productivity shocks hit, av-
erage eﬀort levels fall only slightly (and non-signiﬁcantly). Average absolute levels are
22More precisely, eﬀorts in GT-phases in the GTBT-treatment are lower than the corresponding eﬀort
levels in the FGT-treatment, but not signiﬁcantly so. The diﬀerence between the BT-phases eﬀort levels
in GTBT and the FBT eﬀort levels is, however, highly signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.01).
23We also ask ﬁrms to state an ”expected“ level of eﬀort before they learn worker’s actual decisions,
although in a non-incentivized manner. We ﬁnd that expected levels are very close to the actual levels. In
particular, they track the slight decline in eﬀort levels at the regime switch between GT and BT periods.
We take this as evidence that ﬁrms, to some extent, expect workers not to withdraw eﬀort entirely when
they pay them signiﬁcantly lower wages in BT-periods. Desired eﬀort levels from the contract oﬀers are
ﬂat at about 2 points higher than actual levels with a decline when the markets enters the second BT
phase in period 10; see Figure A1.4 in appendix A1.6.
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clearly above standard predictions but below the predictions from the inequity aversion
model.
Bringing wage levels and eﬀort levels together allows us studying the level of reciprocity.
We follow the convention by deﬁning reciprocity as the slope of the wage-eﬀort relation-
ship.24 Reciprocity levels in the three treatments and separately for GT and BT in GTBT
for diﬀerent wage classes are displayed in Figure 1.4. We distinguish between BT and GT
in the GTBT treatment to see if there are diﬀerences in reciprocity between GT and BT
within GTBT.25
Figure 1.4: Reciprocity in FGT, FBT, and GTBT
We ﬁnd a positive relationship between the accepted wage and exerted eﬀort levels in
all three treatments. Moreover, we observe that the level of reciprocity diﬀers strongly
between FGT and FBT. Close to maximal eﬀort levels prevail in the wage bracket be-
tween 30 and 40 in FBT, whereas in FGT ﬁrms can only expect similar eﬀort levels at
24We acknowledge that positive reciprocity can also be deﬁned diﬀerently; for instance, by the vol-
untary eﬀort over and above the equal-split eﬀort or the desired eﬀort. Since we are not interested in
the level of reciprocity but only in the treatment diﬀerences in reciprocity in this chapter, the choice of
deﬁnition does not really aﬀect our conclusions regarding treatment diﬀerences.
25We exclude wage levels above 40 (in BT) and above 70 (in GT) due to very small number of
observations in these categories.
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wages above 60. Also within GTBT, the levels of reciprocity diﬀer between BT and GT.
Interestingly, the levels of reciprocity in BT and GT in treatment GTBT are close to their
counterparts from the FGT and the FBT treatment, respectively.
Table 1.5: Panel Regressions on Eﬀort
Dep. Var. FBT and FGT, RE All treatments, RE All treatments, FE
eﬀort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GTBT-dummy 0.897*** 0.243
(0.285) (0.246)
FBT-dummy 0.338 -0.375 -0.337 -0.393
(0.492) (0.330) (0.317) (0.314)
Wage 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Private 1.873*** 0.821*** 0.807*** 0.843*** 0.890*** 0.924***
(0.264) (0.193) (0.178) (0.174) (0.243) (0.239)
Tenure 0.379*** 0.137*** 0.158*** 0.147*** 0.125*** 0.116***
(0.048) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
Wage*FBT 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.095***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018)
Wage*GTBT -0.008 0.004 -0.012 0.002
(0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011)
Private*FBT 0.168 0.147 0.180 0.108 0.135
(0.219) (0.209) (0.204) (0.267) (0.263)
Private*GTBT 0.197 -0.094 -0.021 -0.104
(0.234) (0.223) (0.341) (0.313)
BT-dummy 1.015*** 0.851***
× GTBT-dummy (0.228) (0.219)
Period 0.417*** 0.233*** 0.261*** 0.196*** 0.272*** 0.218***
(0.153) (0.081) (0.067) (0.062) (0.071) (0.067)
Period
2 -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.016***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 2.618*** -0.379 -0.425 -0.242 0.066 -0.039
(0.455) (0.358) (0.316) (0.314) (0.164) (0.174)
N 812 812 1242 1242 1242 1242
(Pseudo)R2 0.41 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.68 0.71
Panel random eﬀects (RE) and ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) regressions on the level of eﬀort. Standard errors are
given in brackets, clustering on the market level. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5
%, and * at the 10 % level, respectively.
In order to control for covariates, we also run simple panel random eﬀects (RE) and ﬁxed
eﬀects (FE) estimations on eﬀort levels, including treatment dummies, the wage, a dummy
for a private oﬀer, the tenure of the worker with that particular ﬁrm and a (quadratic)
time trend.26 Table 1.5 gives the results of the estimations. Models (4) and (6) add a
26The tenure is deﬁned as the number of consecutive periods that a ﬁrm-worker couple has stayed
together including the current period. One can argue that the tenure of the relationship is not an
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dummy for the BT-periods (4 − 6 and 10 − 12) in the GTBT treatment.
Our results indicate a robust reciprocal relationship between ﬁrms and workers, i.e., the
wage is highly signiﬁcantly related with eﬀort, regardless of the treatment and control
variables. A one-point increase in the wage, leads to an eﬀort increase between 0.1 and
0.2 according to the treatment. Moreover, the tenure at a speciﬁc ﬁrm has a signiﬁcantly
positive eﬀect on eﬀort exerted, and contracts concluded from a private oﬀer yield an eﬀort
level that is signiﬁcantly higher by roughly one point than from public oﬀers. With the
FGT-treatment being our control group, the induced eﬀort level from one additional wage
increment increases highly signiﬁcantly by 0.1 point in the FBT treatment, which leads
to a higher eﬀort level of about 2 points controlling for the wage. This result is hard to
reconcile with any outcome-based fairness model that takes only eﬃciency concerns into
account, because it is more eﬃcient to exert eﬀort in GT than in BT. The interplay of
eﬃciency concerns and a compassion for the least-well oﬀ in the reference group (the ﬁrm
in our case) – as in the model by Charness and Rabin (2002) – is, however, in principle
consistent with our ﬁndings. The diﬀerence between GTBT and FGT is negligible if we
include a BT-dummy for the GTBT treatment. Hence, reciprocity in GT in GTBT and
in FGT is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, controlling for everything else. However, the highly
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the BT-dummy captures the new wage-eﬀort relationship in BT.
Workers exert more eﬀort in BT ceteris paribus when it is actually less eﬃcient to do so.
Reciprocity in BT in GTBT is clearly strongest, and it does not seem to be compromised
by the ﬂuctuations in GTBT. If at all, it is rather reinforced. We do not ﬁnd contracts
based on private oﬀers to have a diﬀerent eﬀect on eﬀorts across treatments. Fixed eﬀect
estimations in models (5) and (6) yield quantitatively and qualitatively similar results.27
Result 1.4 The wage-eﬀort relationship changes signiﬁcantly over periods of GT and
BT. This is in contrast to standard predictions, but also consistent with our predictions
based on the assumption that workers are inequity averse. Negative productivity shocks
result in steeper wage-eﬀort relationships. The level of reciprocity is reinforced in BT.
exogenous variable. Therefore, it is important to note that dropping the variable tenure does not change
any of our results reported in the following.
27Since 429 out of 1242 contracts in our data lead to either minimal (e = 1) or maximal (e = 10) eﬀort
levels, we have also run tobit panel regressions. They corroborate our conclusions, and estimation results
can be found in Table A1.4 in appendix A1.5.
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Wages and eﬀort levels directly lead to employers’ and workers’ proﬁts which are presented
in Figure A1.6 in appendix A1.6. In FBT and FGT, workers secure themselves an almost
constant average income of 15 points (FBT) and 30 points (FGT) per period. In GTBT,
proﬁts decrease for both employers and workers in BT periods, however to a lesser extent
for workers than for employers. The latter earn, on average, close to zero proﬁts in BT-
periods. In appendix A1.2, we provide evidence that eﬃciency levels are lowest in GTBT
and surplus sharing is similar in the three treatments at about 40 % for ﬁrms and 60 %
for workers. Both outcomes can readily be inferred from wages and eﬀort levels.
Contract Nature
The characteristics of the relationships between workers and ﬁrms that emerge endoge-
nously illustrate the importance of relational contracting. The possibility of directing
oﬀers at particular workers enables ﬁrms to build up long-lasting proﬁtable bilateral re-
lationships. Under constant conditions it has been shown by Brown et al. (2004) that
employers greatly care about the identiﬁcation and thus reputation of their worker. Under
varying conditions, long-term contracts are also possible, but supposed to be more diﬃcult
to establish if ﬁrms and workers cannot implicitly agree on a wage-eﬀort relationship over
GT- and BT-cycles. Indeed, the average contract length in our GTBT treatment amounts
to 1.6 and in the two control treatments to 2.1 (FGT) and 2.3 (FBT), respectively.
The diﬀerence between GTBT and either control treatment in contract length is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney-U-test: p = 0.03 (GTBT vs. FBT), p = 0.07 (GTBT vs.
FGT)). Comparing all three treatments, we obtain a similar picture from a Kruskal-Wallis
test (p = 0.05). These results indicate that variations in economic conditions hamper the
formation of long term contracts. A further conﬁrmation for the hypothesis that varia-
tions in economic conditions have a negative impact on long-term contracting comes from
a closer look at the overall length of a relationship in the three treatments, where Figure
A1.2 in appendix A1.3 shows the cumulative frequency of the length of all concluded
relationships. In the GTBT treatment 46% of all relationships lasted only one period
compared to 34% and 31% in the two control treatments, respectively. Not surprisingly
and already documented by Brown et al. (2004), concluded contracts are more likely to
origin from a private wage oﬀer in the course of the experiment in all three treatments.
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This is in line with a bilateralization of trade on competitive markets in the form of re-
lational contracts which is robust under variations of the economic conditions. Table 1.6
displays the percentage of contracts in clusters of three periods that were concluded on
the basis of a private wage oﬀer.28 Especially the BT-periods in GTBT lead to a more
Table 1.6: Percentage of Contracts from Private Wage Oﬀers
FBT GTBT FGT
Period 1-3 0.43 0.24 0.28
Period 4-6 0.86 0.36 0.45
Period 7-9 0.93 0.64 0.63
Period 10-12 0.91 0.63 0.77
Period 13-15 0.90 0.71 0.84
frequent use of public oﬀers. In periods 4 and 10 (i.e., the ﬁrst BT-periods in GTBT),
there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the proportion of privately concluded contracts between
the treatments (Fisher exact test and χ2-test, p < 0.013).29 It is interesting to note that
bilateralization is highest in treatment FBT (the diﬀerence between FGT and FBT as
well as between GTBT and FBT is highly signiﬁcant (Mann-Whitney-U-tests, p = 0.01
for both comparisons)), i.e., the fact that only small surpluses can be shared seems to
reinforce the tendency of ﬁrms to make private oﬀers. In appendix A1.3 we show that
the renewal probability of contracts is lowest in GTBT compared to the stable FGT and
FBT treatments. More precisely in periods 4 and 10 of GTBT, the proportion of renewed
contracts is only 21 % and 39 %, whereas in the stable treatments this amounts to 42 %
and 70 % (FBT) as well as 40 % and 64 % (FGT).
Result 1.5 Average contract length is lowest in GTBT. Firms increasingly use private
oﬀers across all treatments, but even if contract renewal is positively correlated to previous
eﬀorts in all treatments, this relationship is weakest in GTBT and particularly so in the
BT-periods.
28In appendix A1.6 (Figure A1.5), we report the precise development over the 15 periods. We also split
up our three treatments into two parts (periods 1-7 and 8-15) and check for the percentage of concluded
contracts on the basis of a private oﬀer to ﬁnd a higher share of private contracts in the second half of
the experiment in all but one market. This increase is also conﬁrmed to be statistically signiﬁcant in all
three treatments (Wilcoxon-signed-rank-tests, p = 0.04 (FBT), p = 0.03 (GTBT) and p = 0.04 (FGT)).
29In period 4, we have 82 % (FBT), 31 % (GTBT) and 40% (FGT) and in period 10 93% (FBT), 61%
(GTBT) and 72% (FGT) of all contracts concluded following a private oﬀer.
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1.4.2 Two Control Treatments: No Reputation and Rigid Wages
Productivity shocks have a small negative eﬀect on labor markets with incomplete con-
tracts, but compared to theoretical predictions, reciprocity is very stable, and hence em-
ployment levels are almost maximal even in BT. Two straightforward arguments can be
brought forward for the functioning of the markets on these surprisingly high levels: (i) un-
employment is almost absent because of wage ﬂexibility; and (ii) unemployment is almost
absent because of the possibility to build reputation. Both features of our labor market
so far – reputation formation and wage ﬂexibility – have important implications for labor
market outcomes that are supposed to interact with economic instability/ﬂuctuations as
captured by our treatment GTBT. Therefore, we implement two further control treat-
ments: a treatment in which reputation formation is impossible because IDs are assigned
each period randomly, and this is common knowledge among workers and ﬁrms (denoted
GTBT_RI) and a treatment in which wages are completely rigid at w = 30 (denoted
GTBT_FIX).
Additional details regarding the design and theoretical predictions for GTBT_RI and
GTBT_FIX have been discussed in section 1.3. The chosen level of the ﬁxed wage at
w = 30 in GTBT_FIX is even higher than the overall average wage in GTBT, which
amounts to 26.1, with 31.1 in GT and 18.2 in BT-periods. Everything else was kept
exactly identical to treatment GTBT (including the outside option of workers and the
possibility to set desired eﬀort levels in GTBT_FIX). In the following, we will only com-
pare GTBT with GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX and disregard treatments FGT and FBT
in oder to allow for a more succinct comparison.30
In our main condition GTBT, engaging in a long-term relationship was a possibility for
both parties to retain the relational contract even in BT by relying on the past perfor-
mance of the trading partner. More precisely, if a ﬁrm contracted repeatedly in GT with
a worker who provided high levels of eﬀort, it could reasonably infer that the worker will
also abstain from shirking in BT through combining eﬃciency wages with the threat of
ﬁring. In GTBT_RI, ﬁrms can still pay eﬃciency wages but are deprived of the ﬁring
30We conducted sessions with six markets of GTBT_FIX and with eight markets of GTBT_RI. The
size of these markets were identical to the size of the markets in GTBT; the experimental instructions
were only marginally adapted from the original GTBT-instructions in order to account for the diﬀerent
institutional setting. They are available from the authors upon request.
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threat since they cannot identify workers. In a similar manner, workers cannot signal
their willingness to provide high levels of eﬀort in the future. So in the absence of repu-
tation mechanisms and thus the ability to form relational contracts, we expect outcomes
to be closer to the standard theoretical predictions from section 1.3.3. In GTBT_FIX,
ﬁrms can use the ﬁring threat to discipline workers, but are deprived of the signaling
content of their wage oﬀer. However, the fact that a worker receives an oﬀer can already
be interpreted as a kind signal. Hence, the comparison between GTBT_FIX and GTBT
allows us to disentangle the value of a kindness signal through wage oﬀers and through
an oﬀer in itself.
Figure 1.5: Employment Levels in GTBT, GTBT_RI, and GTBT_FIX
Figure 1.5 displays the employment level measured as the percentage of ﬁrms with a
contract in clusters of periods. Fixing the wage (GTBT_FIX condition) at a level of
w = 30 has surprisingly no detrimental eﬀect on employment since we observe close to
full employment across BT and GT periods. Indeed there are 446 out of 450 possible
contracts that have been concluded across all six markets. In GTBT_RI, however, we
document a signiﬁcant drop in employment in BT periods. Employment declines from
close to full employment in GT to levels of 78% and 64% in BT periods.31 Without repu-
31For GTBT_RI, Wilcoxon-signed-rank-tests with the number of contracts in clusters of periods as
employment criterion give p-values of 0.01, 0.02, 0.01 and 0.01 for the transitions between BT and GT.
The same test for treatment GTBT yields p-values clearly above 0.05.
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tation in GTBT_RI, productivity shocks have the expected eﬀects on wages and eﬀorts.
We observe lower wages in GTBT_RI than in our main condition GTBT, as can be seen
from the left panel of Figure 1.6. Firms are still oﬀering higher wages in GT-periods than
Figure 1.6: Average Wages and Eﬀorts in GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
in BT-periods. Since they have no information about the inclination towards reciprocity
of their worker in GTBT_RI anymore, ﬁrms especially reduce the number of risky high
wage oﬀers in GT-periods. Overall wage levels are consistently below the levels in GTBT;
particularly in GT-periods the wage gap between GTBT and GTBT_RI amounts to
more than 10 points (Mann-Whitney-U-test; p = 0.05). Eﬀort levels in GTBT_RI over-
all are signiﬁcantly lower than in GTBT (Mann-Whitney-U-test; p = 0.02,) and display
no unraveling of types at the end of the experiment through shirking workers. More in-
terestingly, average eﬀort levels are virtually ﬂat over BT- and GT-periods. As already
mentioned, in the absence of reputation mechanisms workers have no incentives to in-
vest in the relationship by providing high levels of eﬀort, and ﬁrms are less willing to
pay eﬃciency wages to motivate workers. Hence, the only rational reason why a worker
would provide more than minimal eﬀorts are other-regarding preferences like in Fehr and
Schmidt (1999), indicated by eﬀort levels that remain clearly above the minimum level
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throughout the whole experiment.
In treatment GTBT_FIX, eﬀort levels match the predictions from our stylized model of
inequity aversion with highly signiﬁcant increases in the BT periods 4 − 6 and 10 − 12
(Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p = 0.03). Figure 1.7 shows the density of eﬀorts in all
BT- and GT-periods separately, i.e., periods 1 − 3, 7 − 9 and 13 − 15, for GTBT and
GTBT_FIX. Comparing mean level of eﬀorts in GT, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the two treatments (5.0 against 5.1 overall eﬀort average, Mann-Whitney-U-test,
p = 0.75). In contrast, looking at the density functions we clearly reject the hypothesis
of identical distributions (Kolmogoroﬀ-Smirnov test, p < 0.01). Under ﬁxed wages close
Figure 1.7: Frequency of Eﬀort in all GT and BT Periods in GTBT and GTBT_FIX
to 80% of the eﬀort levels are between 4 and 7, and we observe only a couple of outliers.
Workers do not choose very high eﬀort levels, as the ﬁxed compensation is too low to in-
duce maximum levels of eﬀort. Moreover, the future value of employment in GTBT_FIX
can be higher than in GTBT, as receiving a wage of 30 in BT is very attractive. There-
fore, on average only 10% of workers shirk in GT in GTBT_FIX, compared to more
than 20% in GTBT. In BT under ﬂexible wages, a close to uniform distribution emerges
where workers provide 4.6 in average eﬀorts which is only slightly below their GT eﬀort
levels. When we ﬁx wages at 30, however, eﬀort levels increase to an average of 7.1 such
39The Fair-Employment Hypothesis
that the diﬀerence between the two treatments is largely signiﬁcant. Close to 80% of the
workers now provide eﬀort levels between 7 and 9. We again reject the hypothesis that
the distributions are the same (Kolmogoroﬀ-Smirnov test; p < 0.01).
The general shift to high levels of eﬀort in BT in treatment GTBT_FIX is a consequence
of the generous wage level of 30, compared to an average wage of slightly above 18 in
BT in treatment GTBT. Fixed wages at a level which is clearly above the wage that
emerges naturally in a comparable situation (in GTBT) are able to stabilize relationships
and to overcome some of the problems associated with ﬂuctuations. Hence, wage rigidity
does not necessarily have to have negative consequences. When we look at proﬁts in
BT periods, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ proﬁts are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between GTBT and
GTBT_FIX in BT periods (Mann-Whitney-U-test on BT market averages, p = 0.87), but
workers succeed in earning substantially more under ﬁxed wages (Mann-Whitney-U-test,
p = 0.004). In other words, in our experiment ﬁxing the wage is eﬃciency-enhancing.
Our descriptive overview of the results is conﬁrmed in a series of panel regressions on
the eﬀort level in Table 1.7 that take only the treatments with productivity shocks into
account. Wage, contracts based on private oﬀers, and the tenure of a relationship increase
eﬀort levels in all treatments, as expected, with one exception: the important eﬀect of
the reputation mechanism is outlined by the negative coeﬃcient on a private oﬀer in
GTBT_RI across all speciﬁcations. Both coeﬃcients jointly are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero (p = 0.29 and p = 0.39 in regressions (7) and (8)), indicating that the positive
eﬀect from private oﬀers is eradicated by the impossibility to build up a relational con-
tract. The increase in provided eﬀort levels in the BT-periods, everything else equal, is
signiﬁcantly higher in treatment GTBT_FIX than in treatment GTBT. Note that with
the inclusion of the interaction terms, the treatment dummies become insigniﬁcant, i.e.,
the positive (negative) eﬀect on eﬀorts in the three treatments is entirely captured by the
BT-dummy and the interaction with the respective treatments. Comparing GTBT and
GTBT_RI in BT-periods shows that the impact of the wage on eﬀort in GTBT_RI is not
lower than in GTBT when controlling for the reputation eﬀect. So even in the absence
of reputation mechanisms, subjects show concern for the situation of their employer by
exerting higher eﬀorts for the same wage in BT-periods. The ﬁxed eﬀect regressions (9)
and (10) conﬁrm the above ﬁndings.
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Table 1.7: Panel Regressions on Eﬀort in GTBT, GTBT_FIX, and GTBT_RI
Dep. Var. Random Eﬀects Fixed Eﬀects





Wage 0.121*** 0.130*** 0.104*** 0.116***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Private 0.878*** 0.856*** 0.693*** 0.717***
(0.138) (0.147) (0.223) (0.212)
Tenure 0.163*** 0.152*** 0.159*** 0.151***
(0.037) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033)
Wage*GTBT_RI 0.021* 0.012 0.029*** 0.018*
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Private*GTBT_FIX -0.245 -0.230 -0.250 -0.280
(0.240) (0.203) (0.296) (0.283)
Private*GTBT_RI -0.713*** -0.702*** -0.583** -0.607**




× GTBT_FIX-dummy (0.298) (0.238)
BT-dummy -0.590 -0.474**
× GTBT_RI-dummy (0.396) (0.241)
Period 0.402*** 0.201*** 0.395*** 0.213***
(0.078) (0.055) (0.046) (0.047)
Period
2 -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.014***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.134 -0.190 0.213 0.143
(0.230) (0.162) (0.164) (0.196)
N 1398 1398 1398 1398
(Pseudo)R2 0.64 0.67 0.59 0.66
Panel random eﬀects (RE) and ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) regressions on the level of eﬀort in GTBT, GTBT_FIX,
and GTBT_RI. Standard errors are given in brackets, clustering on the market level. *** indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 10 % level, respectively.
Result 1.6 Rigid wages do not have a detrimental eﬀect on employment. They signif-
icantly increase eﬀort levels in BT-periods. In GTBT_RI, employment levels and ef-
fort levels decrease signiﬁcantly compared to GTBT. The employment eﬀect is exclusively
driven by BT-periods.
We next look at the level of reciprocity, again deﬁned as the slope of the wage-eﬀort
relationship. Comparing GTBT and GTBT_FIX in the wage bracket 20-30, we ﬁnd
identical levels of ”reciprocity“ despite the fact that the level of the wage itself does not
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convey any intention to the worker (see Figure 1.8). There are three possible explanations
for this ﬁnding: (i) the threat of unemployment after exerting low levels of eﬀort drives
eﬀort levels up; (ii) social preferences are rather outcome-based than intention-based; if
we, however, assume that at least part of other-regarding concerns are driven by intentions,
then explanation (iii) stipulates that the mere fact of receiving an oﬀer is interpreted as a
kind act and reciprocated by workers. The threat of unemployment must be weak, given
that workers choose eﬀort levels which secure themselves the bigger share of the surplus.
Nevertheless they still leave, on average, part of the surplus on the table for ﬁrms. Our
results tentatively suggest that the behavior of the participants in the experiments can
be rationalized rather by outcome-based preferences like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) over
the split of the surplus than by traditional intention-based models acting purely between
wage and eﬀort levels within a period.
Figure 1.8: Reciprocity in GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
From ﬁgure 1.8, reciprocity is found to be higher in GTBT than in GTBT_RI, especially
in BT where the reputation mechanism ensures that workers exert higher amounts of
eﬀort for the same wage bracket. In GT-periods, GTBT and GTBT_RI do not display
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the level of reciprocity. This yields further evidence for the
particular importance reputation mechanisms play in BT-periods where they succeed in
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generating higher levels of reciprocity compared to GTBT_RI.
Result 1.7 Levels of reciprocity are identical in GTBT and GTBT_FIX. Especially in
BT periods, the absence of the reputation mechanism reduces reciprocity in GTBT_RI
compared to GTBT.
Wages and eﬀort levels directly lead to employers’ and workers’ proﬁts which are pre-
sented in Table A1.3 in appendix A1.4. Not surprisingly, GTBT_FIX realizes the highest
possible surplus. As already mentioned, it seems eﬃciency-maximizing in our environ-
ment with incomplete contracts and productivity instability to ﬁx wages, at least within
a certain range of wage levels. The absence of a reputation mechanism in GTBT_RI
harms eﬃciency, particularly in BT-periods which we show in detail in appendix A1.4.
The split of the surplus is almost identical between GTBT, GTBT_FIX and GTBT_RI
over time.
Concerning the contract nature, we ﬁnd that bilateralization of contracts is more pro-
nounced in GTBT_FIX than in GTBT. 73% of all contracts have been concluded on the
basis of a private oﬀer in contrast to only 52% in GTBT, which is indicative of stronger
relational contracts in GTBT_FIX also explaining high eﬀort levels especially in BT.
1.4.3 Driving Forces behind the Stability of Reciprocity with
Productivity Shocks
In this section, we study the micro-mechanisms that explain the stability of employment
that we observe on our experimental labor markets. At the heart of the fair employment
hypothesis is the idea of dynamic reciprocity between ﬁrms and workers that goes beyond
the static relationship between wages and eﬀort within the same period. We ﬁrst analyze
outcomes focusing of worker behavior, before adapting the ﬁrm’s point of view. From
our analysis above, we know that workers provide signiﬁcantly more eﬀort, controlling for
the wage in BT than in GT, on average. We further qualify this ﬁnding in this section
by taking a closer look at worker and ﬁrm behavior in BT-periods and at the transition
between GT- and BT-periods. The analysis is restricted to the GTBT treatment in a ﬁrst
step, before we add ﬁndings from GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX.
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Micro-Mechanisms in Treatment GTBT
In GTBT, the focus of our analysis is on the changes in behavior between periods 3 and
4 as well as 9 and 10, i.e., between the last period of the GT-phase and the ﬁrst period
of three consecutive BT-periods. If the fair employment hypothesis holds, the extent
to which a worker adapts his eﬀort choice in the ﬁrst BT-period compared to the last
period of GT will depend on the contracting outcomes in the previous periods in GT.
We therefore are interested in relating the eﬀort gap of a worker between periods 3 and
4 as well as 9 and 10 to outcomes in periods 3 (respectively, 1-3) and 9 (respectively,
7-9). As a measure of outcome, we refer to the wage-eﬀort relation (i.e., (average) wage
Figure 1.9: Eﬀort Gap (BT-GT) and Past Wage-Eﬀort Relation in GT for GTBT
over (average) eﬀort) that prevailed in the previous period (on average, in the previous
three periods) for the worker. In all six markets, we have 46 instances where a worker
is employed in both periods adjacent to a shift from GT to BT. Figure 1.9 displays a
scatterplot between these two variables which shows a positive relationship where the
eﬀort gap, displayed on the ordinate, is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in eﬀort between period
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4 (10) and 3 (9) accordingly.32
The higher the wage a worker earned in the last three GT-periods for a given level of
eﬀort, the lower is the extent to which he cuts down his eﬀort in the ﬁrst BT-period if
at all. Reciprocity hence acts in a dynamic manner between GT and BT, and it is able
to sustain high eﬀort levels in BT. We conﬁrm this ﬁnding in a series of regressions (see
Table 1.8) that explain the eﬀort gap, where we also include the wage gap between BT-
and GT-periods that naturally explains a substantial part of the eﬀort gap. In all three
speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd the same signiﬁcant relation between the past wage-eﬀort relation
and the eﬀort gap when entering the BT-periods. As one would expect, tenure at the ﬁrm
Table 1.8: OLS Regression on Eﬀort Gap between GT- and BT-periods in GTBT
Dep. Var.
∆ Eﬀort: et − et−1 (11) (12) (13)
∆ Wage: wt − wt−1 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.118***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
Tenure 0.232** 0.294** 0.251**
(0.069) (0.075) (0.079)
Wage-eﬀort relation in last three GT periods 0.144** 0.136**
(0.049) (0.049)
Proposed surplus to the worker 0.304
(0.404)
Proposed surplus to the worker t−1 1.066
(1.374)
Constant -0.071 -1.108** -2.381**
(0.346) (0.421) (0.442)
N 46 46 46
R2 0.56 0.66 0.67
OLS regressions on the eﬀort gap between GT- and BT-periods in GTBT within the same ﬁrm, i.e.,
periods 4 and 10. Standard errors clustered on the market level are given in brackets. *** indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 10 % level, respectively.
also has a positive impact, underlining the importance of relational contracts in coping
with the negative productivity shock. Another possible driving force of eﬀort choices
could be the proposed surplus to the worker through the desired eﬀort level. We compute
the proposed share of the total surplus that accrues to the worker in the ﬁrst BT- and
the last GT-period on the basis of the desired eﬀort level from the ﬁrm’s contract oﬀer
that was accepted. It turns out, however, that the variable has no eﬀect on the eﬀort gap
32We drop four outliers ((wage-eﬀort relation/eﬀort gap): (40/1), (15/1), (15/2), (12/-2)) from the
graph for reasons of succinct presentation, but naturally include them in the regressions. The results are
unaﬀected by the inclusion or the exclusion.
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between BT and GT.33
Pertaining to ﬁrm behavior, employers cut wages considerably when the market enters a
BT-period. We take a closer look at the 57 instances in which a ﬁrm participated in the
market in periods 3 and 4 as well as 9 and 10. We distinguish between those in which the
ﬁrm-worker pairing is identical in the last GT-period and the ﬁrst BT period (17 cases)
and those in which ﬁrms employ a diﬀerent worker in the periods adjacent to a regime-
switch from GT to BT (40 cases). The estimated distribution of the wage gap between
periods 3 and 4 as well as 9 and 10 separately for these two categories is given in Figure
1.10. We observe a clear diﬀerence between the distributions, where ﬁrms reduce the wage
Figure 1.10: Kernel Estimates for Distribution of the Wage Gap between BT- and GT-
periods
by a higher amount in ﬁrm-worker pairs that stay together than otherwise. The diﬀerence
between the two distributions is highly signiﬁcant (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, p = 0.02).
There is evidence that when ﬁrms interact with the same worker within the same relational
contract, they can aﬀord to pay lower wages than when they want or have to hire a new
worker (from the market) for the ﬁrst BT-period. Workers in an existing relationship
33We conduct the same analysis by comparing the wage gaps and eﬀort gaps when taking the average
values (wages, eﬀorts, wage-eﬀort relation and suggested surplus sharing) per worker across the entire
three GT- and BT-periods, respectively. We obtain qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results.
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hence accept lower wages than new workers who have to be motivated through stronger
wage incentives, because for new matches of ﬁrms and workers, relational capital still has
to be accumulated. Since the eﬀort distributions do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov-test, p = 0.19) between relationships that persist over a change from GT to BT
and those who do not, we observe a lower wage-eﬀort relation in long-term ﬁrm-worker
relationships in BT-periods. Firms in BT pay lower wages for the same levels of eﬀort in
relationships with the same interaction partner than with a diﬀerent interaction partner.
We interpret these results as evidence for an increased degree of wage ﬂexibility inside
the ﬁrm through relational contracts in the presence of productivity shocks. The labor
market outside the ﬁrm for new hires is comparatively less aﬀected when the economy
goes from GT- to BT-periods.
In order to explain the driving forces behind the level of the wage-eﬀort relationship that
we observe in Figure 1.9, we construct a dummy variable that takes on the value one
when the contract partners are identical in periods t and t + 1 and the contract was
concluded on the basis of a private wage oﬀer.34 When we consider all 15 periods in
Table 1.9: Panel Regressions on the Wage-Eﬀort Relation in GTBT
Dep. Var.
Wage-eﬀort relation (14) (15)










Random eﬀects panel regressions on the wage-eﬀort relation in every period in GTBT. Standard errors
clustered on the market level are given in brackets. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the
5 % and * at the 10 % level, respectively.
GTBT, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative impact by roughly one point on the wage-eﬀort
relation in renewed contracts. That is to say that in these interactions the ”price“ of eﬀort
that ﬁrms need to pay workers for a given level of eﬀort is on average one point lower
34This is to exclude contracts where interaction partners met a second consecutive time over the
market.
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than in newly established ﬁrm-worker relationships. Adding a dummy for the BT-periods
and an interaction term, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is driven by the BT-periods in general
and, even more so, strengthened in the contracts that are renewed with a private oﬀer
in BT. Relational contracts hence allow ﬁrms to ”buy“ eﬀort at a lower price from the
existing workforce than on the market through new hires in BT-periods. This lends further
support to our general hypothesis that dynamic forms of reciprocity shape labor market
outcomes in the presence of productivity shocks by acting as a crucial element to sustain
comparatively high levels of eﬀorts in BT-periods, particularly in existing ﬁrm-worker
relationships.
Result 1.8 The stability of the labor market in BT-periods crucially depends on the pres-
ence of inter-temporal mechanisms of reciprocity in GTBT. Relationships that persist over
the transition from GT- to BT-periods are characterized by a higher degree of ﬂexibility
than those concluded on the market.
Eﬀects in Treatments GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
As a next step, we want to analyze the eﬀectiveness of the mechanisms outlined above
when reputation mechanisms are absent, in GTBT_RI. Unlike in GTBT, we ﬁnd no
relation between the eﬀort gap between GT- and BT-periods and the wage-eﬀort relation
in the last three GT-periods. The slope of the ﬁtted line as in Figure 1.9 is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Furthermore, when we conduct the same regressions as in GTBT for
the data from treatment GTBT_RI – these regressions can now be viewed as placebo
regressions – we unsurprisingly ﬁnd insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the wage-eﬀort relation
in the past three GT-periods on the eﬀort gap between GT and BT. So if reputation
mechanisms are absent, the inter-temporal eﬀect of reciprocity cannot show up. Obviously,
in GTBT_RI ﬁrms cannot apply diﬀerent wage schemes to existing workers and to new
hires.
When wages are ﬁxed in GTBT_FIX, we again cannot document any inter-temporal
eﬀects of the wage-eﬀort relation in the three GT-periods on the eﬀort gap of workers in
BT-periods. Similar regressions as above for GTBT yield insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients for the
past wage-eﬀort relation. In the absence of incentives through wage oﬀers by ﬁrms, the
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predominant mechanism that guarantees high eﬀort levels in BT-periods in GTBT_FIX
almost exclusively arises from the motivations to share the surplus between ﬁrms and
workers. The surplus sharing norm also governs behavior in GTBT, but is enriched by
the dynamic elements of reciprocity outlined above. These mechanisms are absent in
GTBT_FIX where ﬁrms only can act on employment and not on wages. The fact that
there are other mechanisms at work in treatment GTBT_FIX is an indication that inter-
temporal reciprocity is induced by ﬁrms through their contract oﬀers and not by workers
through eﬀort signals in the last GT-period before the ﬁrst BT-period. However, workers
understand the restrictions for ﬁrms in treatment GTBT_FIX and increase eﬀort levels
nevertheless, which leads to the reported high levels of eﬃciency under ﬁxed wages.
Result 1.9 The absence of reputation mechanisms in GTBT_RI makes inter-temporal
relationships and incentives impossible. Under ﬁxed wages (GTBT_FIX) the norm of
surplus sharing overcomes the lack of signaling through the wage oﬀer, and it promotes
high levels of eﬃciency.
1.4.4 Discussion
Our experiments revealed several remarkable features of markets with incomplete con-
tracts that experience productivity shocks. First, markets are extremely stable in terms
of employment despite the productivity shocks and despite the prediction of full unem-
ployment based on standard assumptions. Wages of workers go down considerably, but
eﬀort levels fall only slightly, on average, when productivity plummets. There are small
eﬀects of productivity shocks on the functioning of the markets such as shorter average
ﬁrm-worker relationships and slightly lower wages and eﬀort levels than in the control
conditions, but the eﬀects are much less severe than predicted by the standard model.
Two main features of our design – entirely ﬂexible wages and the possibility to build up
reputation over time – could be the driving force behind the stability of the markets. Im-
plementing two control treatments that systematically drop these features in the design
allows us to conclude that it is deﬁnitely not the wage ﬂexibility that is responsible for
the functioning of the markets. Fixing the wage in the contract oﬀer on a comparably
high level does neither lead to higher levels of unemployment, nor does it create any
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other frictions. On the contrary, it leads to even higher levels of eﬃciency on the market
through higher levels of eﬀort provided than in our main treatment. Wage rigidity should,
therefore, not be viewed as negative per se; on markets with incomplete contracts and
instability of productivity or proﬁts, it could even be beneﬁcial for certain ranges of wage
levels.
In contrast to wage rigidity, taking away the possibility to form relational contracts over
time makes it harder for ﬁrms and workers to overcome the negative eﬀects of productivity
shocks on the markets. Even though unemployment is still by far lower than predicted
by the standard model, it is signiﬁcantly higher than in all other conditions that we have
analyzed. The negative eﬀect becomes particularly apparent in phases with low produc-
tivity. Furthermore, eﬃciency is lowest in the treatment without reputation formation.
One interesting ﬁnding from our analysis is that workers exert more eﬀort in phases of
low productivity than in phases of high productivity per unit of wage. Remarkably, eﬀort
levels are highest in our control treatment with constant low productivity. Such a behav-
ior is completely in line with models of other-regarding preferences, but it is obviously not
eﬃciency-maximizing. From an eﬃciency perspective it would be optimal to shift eﬀort
provision to high productivity phases. Apparently, relational contracts are not strong or
stable enough to allow for such an intertemporal rationale.
Nevertheless, there are important intertemporal aspects in our data that are able to ex-
plain the well-functioning of the market with productivity shocks. First, relational capital
that is accumulated through reciprocal behavior between ﬁrms and workers over time al-
lows for a smoother transition from GT to BT. Indeed, ﬁrms are able to pay lower wages
to workers in the ﬁrst period of the BT-phase that have already been employed in GT.
Hence, relational contracts seem to allow for a higher degree of wage ﬂexibility within
the ﬁrm compared to the market outside the ﬁrm. Second, while there is no rigorous test
available because of the endogeneity inherent to the interaction, our result indicates that
(i) the mere fact of receiving a (private) oﬀer is already considered to be a kind signal
that is reciprocated by many workers, and (ii) that it is not the workers who are initiating
the sustaining of the relationship in the transition from GT to BT through signaling with
high levels of eﬀort, but the ﬁrms who keep on making attractive oﬀers when entering
BT. Third, we ﬁnd supporting evidence for intertemporal reciprocity over regime switches
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from GT- to BT-periods by looking at the relationship between the wage-eﬀort ratio and
the eﬀort response in the transition. Highly reciprocal relationships during GT display
smaller decreases or even increases in eﬀort levels from the last GT-period to the ﬁrst
BT-period. Hence, it is safe to conclude that workers take intertemporal considerations
into account, but they usually react on contract oﬀers and do not signal intentions in the
last GT-period.
The experimental evidence that we obtained so far appears not fully consistent with the
results by Bewley (1999) based on interviews of executives about their wage and employ-
ment policy during the 1991-recession. Bewley (1999) stresses the importance of ”morale“
to keep workers’ propensity to exert costly eﬀort high, especially during recessions. For
this reason, he concludes that executives consider a wage cut to be a severe hazard to a
worker’s morale and thus refrain from cutting wages during a recession, but rather lay
the least productive workers oﬀ ”to get the problem out of the door all at once“ when
productivity of eﬀort is low.
In our setup so far, we restricted ﬁrms to hire a maximum of one worker such that it is not
possible to disentangle these two motives of ﬁrms from each other. If ﬁrms are able to hire
more than one worker and when workers are diﬀerently productive, they obviously have
two ways of reacting to a productivity shock: reducing wages of the existing workforce or
cutting employment through lay-oﬀs. In order to investigate Bewley’s main hypothesis in
our setup and to assess the wage policy of ﬁrms vis-á-vis its employment policy when hit
by productivity shocks, we extend our setup to ﬁrms that can hire up to two workers.
1.5 Good Times and Bad Times in a Multi-Worker
Firm
1.5.1 Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions
The experimental design in this section strongly parallels the design from section 1.3 in
many aspects. In our main treatment with multiple workers (denoted GTBT2 henceforth),
ﬁrms and workers again interact over 15 periods. In each of the 15 trading phases ﬁrms
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can post binding public or private wage oﬀers that can be accepted by workers who choose
non-enforceable eﬀorts after accepting an oﬀer. As the major diﬀerence, ﬁrms are now
allowed to hire up to two workers per period, but workers could still only accept at most
one contract.35 Each market consisted of 11 subjects, with 3 ﬁrms and 8 workers such
that the competitive pressure with two workers in excess supply was identical to the one-
worker setting introduced above. In all treatments, ﬁrms were exposed to the same cyclical
pattern in productivity as in our GTBT treatment from above. The eﬀort costs of workers
were again given by Table 1.1 such that incentives for workers were unchanged.36 As in
Altmann et al. (2009), a ﬁrm’s production technology is now characterized by decreasing
returns to scale while being subject to the same productivity shocks in BT-periods that
we introduced earlier. The material payoﬀ of a ﬁrm during GT (i.e., periods 1-3, 7-9 and
13-15) is given by:
πf =

       
       
8 · (e1 + e2) − w1 − w2 if two contracts were concluded
10 · e1 − w1 if one contract was concluded
0 otherwise
In BT-periods (i.e., periods 4-6 and 10-12), a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given by:
πf =

       
       
4 · (e1 + e2) − w1 − w2 if two contracts were concluded
5 · e1 − w1 if one contract was concluded
0 otherwise
Note that if a ﬁrm hires only one worker, her material payoﬀ is identical to the situation
in the one-worker setting. In addition to that, the ﬁrm is now able to hire a second worker
at a lower marginal productivity than her ﬁrst worker yields.37 Full eﬀort of e = 10 is
35Since ﬁrms could not withdraw wage oﬀers, all outstanding oﬀers from one ﬁrm were automatically
deleted upon acceptance of one contract by a worker (see Altmann et al. (2009)). If a ﬁrm wanted to hire
a second worker, she could again post new oﬀers that could be then accepted by all remaining workers
that were without contract at this time. We implemented this feature to guarantee that if employers
wanted to employ only one worker but entered multiple oﬀers for the ﬁrst hire, they did not end up with
two workers unintentionally.
36Remember that workers obtain an unemployment beneﬁt of 6 if they are not employed in a given
period. This feature of the market is also retained.
37It is important to underline that in our speciﬁcation of ﬁrm proﬁts only the eﬀort sum is relevant. It
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always eﬃcient with this speciﬁcation, regardless of the condition of the economy since
the second worker’s marginal productivity per unit of eﬀort lies at 3 in BT and thus
never exceeds his marginal cost of eﬀort that lies between 1 and 3. All parameters were
made common knowledge in the instructions for our experimental participants. After the
eﬀort choice, participants were only shown the payoﬀs that resulted from their trade with
their contracting partner, i.e., workers only learned the proﬁt the ﬁrm was making with
them and whether the ﬁrm had hired a second worker in the given period, but not any
payoﬀs to the ﬁrm or another worker resulting from a possible second contract in the
same period. This was done to prevent confounding eﬀects of social comparison between
workers (Abeler et al., 2010; Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Gächter et al., 2010) and, hence,
to be able to focus on the incentive eﬀects from the productivity shocks.
In addition to treatment GTBT2 where wages were set by employers, we conducted a
second multi-worker treatment in which, in a similar manner as in the single-worker
setting, we exogenously ﬁxed the wage oﬀers at a level of 30, thereby eliminating all
signaling content in the wage oﬀer (denoted GTBT2_FIX henceforth). Our setup allows
us to analyze the diﬀerences in behavior between single-worker and multi-worker ﬁrms
with productivity shocks under exogenous wage rigidities. We conducted the experiments
in the MELESSA laboratory of the University of Munich in 2009. We implemented six
markets of each treatment, such that in total 132 subjects took part in the experiment
where they earned 27.8 €, on average, for sessions that lasted less than two hours. No
subject that had already taken part in the one-worker experiments took part in the two-
worker experiments.
Theoretical predictions for the two treatments are straightforward and very similar to the
ones derived for our main treatments. Under ”standard“ assumptions, it is optimal for
proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms to oﬀer wages of 6 when productivity is high since selﬁsh and
rational workers cannot be forced to exert higher than minimal eﬀort levels. The ﬁrm
is indiﬀerent to hire a second worker at minimal eﬀorts as this leaves her proﬁt level
unchanged.38 If the productivity level is low in BT, a ﬁrm cannot make any oﬀer that
does not make a diﬀerence which worker provided what level of eﬀort when calculating ﬁnal ﬁrm proﬁts.
Distinguishing between the workers or assigning worker productivity types would have complicated the
experiment considerably without adding much additional insight.
38If a ﬁrm hires one worker at a wage of 6, she makes πf = 10 · 1 − 6 = 4; with two workers exerting
minimal eﬀort she earns πf = 8 · (1 + 1) − 6 − 6 = 4.
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guarantees at least zero proﬁts, neither when she hires one worker (πf = 5 · 1 − 6 = −1),
nor when she employs two workers (πf = 4·(1+1)−6−6 = −4) such that the theoretical
prediction is full unemployment in BT. In treatment GTBT2_FIX with a ﬁxed wage of 30,
ﬁrms cannot make any oﬀers that leave them with non-negative payoﬀs when workers exert
minimal eﬀort levels. Regardless of the productivity level, full unemployment prevails with
money-maximizing workers with a wage of 30.
Similar to the results from the one-worker setting, if there are enough fair-minded workers
in the population, ﬁrms pay high wages and workers reciprocate by exerting high levels of
eﬀort, where the threat of ending the relationship makes it proﬁtable for both parties to
adhere to these strategies. We determine optimal behavior in the presence of non-selﬁsh
workers in appendix A1.1 in the same way as we did for the single worker case to ﬁnd
critical values γ∗ of the fraction of non-selﬁsh workers to sustain an eﬃcient equilibrium
with either one or two workers. One complicating issue in the context of two-worker ﬁrms
is the deﬁnition of the reference group: equilibrium cut-oﬀ levels of γ depend on whether
the worker compares his proﬁt only with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt or also with the other worker’s
proﬁt. Since we give no information about payoﬀs from a potential co-worker to workers,
we consider the ﬁrst scenario a more reasonable benchmark for our setup. The cut-oﬀ
levels for sustaining fairness equilibria become slightly more demanding in the two-worker
case than in the one-worker case. Details can be found in appendix A1.1. We expect that




We begin by comparing the one-worker setting and the two-worker setting with respect to
employment.39 Table 1.10 reveals that employment levels are lower in treatment GTBT2
than in treatment GTBT (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.01). The diﬀerence is almost
identical in GT and in BT. It seems that ﬁrms are deliberately rationing jobs, even
39We again refer to a situation as having ”full employment“ when all ﬁrms have hired the maximum
number of workers allowed, i.e., 5 workers per market in the single-worker setting and 6 in the two-worker
setting.
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Table 1.10: Employment Levels for GTBT, GTBT_FIX, GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX.
treatment Overall GT BT
Employment Employment Employment
GTBT 95.5 % 98.2 % 91.7 %
GTBT_FIX 99.1 % 98.5 % 100 %
GTBT2 81.5 % 84.9 % 76.4 %
GTBT2_FIX 75.4 % 84.9 % 61.1 %
though average levels of unemployment in treatment GTBT2 are again signiﬁcantly below
the predicted levels based on standard assumptions. The negative employment eﬀect is
ampliﬁed in treatment GTBT2_FIX, which is mainly caused by BT-periods where most
ﬁrms ration employment to one worker. An employment level of more than 61% is of
course still far above the theoretical prediction of full unemployment. Figure 1.11 depicts
the pattern of employment policy of ﬁrms over time.
Figure 1.11: Employment Strategies over Time
Percentage of employers that hire no worker, one worker or two workers in GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX
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Result 1.10 When the production technology is characterized by decreasing returns to
scale and ﬁrms can employ more than one worker, BT-periods show lower levels of em-
ployment. This eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the presence of wage rigidities, but the level of
employment is still much higher than the theoretical prediction under standard assump-
tions.
At ﬁrst sight, the results from the ﬂexible wage treatment lend partial support to the
hypothesis of Bewley (1999) that ﬁrms prefer to get the least productive worker out of
the door in BT rather than suﬀering from the negative incentive eﬀects when cutting their
wages. In order to get a comprehensive picture of the actual policy that multi-worker ﬁrms
implement in BT, we next turn to the analysis of wages and eﬀorts.
Eﬀort Levels and Wage Setting Behavior
Under ﬂexible wages, we conﬁrm our ﬁndings from GTBT and observe an almost identical
wage pattern as in Figure 1.2 based on the single-worker setting (Mann-Whitney-U-test,
p = 0.52), see Figure A1.10 in appendix A1.6.40 Firms cut wages by 31% and 40%,
respectively, when the productivity shock occurs such that we can refute the hypothesis
that ﬁrms only act on the employment in BT, leaving wages unaﬀected. Apparently,
ﬁrms use a mixture policy by reducing employment and cutting wages after a productivity
shock, with a stronger tendency to cut wages.
OLS regressions, given in Table 1.11, ﬁnd robust positive relationships between the level
of eﬀort and the wage levels, private contracts and a quadratic time trend.41 Comparing
the two treatments indicates that also in the two-worker setting, BT elicit additional eﬀort
provision. Controlling for the wage, productivity shocks increase eﬀort levels by about one
point. However, there is no additional eﬀort from the interaction term of a productivity
shock and the ﬁxed-wage treatment, indicating that workers do not provide signiﬁcantly
higher eﬀort in BT for a given wage level. Interestingly, workers exert slightly lower levels
40If not otherwise indicated, we consider every contract separately rather than aggregating over ﬁrms,
i.e., if a ﬁrms hires two workers in one period, it concludes two contracts. See Figure A1.9 in appendix
A1.6 for average wages and eﬀorts in the multiple-worker treatments and Figure A1.10 also for an eﬀort
comparison between the single- and the multiple-worker setting.
41We also run tobit regressions which yield very similar results.
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OLS regression on eﬀort for GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX. Standard errors are given in brackets, clustering
on the market level. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 10 % level,
respectively.
of eﬀort if their contract is the second contract to an employer in a given period, although
they can only infer this from a later time of acceptance. This could reﬂect the response
of a worker when he is discouraged by the fact that he correctly believes not to be the
number-one worker of a given ﬁrm.
Workers were only informed about their own payoﬀ but not about the payoﬀ of a potential
co-worker at the same ﬁrm. We therefore expect no diﬀerence in average eﬀort levels
compared to the single-worker setting, like we did not obtain any diﬀerences in wages
either. This is conﬁrmed for the treatments with ﬂexible wages (Mann-Whitney-U-test,
p = 0.26), but not for the treatment with ﬁxed wages (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.02). A
possible explanation for the diﬀerence with ﬁxed wages could be latent worker competition
given the attractiveness of an employment with a guaranteed wage of 30, with eﬀort levels
being slightly higher in GTBT2_FIX than in GTBT_FIX.
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Table 1.12: Panel Regression on Firm Proﬁts
GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX, RE
(18) (19)
Average wage -0.174 -1.541***
(0.111) (0.077)



















Random eﬀects panel estimation on ﬁrm proﬁts. Standard errors are given in brackets, clustering on the
market level. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % and * at the 10 % level respectively.
In order to assess the proﬁtability of the hiring strategy of ﬁrms, we take a closer look
at the determinants of their proﬁts. We therefore aggregate ﬁrm behavior in one period
into one observation by calculating average eﬀorts and wages in case a ﬁrm hired two
workers. Table 1.12 with panel regressions conﬁrms our hypothesis that it has indeed
a negative impact on total ﬁrm proﬁts per period when ﬁrms hire two workers in BT.
Not surprisingly, ﬁrms suﬀer considerably from the productivity shock in terms of proﬁts,
especially when ﬁrms are forced to pay a wage of 30. In contrast, proﬁts are signiﬁcantly
higher for two-worker ﬁrms in GT.
Result 1.11 Under ﬂexible wages and multiple-workers, ﬁrms combine both wage cuts
and a reduction in workforce to overcome productivity shocks, but workers do not with-
draw eﬀort provision accordingly. In the absence of wage ﬂexibility, we observe ﬁrms to
substitute wage cuts with a more restrictive hiring policy.
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1.5.3 Discussion
In our experimental labor markets, we are not able to unambiguously conﬁrm the argu-
ment Bewley (1999) has brought forward to explain wage rigidities. Workers accept wage
cuts without reducing eﬀorts accordingly such that it is the best strategy for ﬁrms to
reduce wages when they experience a productivity shock. The fairness norms of workers
in our experimental labor markets are not governed by the nominal levels of their wages,
but rather by the share of the surplus between them and their employer. Figure A1.11
in appendix A1.6 illustrates that although this share varies from 40 % to 70 % between
GT and BT, the share from the treatments GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX track each other
surprisingly well and are also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the surplus split in the one-
worker setting in Figure A1.1. Pertaining to overall market eﬃciency, the positive eﬀect of
exogenous wage rigidity on eﬀort levels in the single-worker setting (GTBT_FIX) is coun-
terbalanced by the negative employment eﬀect in the two-worker setting (GTBT2_FIX)
in BT. Taking both eﬀects together, markets in GTBT_FIX realize 78% of the possible
surplus in bad times, whereas GTBT2_FIX markets attain eﬃciency levels of only 66%.
The negative employment eﬀect more than oﬀsets the positive eﬀect from higher eﬀorts in
BT in terms of eﬃciency. The corresponding levels for GTBT and GTBT2 are 49 % and
57 % which indicates that ﬁxing the wage in our setup generally increases eﬃciency. The
increase is more pronounced for the single-worker treatments, where ﬁrms cannot adapt
employment levels other than not hiring a worker at all.
At this point, we can only speculate about the reasons why we are not able to reproduce
the hiring policies put forward by Bewley (1999) under ﬂexible wages in the presence of
a ”recession“. One aspect is possibly related to the diﬃculties to reproduce the notion of
”morale“ from real world labor markets in the laboratory without real eﬀort tasks.42 The
results from the two-worker setting show, however, that ﬁrms readily act on both - wage
and employment levels - when being hit by a productivity shock depending on the level of
wage rigidity prevalent in the market. In general, a static interpretation of only wages and
eﬀorts in the spirit of the fair-wage hypothesis falls short of capturing important aspects
of reciprocity between workers and ﬁrms when labor markets are prone to ﬂuctuations.
42We did not frame our experiments as labor markets either, but rather as neutral goods markets
thereby also removing framing eﬀects from a labor market setting.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we extend the fair wage-eﬀort hypothesis to a setup where ﬁrms are facing
productivity shocks on labor markets with non-enforceable but observable eﬀort. Workers
build up a reputation such that ﬁrms and workers engage in long-term relationships in
which ﬁrms cut wages considerably in BT and workers only reduce eﬀorts marginally.
As a consequence, under ﬂexible wages new wage-eﬀort relationships arise endogenously
in BT as workers do not withdraw eﬀort accordingly when their wage falls. The disci-
plining threat of not employing a worker is virtually never carried out by ﬁrms as we
observe close to full employment in all our treatments. When we restrict oﬀered wages
to be constant over time, thereby eliminating wage cuts in BT, eﬀort levels increase sig-
niﬁcantly compared to GT, without aﬀecting the employment level at all but increasing
eﬃciency. Removing reputational mechanisms, however, has harmful eﬀects for both the
employment level and the achieved market eﬃciency particularly in BT. Our results lend
support to what we call the ”fair employment hypothesis“, i.e., the fact that reciprocity
prevails not only between wage levels and exerted eﬀort in a static way, but even more
so in a dynamic manner between ﬁrm’s actual employment decision and eﬀorts over GT
and BT. We provide evidence for this hypothesis in the form of intertemporal elements of
reciprocity at the micro level between ﬁrms and workers when markets enter times of low
productivity. Relational contracts help to increase ﬂexibility for the labor market inside
the ﬁrm, compared to the outside market. We furthermore show in a multiple-worker
treatment that ﬁrms substitute changes in the wage level by an adaptation of their em-
ployment level to adjust a productivity shock if there is no wage ﬂexibility.
Relating our ﬁndings to real-world indicators in the spirit of our stylized model with
non-selﬁsh workers, it is somewhat unclear to what precisely workers compare their wage
to, as ﬁrm’s overall proﬁts may yield a very noisy indicator. This notwithstanding and
as a response to low ﬁrm productivity, increasing individual eﬀort under downward rigid
wages on real labor markets in bad economic conditions is consistent with our experi-
mental evidence, which keeps the unemployment rate low as the recent economic crisis
demonstrated. After all, it is not too diﬃcult for workers to obtain good signals on the
current situation of their ﬁrm. Furthermore, our results raise the question if wages are
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really as downward rigid as the economic literature has been underlining or if real wages
are subject to (minor) downward adaptations dependent on the situation of the economy.
Our ﬁndings show that intertemporal considerations between ﬁrms and workers play an
important role on labor markets. It is not clear from our results how these dynamic
considerations interact with institutions and features of labor market that equally aﬀect
behavior of ﬁrms and agents, e.g. the level of competition, collective agreements, the level
of sick pay, etc. We hope that our study will encourage further analyses of the interplay
between factors that are exogenous to the contracting environment and endogenously
arising incentives in a relational contract. More speciﬁcally, it would be interesting to
investigate the eﬀects of asymmetric information in our setting where only ﬁrms have
knowledge about the state of the economy. What would happen if shocks were unpre-
dictable and idiosyncratic to speciﬁc ﬁrms? What if ﬁrms could go bankrupt? How would
markets behave if there was wage rigidity within ﬁrms, but not on the market? Answers
to all of these questions are important ingredients for the understanding of phenomena
that we observe on real-world labor markets. We think that - next to empirical analyses
of speciﬁc labor market features such as job protection, probation time, etc. - particularly
the incentives arising from labor market ﬂuctuations on individual behavior of both ﬁrms
and workers are largely unexplored and deserve future research.
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1.7 Appendix A1
Appendix A1.1: Theoretical Predictions
In this appendix, we want to illustrate theoretically the consequences of market-wide
productivity shocks on the proﬁtability of diﬀerent contracting strategies by ﬁrms when
there are two types of workers in the market, fair-minded and selﬁsh ones. We thereby
do not aim at characterizing the full set of possible Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria,
but rather show how market outcomes can change in the presence of fairness preferences
among workers. More precisely, we analyse how the fraction of fair-minded workers in the
population governs a diﬀerent contracting behavior by ﬁrms between GT and BT.
One worker ﬁrms
We assume that workers are of two diﬀerent types where types are private information.
A fraction 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 of workers has egalitarian preferences such that they are assumed
to fulﬁll the contract oﬀered to them as long as they are oﬀered at least the equal split of
the surplus being generated by the transaction.43 If they are oﬀered less than the equal
split, workers accept the contract but shirk by providing the minimum level of eﬀort as
their fairness norm of equal division has been violated. The remaining fraction (1−γ) of
workers is purely selﬁsh and would shirk in a one-shot interaction. The utility function
of a fair-minded worker in GT can be expressed by




w − c(e) if w − c(˜ e) < 1
2[pGT,1w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
w − c(e) − k max[˜ e − e;0] if w − c(˜ e) ≥ 1
2[pGT,1w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
(A1.1)
where w is the oﬀered wage, ˜ e and e desired and actual eﬀort levels with the associated
cost function c(·), pGT,1w indicates the productivity parameter of the ﬁrm in GT and k
is a fairness parameter that implies that a fair-minded worker chooses the desired eﬀort
43We do not rule out that ﬁrms also have some sort of fairness preferences, but since workers are
always reacting to the contract oﬀer by ﬁrms with their eﬀort decision, we consider their preferences over
outcomes at the heart of the stylized transaction. For the purpose of this appendix, assuming fairness
preferences of ﬁrms other than in their contracting policy would complicate the analysis but add little
insight.
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level ˜ e as long as he obtains (at least) half of the net surplus created from the contract.
In order to guarantee this, we furthermore assume that
k > maxc
0(e) (A1.2)
such that e = ˜ e is indeed optimal since the fairness costs associated with choosing a lower
level of eﬀort than desired in the contract outweigh the material beneﬁts from a lower
eﬀort level.
We assume that ﬁrms are risk neutral and maximize their expected monetary payoﬀ. In
the last period of the game T, a ﬁrm can either oﬀer a ”trust“ contract that equalizes
payoﬀs between the ﬁrm and the worker characterized by above minimal eﬀorts and wages
or oﬀer workers their outside option in the form of a ”standard“ contract. This contract
has to account for the level of the unemployment beneﬁt of 6, i.e., ﬁrms have to oﬀer at
least a wage of 6 to induce workers to accept.44 With the parameters of our experiment
this outside option gives ﬁrms a last period proﬁt of
π
f
T(w, ˜ e) = π
f
T(6,1) = 10 · 1 − 6 = 4 (A1.3)
In the last period when productivity is high, a ﬁrm can do better by oﬀering the ”trust“
contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] if the fraction γ of fair-minded workers in the population is large
enough. This contract yields a payoﬀ of πw = πf = 41 for both the ﬁrm and the worker,
such that fair-minded workers would accept and exert the desired eﬀort level of ˜ e = 10.45
For such a ”trust“ oﬀer to be proﬁtable the following condition has to hold:
γ(pGT,1w · ˜ e − w) + (1 − γ)(pGT,1w · 1 − w) ≥ π
f
T(6,1) (A1.4)
which boils down to γ ≥ γ∗
GT,1w with γ∗
GT,1w ≈ 0.59. So if γ ≤ γ∗
GT,1w, a ﬁrm is better oﬀ
oﬀering the ”standard“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [6,1] in the last period. In all pre-ﬁnal periods,
the ﬁrm will employ a policy of contingent contract renewal, i.e., re-employ the worker if
44In what follows we will assume that if workers are indiﬀerent between accepting the unemployment
beneﬁt and accepting an oﬀer with a wage of 6 and shirking, they choose to do the latter.
45Note that if workers are characterized by egalitarian preferences as described above, it is never
optimal for a ﬁrm to make a payoﬀ equalizing contract oﬀer in which it desires an eﬀort level that is
lower than ˜ e = 10.
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he exerted the desired eﬀort level and dismiss him if he shirked. A fair worker will accept
any oﬀer that shares the surplus equally and selﬁsh workers will cooperate if future rents
from cooperating exceed the gains from shirking. Hence, in the pre-ﬁnal period a selﬁsh
worker has to choose between cooperating and shirking in the last period, which gives
him a payoﬀ of πw
T−1 + πw
T = w − c(10) + w − c(1) = 100, and shirking right away and
remaining unemployed in the last period, i.e., πw
T−1 + πw
T = w − c(1) + b = 65, such that
selﬁsh workers clearly prefer to cooperate in the pre-ﬁnal period and reveal their type
only in the last period when they shirk.
By backward induction this holds also for all prior periods regardless of the productivity
level, since the continuation value of a relationship induces selﬁsh types to work and
their incentives are unaﬀected by the presence of periods of low productivity. The fair
contract in BT, however, has a decreased wage and amounts to [w, ˜ e] = [34,10] which
yields identical payoﬀs to both parties of πw = πf = 16.
Optimal behavior in GTBT therefore depends on the value of γ:
• γ > γ∗
GT,1w: Firms oﬀer the ”trust“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] in GT and [w, ˜ e] =
[34,10] in BT. The contract is accepted by all workers who exert the desired eﬀort
level in all but the last period T. Workers earn πw
GT = 59 − 18 = 41 in GT and
πw
BT = 34−18 = 16 in BT until the last period T in which fair-minded workers earn
πw
T = 59−18 = 41, but selﬁsh workers shirk to obtain a payoﬀ of πw
T = 59−0 = 59. In
all non-ﬁnal period, ﬁrms earn π
f
GT = 10·10−59 = 41 in GT and π
f
BT = 5·10−34 =
16 in BT. In the last period, ﬁrms earn π
f






GT,1w > γ: Firms oﬀer the ”standard“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [6,1] in GT and do not
make an oﬀer in BT. The contract is accepted by all workers who shirk by exerting
the desired eﬀort level of 1 all periods. Workers earn πw
GT = 6 − 0 = 6 in GT and
the unemployment beneﬁt b = 6 in BT. Firms earn π
f
GT = 10·1−6 = 4 in GT and
nothing in BT.
These strategies imply that a ﬁrm can re-hire a worker it had employed in the past through
an identiﬁcation mechanism as present in our main treatments. When wages are ﬁxed at
30 in our GTBT_FIX treatment, the mechanism is identical as outlined above, with the
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exception that the ”trust“ contract is [w, ˜ e] = [30,5] in GT [w, ˜ e] = [30,9] in BT. The
lower wage of 30 in GT does not destroy the incentives for selﬁsh types in the pre-ﬁnal
period to mimick the non-selﬁsh types.
In the absence of this reputation mechanism in GTBT_RI, every period can be treated
like the last period. Firms have to rely entirely on a belief about γ throughout the
experiment, when they enter the oﬀer phase in every period. Selﬁsh types do not have
an incentive to provide eﬀort to stay in the relationship, such that in every period γ has
to be suﬃciently high to induce ﬁrms to oﬀer the ”trust“ contract. γ > γ∗
GT,1w ensures
that ﬁrms oﬀer a ”trust“ contract in GT (identical to the last period from above), but
in BT there is an additional condition for the critical value of γ to sustain an eﬃcient
equilibrium. This critical value γ∗
BT,1w stems from the incentive of ﬁrms in BT, i.e.,
π
f
BT = γ(16) + (1 − γ)(−29) ≥ 0 ∀γ > γ∗
BT,1w where γ∗
BT,1w ≈ 0.64. In GTBT_RI,
the ﬁrst condition from above only holds for γ > γ∗
BT,1w. If γ∗
BT,1w > γ > γ∗
GT,1w, the
equilibrium looks as follows:
• γ∗
BT,1w > γ > γ∗
GT,1w: Firms oﬀer the ’fair’ contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] in GT and do
not make an oﬀer in BT. In GT, the contract is accepted by all workers where only
the fair-minded workers exert the desired eﬀort level and the selﬁsh workers shirk.
Workers earn πw
GT = 59−18 = 41 (fair-minded) or πw
GT = 59−0 = 59 (selﬁsh) in GT
and the unemployment beneﬁt b = 6 in BT. Firms earn πf = γ(41)+(1−γ)(−49) ≥
πf(6,1) ∀γ > γ∗
GT,1w in GT and nothing in BT.
If γ∗
GT,1w > γ, the ineﬃcient equilibrium from above prevails also for GTBT_RI in all
periods.
Two worker ﬁrms
When ﬁrms are not restricted to hire only one worker, they can choose between diﬀerent
employment strategies. The incentives for ﬁrms compared to the one-worker case are
unchanged if they restrict themselves to hire indeed only one worker. Decreasing returns
to scale of the second worker are set in a way that the marginal beneﬁt of hiring a
second worker exceeds marginal costs, making full employment of two workers the eﬃcient
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outcome. In the last period, their outside option is to oﬀer the ”standard“ contract
[w, ˜ e] = [6,1] to either one or two workers which gives them
π
f






pGT,1w · e − w = 10 · 1 − 6 = 4 if they hire one worker
pGT,2w · e − w = 8 · (1 + 1) − 6 − 6 = 4 if they hire two workers
(A1.5)
which means that they are indiﬀerent between hiring one or two workers in the ﬁnal
period. We again assume egalitarian preferences on behalf of the workers, but these can
now take two diﬀerent forms, depending on their fairness benchmark when a ﬁrm hires
two workers. It is crucial to note that in our experiment, there was no information about
the terms of the contract of a potential co-worker before a worker exerted costly eﬀort.
This was implemented to focus on the relationship between ﬁrm and worker by avoiding
peer eﬀects between multiple workers. So we assume that the worker could condition his
eﬀort decision neither on the existence of a second worker (which he learned at the end of
every period) nor on the contract terms of a potential colleague (which he was not told at
anytime).46 The way how workers’ fairness preferences for multiple worker relationships
look like determines the wage ﬁrms have to oﬀer in order to induce workers to accept their
terms. We distinguish between two cases: relationship-speciﬁc (”bilateral“) and strictly
egalitarian preferences (”trilateral“).
Relationship speciﬁc fairness preferences (”bilateral“)
In the two-worker scenario, we therefore assume that a ”fair-minded“ worker exerts the
desired eﬀort level as soon as the contract terms guarantee him at least half of the surplus
from the transaction with the ﬁrm. Furthermore, we make the assumption in this section
that a ﬁrm hires two workers, since the incentives for the one-worker case are identical to
the ones discussed in the previous section.
46We thus abstract from the possibility of signaling between ﬁrms and workers on the existence of a
second through contract terms.
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The preferences of a worker in GT under this set of assumptions can be represented by




w − c(e) if w − c(˜ e) < 1
2[pGT,2w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
w − c(e) − k max[˜ e − e;0] if w − c(˜ e) ≥ 1
2[pGT,2w˜ e − c(˜ e)]
(A1.6)
Thus, the ”trust“ oﬀer is now given by [w, ˜ e] = [49,10] yielding a payoﬀ from the
transaction of πw
GT = 49 − 18 = 31 for workers and π
f
GT = 80 − 49 = 31 for ﬁrms
that hire two workers. With a second worker for identical conditions, ﬁrms would earn
π
f
GT = 160−98 = 2·31 = 62.47 We again can compute the fraction of fair-minded workers
in the population required to make a ”fair“ oﬀer [w, ˜ e] = [49,10] proﬁtable for ﬁrms in









The ﬁrst term captures a ﬁrm employing two fair-minded workers which happens with
probability γ2, the second term if the ﬁrm employs two selﬁsh workers with probability
(1 − γ)2 and the third term if she employs one selﬁsh and one fair-minded worker. The
critical threshold is given by γ ≥ γ∗
GT,2w with γ∗
GT,2w ≈ 0.60. All selﬁsh workers have an
incentive to mimic fair-minded types in all pre-ﬁnal periods including BT, such that they
shirk only in the last period of the experiment. Similarly to the one-worker case we can
describe market outcomes in GTBT2 under a policy of contingent contract renewal of
ﬁrms which depend on the value of γ:
• γ > γ∗
GT,2w: Firms oﬀer the ”trust“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [49,10] to two workers in
GT and [w, ˜ e] = [29,10] to two workers in BT. The contract is accepted by all
workers who exert the desired eﬀort level in all but the last period. Workers earn
πw
GT = 49 − 18 = 31 in GT and πw
GT = 29 − 18 = 11 in BT until the last period
in which fair-minded workers earn πw
T = 49 − 18 = 31, but selﬁsh workers shirk to
obtain a payoﬀ of πw
T = 49 − 0 = 49. In all non-ﬁnal periods, ﬁrms earn π
f
GT =
8·20−49−49 = 62 in GT and π
f
BT = 4·20−29−29 = 22 in BT. In the last period,
ﬁrms earn π
f
T = γ2(62) + (1 − γ)2(−82) + 2γ(1 − γ)(−10) ≥ π
f
T(6,1) ∀γ > γ∗
GT,2w.
47If a ﬁrms hires only one worker at these conditions, it would earn π
f
GT = 100 − 49 = 51 and thus
less than with a second worker.
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• γ∗
GT,2w > γ > γ∗
GT,1w: Firms oﬀer the ”trust“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [59,10] in GT and
[w, ˜ e] = [34,10] in BT to one worker. The contract is accepted by all workers who
exert the desired eﬀort level in all but the last period. Workers earn πw
GT = 59−18 =
41 in GT and πw
BT = 34 − 18 = 16 in BT until the last period in which fair-minded
workers earn πw
T = 59 − 18 = 41, but selﬁsh workers shirk to obtain a payoﬀ of
πw
T = 59 − 0 = 59. In all non-ﬁnal period, ﬁrms earn π
f
GT = 10 · 10 − 59 = 41
in GT and π
f
BT = 5 · 10 − 34 = 16 in BT. In the last period, ﬁrms earn π
f
T =
γ(41) + (1 − γ)(−49) ≥ π
f
T(6,1) ∀γ > γ∗
GT,1w.
• γ∗
GT,1w > γ: Firms oﬀer the ”standard“ contract [w, ˜ e] = [6,1] in GT and do not
make an oﬀer in BT. The contract is accepted by all workers who shirk by exerting
the desired eﬀort level of 1 in all periods. Workers earn πw
GT = 6−0 = 6 in GT and
the unemployment beneﬁt b = 6 in BT. Firms earn π
f
GT = 10·1−6 = 4 in GT, are
indiﬀerent whether they hire one or two workers in GT and earn nothing in BT.
In comparison to GTBT, an additional condition on γ is required to sustain an equilibrium
where ﬁrms hire two workers instead of one in GTBT2. The mechanism in GTBT2_FIX is
identical, only contract oﬀers are diﬀerent since wages are exogenously ﬁxed at 30. In GT,
the ”trust“ contract is given by [w, ˜ e] = [30,6] such that ﬁrms earn π
f
GT = 48 − 30 = 18
and workers πw
GT = 30 − 8 = 22 if they adhere to the contract terms. In BT, ﬁrms oﬀer
[w, ˜ e] = [30,10] to earn π
f
BT = 40 − 30 = 10, with πw
BT = 30 − 18 = 12 left on the table
for workers. The critical threshold of γ to make it proﬁtable in GTBT_FIX to hire two
workers throughout the 15 periods amounts to γ∗
GT_FIX,2w ≈ 0.55.
Hence, depending on the proportion of fair-minded workers, market outcomes take on
diﬀerent forms from a complete market breakdown to eﬃcient contracting despite the
moral hazard problem. If γ is high enough, it is always better for ﬁrms to employ two
workers, and only when γ decreases we expect negative employment eﬀects.
Egalitarian fairness preferences (”trilateral”)
In this section, we only brieﬂy discuss the consequences of workers having egalitarian
preferences which require them to obtain a third of the overall generated surplus when
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a ﬁrm employs two workers in order to exert the desired level of eﬀort. Since in our
experiment workers were not told the conditions of another contract between their ﬁrm
and a second worker, we do not consider this theoretical case a real benchmark such that
we only brieﬂy comment on it here.
Applying the same reasoning as above, ﬁrms now have to make a ”trust“ oﬀer [w, ˜ e] =
[60,10] to both workers in the last period to induce workers to work such that every worker
obtains πw
T = 60 − 18 = 42 and the ﬁrm π
f
T = 8 · 20 − 120 = 40. The critical threshold
of γ for this to be proﬁtable naturally increases to γ∗
GT ≈ 0.75. In BT, the ”trust“ oﬀer
would have to be [w, ˜ e] = [33,10] leading to proﬁts of πw
T = 33 − 18 = 15 for workers and
π
f
T = 4 · 20 − 66 = 14 for ﬁrms. Under this stronger case of fairness preferences among
workers, eﬃcient market outcomes are even harder to achieve compared to the bilateral
case.
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Appendix A1.2: Eﬃciency and Surplus Sharing in Good and Bad
Times
In this appendix, we present the results on eﬃciency and surplus sharing in the three
main treatments GTBT, FGT and FBT that can be inferred from the evidence on wages
and eﬀorts in the text.
Remember that exerting maximal eﬀort at e = 10 is always eﬃcient, regardless of the
treatment since it generates the biggest possible surplus to be shared by the two contract-
ing parties. As a measure of eﬃciency, we calculate the generated surplus as the sum of
the employer’s and the worker’s proﬁts and subtract the outside option of the worker of
6. We compare this with the maximal achievable surplus under complete contracts of 76
in GT and 26 in BT.48 Table A1.1 shows eﬃciency levels according to our measure over
time and overall averages that naturally reinforce the conclusions from section 1.4.1. The
ﬂuctuations in GTBT lead to a decrease in eﬃciency, such that in none of the three-period
clusters the market reaches the eﬃciency level of the respective control treatments. The
main reason for this are the sharp wage drops that occur in BT of GTBT. Mann-Whitney-
U-test tests on aggregate market eﬃciency conﬁrm signiﬁcant diﬀerences between FBT
and GTBT (p = 0.025), but not between FGT and GTBT (p = 0.36). When looking
at BT periods separately, the diﬀerence between FGT and GTBT is highly signiﬁcant
(p = 0.006). In contrast, there is no diﬀerence between GT periods in GTBT and FGT
(p = 0.85).
Result 1.12 Eﬃciency levels are highest in FBT. The productivity shocks in GTBT result
in a reduction in eﬃciency compared to the relevant periods in FGT and FBT.
We next turn to the split of the surplus. Taking our stylized model with non-selﬁsh workers
seriously, the split of the surplus is a driving force for their behavior. As a measure for
the split of surplus, we calculate the share of a worker’s proﬁt to the overall proﬁts from
trade for both parties. In FBT and FGT, this share converges to a level between 50%
48If pt = 10, the surplus from bargaining under complete contracts and maximal eﬀorts is 100−c(10)−
6 = 100−18−6 = 76. Under pt = 5, the maximal surplus is given by 50−c(10)−6 = 50−18−6 = 26.
Our eﬃciency measures are not well-behaved for minimal eﬀorts since they amount to non-zero values
when workers shirk (0.05 if pt = 10, −0.04 if pt = 5), but this does not distort treatment comparisons.
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Table A1.1: Relative Eﬃciency Levels in FBT, GTBT, and FGT
Treatment pt period period period period period Total
1 − 3 4 − 6 7 − 9 10 − 12 13 − 15 Eﬃciency
FBT 5 0.46 0.65 0.73 0.78 0.62 0.65
GTBT 5 0.38 0.48 0.43
10 0.43 0.53 0.52 0.49
FGT 10 0.46 0.48 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.56
Relative eﬃciency levels in treatments FBT, GTBT, and FGT measured as the ratio of the realized
surplus minus the outside option divided by the theoretically feasible surplus under complete contracts
and 60% after some initial ﬂuctuation. From period 4 onwards, workers generally succeed
in obtaining higher proﬁts than ﬁrms despite the excess supply of labor on the market.
In treatment GTBT, in the ﬁrst three BT-periods workers reap over 80% of the surplus
and a somewhat lower but still slightly higher than 60%-share during the second three
BT-periods. In the long run, the split of surplus is very similar in all three treatments.
Result 1.13 The split of the surplus appears to be similar in treatments FBT, FBT and
GTBT, after an initial phase of diﬀerent sharing norms. It is around 40% for ﬁrms and
60% for workers.
Figure A1.1: Surplus Split in FBT, GTBT and FGT
Share of the surplus that accrues to the worker in treatments FBT, GTBT and FGT.
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Appendix A1.3: Contract Nature
In this appendix, we provide further evidence on the eﬀects of productivity shocks on the
nature of contracts concluded, focusing on the contract length and the renewal probability
of contracts.
Figure A1.2: Cumulative Frequency of Relationship Length in FBT, GTBT and FGT
Figure A1.2 shows that the average contract length is lowest in GTBT compared to the
two control treatments. We furthermore expect contracting behavior of ﬁrms to depend
on their experience from past periods. If a worker has provided more than the desired
eﬀort, a ﬁrm will be willing to continue the relationship by oﬀering him a new contract
in the next period. A lower level of eﬀort is thus more likely to induce the end of a
relationship. These considerations will crucially depend on what ﬁrms and workers think
to be a ”fair“ wage-eﬀort relationship.
We hypothesize that in a stable economic environment a consensus between ﬁrms and
workers is easier to reach as under varying economic conditions. If the conditions alter,
we conjecture that adaptations to the new circumstances lead to higher break-up rates
of contracts. Table A1.2 shows that the probability of renewing one’s contract with the
same employer is increasing in the eﬀort provided in the previous period. This holds for
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Table A1.2: Probability of Contract Renewal
Eﬀort in previous period FBT GTBT FGT
1 0.21 0.24 0.37
2 0.09 0.38 0.00
3 0.47 0.44 0.50
4 0.75 0.48 0.69
5 0.50 0.58 0.67
6 0.71 0.61 0.69
7 0.67 0.75 0.85
8 0.75 0.63 0.85
9 0.95 0.72 0.92
10 0.98 0.80 1.00
all three treatments demonstrating that ﬁrms reward a good worker performance with a
new contract oﬀer. In the GTBT treatment, this mechanism is qualitatively the same but
not quantitatively. A higher eﬀort in the previous period still increases the probability
of a renewed contract in the next period, but to a lower extent. To check for this, we
compute Spearman’s ρ between eﬀort in the previous period and a dummy if a contract
is renewed for each treatment to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive correlations between the two.
The correlation is, however, lowest in the GTBT treatment (Spearman’s ρ: FBT: 0.53,
GTBT: 0.37, FGT: 0.53). In a similar manner, a probit regression of a contract renewal
dummy on the eﬀort provided in the previous periods yields highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients
in all treatments, but the lowest in the GTBT treatment. A fortiori, the unconditional
probability of a contract being renewed is again lowest in the GTBT treatment (Mann-
Whitney-U-test, p = 0.02 for FBT and GTBT, p = 0.07 for FGT and GTBT; Kruskal-
Wallis test, p = 0.05).49 We conclude, that the presence of commonly known productivity
shocks for ﬁrms weakens the strength of the bilateralization of trade compared to stable
conditions as in Brown et al. (2004) and our control treatments FGT and FBT.
49The unconditional probability of contract renewal on the basis of all concluded contracts amounts
to 56 % in FGT, 53 % in FGT and only 38 % in GTBT.
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Appendix A1.4: Eﬃciency and Surplus Sharing in the Control
Treatments
In this appendix, we report the results on eﬃciency and surplus sharing in the treat-
ments GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX. We calculate the total generated surplus per
contract, subtract the outside option of 6 and divide this measure by the theoretically
maximal surplus of 76 in GT and 26 in BT.50 Note that this measure abstracts from the
employment eﬀect, since we only look at concluded contracts.
Table A1.3: Relative Eﬃciency Levels in GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
Treatment period period period period period Total
1 − 3 4 − 6 7 − 9 10 − 12 13 − 15 Eﬃciency
GTBT_FIX 0.48 0.68 0.58 0.77 0.47 0.60
GTBT 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.47
GTBT_RI 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.30 0.27
Relative Eﬃciency Levels in Treatments GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX measured as the ratio of
the realized surplus minus the outside option divided by the theoretically feasible surplus under complete
contracts
In the absence of reputation mechanisms, eﬃciency is clearly lowest across all control
treatments (see Table A1.3). Particularly, BT-periods decrease eﬃciency sharply, which
points again at the importance of reputation in phases of low productivity. In contrast,
GTBT_FIX surprisingly displays the highest eﬃciency values. In fact, they are even
higher than in GTBT, with markets performing especially well in BT-periods with realized
eﬃciency levels of more than 70%. Hence, ﬁxed wages do not necessarily have to have
a negative impact on eﬃciency. Mann-Whitney-U-tests on aggregate market eﬃciency
conﬁrm that eﬃciency in GTBT is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from GTBT_FIX (p = 0.025)
and from GTBT_RI (p = 0.02).
As far as the surplus split is concerned, we ﬁnd an almost identical pattern across all three
treatments. During the ﬁrst BT-periods, workers reap the full surplus with nothing being
left on the table for ﬁrms. In GTBT_RI, proﬁts for ﬁrms are even negative on average
such that workers obtain more than 100% of the surplus. In the second BT-phase, we
observe a lower share that goes to the worker. Overall, the surplus split of 60% to the
50See appendix A1.2 for details regarding our eﬃciency measure.
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worker and 40 % to the ﬁrm is a very persistent pattern across all three control treatments.
An overview is provided in Figure A1.3.
Result 1.14 The absence of reputation considerably harms eﬃciency, particularly in BT-
periods. Markets in GTBT_FIX realize 60% of the possible surplus, which is even higher
than that of GTBT markets. Surplus sharing is identical across GTBT, GTBT_RI and
GTBT_FIX.
Figure A1.3: Surplus Split in GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
Share of the surplus that accrues to the worker in treatments GTBT, GTBT_RI and GTBT_FIX
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Appendix A1.5: Tables
Table A1.4: Panel Tobit Regressions on Eﬀort
































Panel Tobit random eﬀects (RE) regressions on the level of eﬀort. Standard errors are given in brackets,




Figure A1.4: Actual, Desired and Expected Eﬀort Levels in GTBT
Figure A1.5: Percentage of privately concluded Contracts in FBT, GTBT and FGT
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Figure A1.6: Per Period Proﬁts in FBT, GTBT, and FGT
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Figure A1.7: Employment Levels in GTBT and GTBT2
Figure A1.8: Employment Levels in GTBT_FIX and GTBT2_FIX
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Figure A1.9: Average Wage and Eﬀort Levels in the Two-Worker Setting
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Figure A1.10: Average Wage and Eﬀort Levels in GTBT and GTBT2
Figure A1.11: Share of the Surplus to the Worker in GTBT2 and GTBT2_FIX
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Figure A1.12: Screenshot: Trading Phase (Firm)
Example of the screen of a buyer (ﬁrm) during the trading phase with all public oﬀers (left column),
private oﬀers (middle column) and the contract oﬀer space (right column)
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Figure A1.13: Screenshot: Trading Phase (Worker)
Example of the screen of a seller (worker) during the trading phase with all public oﬀers (left column)
and private oﬀers (middle column)
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The objective of this experiment is the analysis of economic decisions. You and all other participants will be 
taking decisions during the experiment. You will be earning money. Your payoff will depend on both your own 
decisions as well as the decisions of other participants according to the rules on the following pages. 
Types of participants 
There are two types of participants: Participant A and Participant B. You will be assigned a role randomly. At 
the beginning of the experiment, you will be told your role (A or B) on the first screen after the start of the 
experiment. You will remain in the same role for the whole duration of the experiment. Every participant obtains 
an identification number. This number also remains unchanged throughout the whole experiment. 
Earnings 
At the beginning of the experiment, you obtain an amount of 4 Euro. In the course of the experiment, you will be 
earning more money by gaining points.  All earned points will be converted into Euros at the following 
conversion rate: 
 
1 Point = 0.10 Euro (10 Eurocent) 
i.e. 1 Euro = 10 Points 
 
 
At the end of the experiment, you are paid the amount you have earned during the experiment plus the 4 
Euro starting stack privately and in cash. 
Duration 
The whole experiment takes about 2 hours. The experiment is divided into 15 periods. In every period you have 
to take decisions that you enter into the computer in front of you. 
Documentation 
You also find a documentation sheet at your desk. Please enter your identification number at the beginning of the 
experiment into the upper right corner. In every period, you will be entering certain pieces of information into this 
sheet (see below). Please note that every period has a single line. 
Anonymity 
You will not be learning neither during nor after the experiment the identity of other participants. Interaction only 
takes place via the identification numbers. The other participants do not learn neither during nor after the 







Appendix A1.7: Instructions (translated from German)
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Communication is strictly prohibited to during the whole experiment! We additionally advise you only to 
make use of those functions at the computer which are relevant for the experiment. Communication or playing 
with the computer leads to exclusion from the experiment. 
Brief Overview over the Course of events in the Experiment 
In every period of the experiment, a participant of type A can conclude a trade with a participant of type B. Type 
B realizes a gain through the trade, if he obtains a transfer that exceeds his costs. Type A realizes a gain through 
the trade if earns more through the factor that the transfer costs to him. The level of the costs for type B and the 
revenues of type A depend on the factor, which is determined by type B. 
 
The whole experiment has 15 identical periods. The course of events in every single period is organized as 
follows: 
 
1.  Every period starts with a trading phase which takes 3 minutes. During this phase type A participants can 
make offers which can be accepted by type B participants. 
 
An offer consists of three things that have to be specified:  
 
•  the transfer type A is offering,  
•  the factor he is desiring from type B  
•  and finally to which type B the offered is directed. Type A participants can make two sorts of offers: 
private and public offers. Private offers are only directed to one single type B participant and can only 
be accepted by this particular type B. Public offers are directed towards all type B participants and can 
be accepted by every type B. 
 
Type A participants can make as many offers as they want in every period. A standing offer can be accepted 
at any time. Every type B can agree to only one single trade per period, i.e. accepting one offer. Type A 
participants also can only agree upon one trade with one type B participant. Since there are 5 type A 
participants and 7 type B participants, there are some type B participants that cannot conclude a trade in 
every period. 
 
2.  Next to the trading phase, all type B participants who have agreed upon a trade must decide upon the factor 
they are delivering to the type A participant. Type B is not obliged to deliver the factor type A is desiring 
from him. When all type B participants have made their factor choices, the payoffs from this period are 
determined. After that, the next period starts. 
 
As a reference to reality, you can think of the experiment as a labor market: type A is the employer who is 
offering work contracts. The transfer constitutes the wage and the factor is the desired performance (hours 
worked, etc.). Every employer can only hire one employee. Upon his employment (i.e. the acceptance of the 
contract), the employee decides whether to deliver the desired performance.  
 
Detailed Procedure of the Experiment 
On your market, there are 5 type A and 7 type B participants. Overall, there are two parallel markets in this room 
with 24 participants. Throughout the whole experiment you remain in the same role and interact on the same 
market. During the experiment, you enter your decisions into the computer in front of you. Subsequently, it is 
explained in detail how you can make your decisions in every period. 
The Fair-Employment Hypothesis
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In the trading phase, type A participants see the following screen: 
 
In the top left corner you can see the number of the period you are currently in. In the top right corner you are 
shown the remaining time of the trading period in seconds. The trading phase lasts for 3 minutes, i.e. 180 






As soon as you see the above screen, a trading phase has started. Type A participants can now make offers. To do 
so, they have to enter three things at the right of the screen: 
 
a)  First, they have to determine whether to make a public or a private offer: 
 
•  Public Offers 
  Public Offers are communicated to all market participants. All type B participants of your market see all 
public offers of their respective market on their screens. A public offer can hence be accepted by every 
type B. Also all type A participants see all public offers of all other type A participants from their market 
on their screens. 
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•  Private Offers 
Private offers are only directed towards one single type B. Only this particular type B participant can 
accept the offer. All other participants do not find out anything about this offer. 
To make a private offer, first click on the icon “private”. After that, you have to enter to which type B 
the offer is directed. All 7 type B participants on your market have an identification number (type B1, 
type B2, …, type B7). All type B participants keep this identification number throughout the whole 
duration of the experiment. To direct an offer to a particular type B participant, you have to enter the 
identification number of this type B (e.g. “4” for type B4). 
 
b)  Once it has been determined to whom the offer is directed, a transfer has to be fixed. This transfer has 
to be entered into the field “Your Transfer”. The offer must not be smaller than 0 and not exceed 100: 
 
0 ≤ Offer ≤ 100 
 
c)  Finally, you have to state which factor you desire. This has to be entered into the field “desired factor”. 
The desired factor has to be an integer and must not be smaller than 1 and not exceed 10: 
 
1 ≤ Desired Factor ≤ 10 
 
Once an offer has been fully specified, you have to click on the “OK”-button to submit the offer. As long as the 
“OK”-button has not been clicked, an offer can be modified. After clicking on the “OK”-button, the offer is 
displayed on screens of the type B participants to whom it has been directed. 
 
On the left hand side of type A’s screen, you can find the headline “Public Offers”. All public offers of the 
current trading period are displayed here. You will be seeing both your own public offers as well as those 
submitted by other type A participants. You can identify what participant made the offer, which transfer he is 
offering and which factor he is desiring. All type A participants also have an identification number that is 
constant for the whole experiment (type A1, type A2, …, type A5). 
 
In the middle of the screen below the headline “Your private Offers” you are given the private offers that you 
submitted in the current trading phase. You can see to what type B participants you submitted an offer, what 
transfer you were offering and what effort you are desiring. 
 
Every type A can submit as many public and private offers in every period as he wants to. Every submitted 
offer can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. A submitted offer cannot be withdrawn. 
 
Every type A can conclude only one contract per period. As soon as an offer has been accepted, the respective 
type A participant gets to know which of his offers has been accepted by which type B participant. In the bottom 
right corner of the screen appears the identification number of the type B who has accepted one offer, the transfer 
and the desired factor. Since every type A can only conclude only one contract, all other offers of this type A are 
automatically deleted upon acceptance of one of the outstanding offers. No further offers can be made this period. 
 
Every type B can conclude only one contract per period. The type A participants are continuously informed 
about which type B participants have not yet concluded a contract. Below the headline “Information which type 
B participants have already concluded a contract” you can find 7 fields. If one type B has accepted an offer, the 
white box in front of his identification number is ticked. It is not possible to make private offers to type B 
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TYPE B 




In the top left corner you can see the number of the period you are currently in. In the top right corner you are 
shown the remaining time of the trading period in seconds. The trading phase lasts for 3 minutes, i.e. 180 
seconds. When time is up, the trading phase is over such that you cannot make any offers anymore this period nor 
accept them. As soon as you see the above screen, a trading phase has started. The type B participants now can 
accept offers that have been directed to them by type A participants. 
 
•  Private Offers to You 
If you obtained private offers, these offers appear on the left hand side of the screen, below the headline 
“Private Offer to You”. The offer contains The following pieces of information: the identification 
number of the respective type A who submitted the offer, the transfer and the desired factor. In order to 
accept a private offer, you have to mark the entry with the corresponding offer by clicking on it. To 
definitively accept the offer, you have to click on the “Accept” button at the bottom of the table. As long 
as the “Accept” button has not been clicked, you can still modify your choice. 
 
•  Public Offers 
All public offers appear on the right hand side of the screen below the headline “Public Offers”. These 
offers have to be accepted in the same way as the private offers described above. Please take care to 
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As soon as an “Accept” button has been clicked, the accepted offer appears in the bottom line of the screen. As 
soon as 5 type B participants have concluded a trade this period or the three minutes have expired, the trading 
phase is over. No type A is obliged to submit an offer; no type B is obliged to accept an offer. 
 
2. Determining the Factor 
 
After the trading phase, all type B participants who have concluded a trade have to determine their actual factor. 
The desired factor stipulated in the offer is not binding. Type B can choose exactly the desired factor or a 






To choose the actual factor, you enter the value of the factor into the field “Choose your actual factor” and click 
the “OK” button. As long as the “OK” button has not been clicked, you can modify your choice. The factor has to 
be an integer between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ Actual Factor ≤ 10 
 
 
During the time when type B enters the actual factor, type A enters on a separate screen, what actual factor he 
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How are incomes calculated? 
Income Type A: 
•  If no trade has been concluded in a trading phase, type A gets a payoff of 0 points this period. 
•  If one offer has been accepted, your income depends on the offered transfer and the actual factor chosen by 
the type B participant who accepted your offer. Your income is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Income Type A = K*(Factor) – (Transfer) 
 
 
[GTBT: The value of K depends on the period you are currently in. The following table indicates the value of K 
dependent on the period (the number of the current period is shown in the first line of every screen):] 
 
Period  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
K  10  10  10  5  5  5  10  10  10  5  5  5  10  10  10 
 
[FGT/FBT: The value of K is always 10/5 across all periods.] From the formula above it is clear that the 
income is higher, the higher the actual factor chosen by type B. At the same time, the income is higher, the lower 
the transfer that was offered. 
Income Type B: 
•  If no trade has been concluded in a trading phase, type B gets a payoff of 6 points this period. 
•  If one offer has been accepted, your income depends on the transfer minus the costs of the factor that you 
have to bear. Your income is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Income Type B = Transfer – Costs of the Factor 
 
 
The income of type B is higher, the higher the transfer and the lower the actually chosen factor is. The costs of 
the actual factor are higher, the higher the actually chosen factor is. The costs of each factor are given by the 
following table: 
 
Factor  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Costs of  
Factor  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  18 
 
All incomes of type A and type B participants are calculated in the same way. Every type A can calculate 
the income of the type B participant who concluded a trade with him. Every type B can calculate the 
income of the type A participant who concluded a trade with him. In addition, both type A and type B learn 
the identification of their trading partner in every period.  
The Fair-Employment Hypothesis
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Picture 4 
 
Please be aware of the fact that both type A and type B participants can make losses in every period. You have 
pay them through your starting stack or from gains accumulated in other periods. A (very unlikely) overall loss 
can either be paid in cash or through student work at the laboratory ( 5 EUR per half an hour). 
 





This screen displays the following pieces of information:  
 
  number of identification of your trading partner 
  the offered transfer 
  the desired factor  
  the actual factor 
  the income of your trading partner 
  your income this period 
 
Please enter all the information on the joint documentation sheet. After the “Income” screen, a period is finished. 
The next period starts with a new trading phase. Once you are finished with entering the information on the 
documentation sheet, please click on the “Continue” button. 
 
The experiment does not start until all participants are completely familiar with the course of events and the 
calculations. To assure this, we kindly ask you to solve the exercises that you find on the next two pages. 
Additionally, we will conduct two test trading periods to make you familiar to the computer program. These test 
trading phases do not count towards the final results and are not paid out. After the two test periods, the actual 
experiment starts consisting of 15 periods. 
The Fair-Employment Hypothesis
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Exercises 
Please solve the following questions by indicating the way you obtained your result. Once you have finished the 
exercises, pleases raise your hand and the experimenter will control your results. Wrong answers do not have any 
consequences whatsoever for you. 
 
Exercise 1 
Type A has not submitted an offer in a trading phase. What is his income this period? 
 
Income Type A =  
 
Exercise 2 
Type B did not accept any offer in a trading phase. What is his income this period? 
  
Income Type B =  
 
Exercise 3: 
In the first period, an offer with a transfer of 30 and a desired factor of 9 is accepted. Type B chooses an actual 
factor of 9. 
Income Type A = 
Income Type B = 
 
Exercise 4: 
In period 5, an offer with a transfer of 30 and a desired factor of 9 is accepted. Type B chooses an actual factor of 
6. 
 
Income Type A = 
Income Type B = 
 
Exercise 5: 
In period 9, an offer with a transfer of 10 and a desired factor of 2 is accepted. Type B chooses an actual factor of 
5. 
 
Income Type A = 
Income Type B = 
 
Exercise 6: 
In period 12, an offer with a transfer of 20 and a desired factor of 4 is accepted. Type B chooses an actual factor 
of 5. 
 
Income Type A = 
Income Type B = 
 
Exercise 7: 
In the last trading phase, type A has made several offers. Neither has been accepted. What is his income in this 
period? 
 
Income Type A = 
 
 
When you have finished the exercises, we recommend to you to take a closer look at the exercises and the 




and Wage Diﬀerentials: Evidence
from a Gift-exchange Experiment
0
2.1 Motivation
Firms spend substantial resources in their hiring procedures to select the “best” candidate
for a job. In particular, an increasing fraction of ﬁrms uses both ability and personality
tests in their hiring processes, see, e.g., Autor and Scarborough (2008). While the ratio-
nale for selecting the most “able” candidate is obvious, recent work has highlighted that
personality tests can generate additional information, too, so as to improve the chance
to hire a suitable candidate for a given position. One important piece of additional
information about a potential candidate are her social preferences. In particular in the
presence of moral hazard, it is valuable for ﬁrms to have access to employees that can be
motivated by “social incentives” via gift exchange, see for example Englmaier and Leider
(2011).
Despite the importance of information acquisition in real world contracting, the un-
derstanding of the impact of the availability of information on the terms of a contract
is surprisingly limited and in particular empirical evidence on the issue is scarce. It is
0
This chapter is based on joint work with Florian Englmaier and Joachim Winter.
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precisely this gap that we want to ﬁll: We provide controlled evidence from the laboratory
on how speciﬁc pieces of information about a contracting partner are used and how they
interact with the contracting behavior between a principal and an agent in a gift-exchange
situation.
Research Question When making employment and contracting decisions, ﬁrms
naturally desire to minimize the risk of hiring an unsuitable candidate. They try to
learn about the qualiﬁcation of a candidate, his education, his family background, etc.
before oﬀering an employment contract. As a necessary simpliﬁcation of reality for
our experiment, we concentrate on two dimensions of information about a candidate
that we regard as essential on real world labor markets. First, information about what
we call productivity henceforth is meant to capture an objective assessment whether
the candidate is good at the job he is supposed to accomplish. Second, information
about what we call trustworthiness henceforth is supposed to encompass all social and
reciprocal preferences by the candidate. We consider these two measures of a worker’s
traits the most relevant skills in our setting. Hence, we expect that information about
these skills matters for ﬁrms. In a situation characterized by moral hazard, we expect
both elements to play an important part in the eﬀort decision of the agent and hence
for the outcome for the principal: Controlling for social preferences, an agent who is
more productive at accomplishing a certain task will produce a higher outcome for the
principal. Similarly, for given productivity, a reciprocal agent will put in more eﬀort in
response to a “generous” wage oﬀer leading to a higher outcome for the principal.
In this chapter, we concentrate on a contracting situation where information about a
worker stems from sources external to the ﬁrm-worker relationship. In contrast to e.g.
Brown et al. (2004) or Bartling et al. (2011), we abstract from information about the
worker that arises endogenously in a repeated relationship and can be used for ﬁrms to
adapt contracts over time. We focus on the trade-oﬀ between two pieces of information
and their impact on contracting behavior by both principals and agents in a one-shot
interaction. The main research question we have in mind is to explore how and if at all
these two pieces of information are conditioned upon when writing contracts and to what
extent they can be used to predict behavior. Eventually, we evaluate how the presence
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of certain skill sets and available information about them shapes labor market outcomes
under moral hazard. The high degree of control makes the laboratory an ideal setting to
address these questions.
Design Our experiment consists of two parts, which are presented sequentially to
subjects such that they do not know what will be the content of the next part. Subjects
know in advance, however, that decisions in earlier parts may have an impact on later
parts. In the ﬁrst part, agents work on a real eﬀort task under a piece rate contract. We
use their score in this piece rate task as our measure of productivity. Subsequently, agents
are presented with a binary, neutrally framed, trust game which we use to proxy for social
and reciprocal concerns. In the second part, half of the players are randomly assigned
to be employers and the other half to be employees. Subjects play a gift exchange game
where the employer ﬁrst oﬀers the employee a ﬂat wage and the employee thereafter
performs the real eﬀort task from the ﬁrst part under standard gift-exchange incentives.
Before making their wage oﬀers, principals are presented with the information about
workers from the elicitation tasks. The amount and the degree of information provided
to ﬁrms is our treatment variable. In our main treatment, employers are presented
the productivity and the trustworthiness measure in a binary way (hereafter treatment
PTB) before submitting wage oﬀers. To control for strategic behavior in the elicitation
phases, we run two control treatments where only one piece of information is made
available to ﬁrms. In treatment “Productivity”(hereafter P) they are only presented the
productivity measure, and in treatment “Trustworthiness” (hereafter T) they are only
presented the trustworthiness measure. By comparing our treatments P and T to the
PTB treatment, we can control if the information revelation in the ﬁnal phase distorts
the elicited measures in phases 1 and 2.1 To assess the impact of the mode of information
presentation on behavior, we conduct a further control treatment (hereafter PT) where
we vary the precision of the productivity information.
1In P (T) it is communicated to subjects that in the second part only information from the elicitation
of productivity (trustworthiness) possibly made available in later parts of the experiment, whereas in
PTB this applies for both measures.
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Results We have four main ﬁndings. 1) Contracts oﬀered by principals systematically
vary with the information they have about the agent. Principals tailor their wage
oﬀers to employee types, oﬀering more generous contracts to more productive and more
trustworthy subjects. The wage premium for “better” agents is higher with respect to
productivity than for trustworthiness. 2) We ﬁnd a positive wage-eﬀort relation for all
worker types, i.e., gift-exchange is robust across all types of workers, but is most eﬀective
with trustworthy workers. 3) Worker characteristics aﬀect ﬁrms’ proﬁt levels, such that
optimal wages are made contingent on the worker type. Only for trustworthy workers
the wage-eﬀort relation is steep enough that an increase in the wage induces a signiﬁcant
proﬁt increase for ﬁrms. 4) Subtle diﬀerences in the information presentation to ﬁrms
induce an endogenously diﬀerent distribution of wage oﬀers. If given access to the precise
level of worker productivity instead of the binary measure from PTB, ﬁrms are too
focused on productivity than on trustworthiness.
Related Literature An extensive experimental literature documents incentives and
behavior in gift exchange games, see e.g. Akerlof (1982), Fehr et al. (1993), Fehr et al.
(1997). This protocol has proven to be a valuable paradigm that captures incentives on
real world labor markets in the laboratory. As a major ﬁnding of this literature, prefer-
ences for fairness and reciprocity serve as a powerful source of motivation to overcome the
informational asymmetry between principals and agents on labor markets2. These labo-
ratory studies have also been validated in the ﬁeld; see e.g. Falk (2007) or Bellemare and
Shearer (2009). It is now also widely acknowledged that social preferences like reciprocity
or inequity aversion potentially do not only shape market outcomes or the result of bilat-
eral bargaining, but have an important eﬀect on the design of optimal incentive schemes
as well, see Englmaier and Wambach (2010) for a theoretical treatment and Fehr et al.
(2007) for empirical evidence. One additional important empirical ﬁnding from both ﬁeld
and laboratory data (e.g. Dohmen et al. (2009)) is that there is substantial heterogeneity
with respect to the prevalence of reciprocal inclinations and social preferences among the
population, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Fischbacher et al. (2001).
Recent theoretical and experimental work suggests that there are complementarities from
2For references see Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (2003) or Fehr and Falk (2008).
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matching incentive structures to worker types; e.g. Ichniowski et al. (1997); Englmaier
and Leider (2011) or Bartling et al. (2011). However, little work has been done that
tests how worker characteristics (amongst them social preferences, if measured) relate to
behavior across games, see Englmaier and Leider (2009) for an exception, and, more to
our point, how worker types interact with incentives. One recent important exception is
a paper by Cabrales et al. (2010) who design an experiment where in the ﬁrst phase, all
subjects choose a payoﬀ vector and play a self-chosen eﬀort game. From these choices their
preference parameters in terms of both outcome preferences and reciprocal inclination are
estimated, assuming preferences à la Charness and Rabin (2002). In the second phase,
it is documented that these estimated preferences predict behavior in a gift exchange
game conditional on contract oﬀers. Moreover, contract oﬀers vary systematically with
estimated preferences of principals. However, Cabrales et al. (2010) do neither use a real
eﬀort task (and hence they do not elicit measures about productivity), nor is information
about workers presented to the principals prior to their contract oﬀers. We consider this
last feature essential for our understanding of the functioning of real world labor markets.
Most closely related to our study, Dohmen and Falk (2011) design a laboratory experi-
ment where they elicit worker characteristics to explain sorting behavior of subjects into
variable or ﬁxed-payment incentive schemes. They ﬁnd strong evidence for worker sorting
along multiple dimensions, but claim that ”many of the discussed worker attributes are
typically unobservable in the hiring process“ (p.558). While this is certainly the case for
some attributes that are diﬃcult to observe, we argue that proxies for the most important
skills of a worker are well available to ﬁrms before hiring a worker, e.g. in the form of a
curriculum vitae or the results from hiring tests. We therefore complement their analysis
by showing how the presence of information about these attributes interacts with incen-
tives on the labor market.3
This chapter adds to another strand of literature that assesses the eﬀects of the availabil-
ity of potentially costly information about an interaction partner on subsequent strategic
behavior. Kurzban and DeScioli (2008) show that subjects in public goods game buy
3A somewhat related literature on cognitive and non-cognitive skills has mainly focused on the relation
between these two skill sets and their interdependence, see e.g. Heckman et al. (2006), Borghans et al.
(2008b), and their relationship to balor market outcomes, see e.g. Murnane et al. (1995), Borghans et al.
(2008a), Heineck and Anger (2010).
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information about behavior of others in previous round to adjust their behavior. More
recently, Eckel and Petrie (2011) give subjects the possibility to purchase a picture of
the interaction partner in a trust game before deciding about trust and trustworthiness.
They ﬁnd that there is informational value in a counterpart’s face since many subjects
do purchase the picture at nonzero costs. Evidence from the ﬁeld suggests that ﬁrms use
the acquired or available information about workers and applicants for screening purposes
and to tailor incentive schemes in the presence of moral hazard, see e.g. Ichniowski et al.
(1997); Huang and Cappelli (2010). To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to
focus on the pure eﬀects of the availability of information about interaction partners on
contracting outcomes in a one-shot moral hazard situation. A controlled laboratory study
allows us to exogenously vary the information structure and eliminate eﬀects of worker
competition.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the experimen-
tal design. In section 2.3 we lay out our hypotheses and section 2.4 presents the results
of the experiments. Section 2.5 discusses our ﬁndings and concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts, which are presented sequentially to subjects such
that they do not know what will be the content of the next part. Subjects knew in advance,
however, that their decisions earlier on may potentially be disclosed to other subjects later
on of the experiment. Overall, we ran 14 sessions with a total of 336 subjects in June and
July 2011 at the MELESSA laboratory at LMU Munich. The subjects were invited via
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the experiment was implemented with zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects earned experimental points (EP) during the experiment. The exchange
rate from EP to Euros was 1EP = 0.0125 €. The experiment lasted about 60 minutes
and subjects earned on average 11.8 €.
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2.2.1 Elicitation of Productivity and Trustworthiness
In a ﬁrst part of the experiment, measures of both productivity and trustworthiness are
elicited from all subjects. We proxy productivity with a measure from a real eﬀort task
that consists in matching words and a four-digit code from a list.4 Subjects perform this
task for 90 seconds and are paid a piece-rate per correct answer of 10 EP that is paid out
at the end of the experiment.5 There is no particular training required for fulﬁlling this
task and we assume that all subjects put in full eﬀort under the piece rate scheme such
that our measure of productivity is as closely related to underlying ability as possible.
In the remainder of the analysis, we therefore refer to ”productivity“ as the number of
correct answers in this task. The corresponding payoﬀ from part one is calculated as
follows according to the number of correct answers:
10 EP ∗ (#correct answers)
Subjects are presented three screens of 30 seconds each one after another, i.e., a total of 90
seconds, with randomly generated words and codes for every new screen. We conjecture
that intrinsic costs for the task are linear over the interval of 90 seconds, i.e., there are no
eﬀects from fatigue or boredom. The resolution of the number of correct answers is given
to subjects only at the end of the experiment.
Furthermore, subjects play a standard binary trust game in neutral framing to provide a
measure of trust and trustworthiness at the individual level.6 We make use of the strategy
method to get data on both trusting behavior and trustworthiness. Subjects take both
decisions for both roles and at the end of the experiment they are matched with another
subject, roles are randomly determined and payoﬀs are realized according to the decisions
taken in the respective roles. Behavior in the trust game can be seen as indicative whether
individual preferences are characterized by high or low levels of trust and trustworthiness
4A screenshot of the experimental screen of the coding task can be found in Figure A2.1 in appendix
A2.3. We conduct a trial period before the elicitation task to familiarize subjects with the computer
programme.
5To discourage guessing there is a penalty for every wrong answer of 10 EP, which is known to
subjects. Our measure of productivity therefore consists in the number of correctly matched codes after
subtracting all wrong answers.
6See Figure A2.2 in appendix A2.3 for the precise amounts used in the trust game.
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when engaging in an interaction with another person. We focus on the trustworthiness of
subjects as this appears as a more relevant proxy of social and reciprocal concerns in the
gift exchange game than the initial trusting decision.
Importantly, there was no feedback given to subjects about the elicitation procedures (and
the resulting payoﬀs) until the very end of the experiment such that subjects’ subsequent
behavior in the experiment was not aﬀected. We also elicit all subjects’ detailed expecta-
tions about productivity and trustworthiness in the population. Since they turn out not
to matter for the subsequent experiment, we relegate the description of the experimental
protocol and the results on expectations to appendix A2.1.
2.2.2 Gift-Exchange Game
In the second phase of the experiment, an experimental gift exchange game is implemented
in which the task to be fulﬁlled is identical to the real eﬀort task in the ﬁrst part of the
experiment. Subjects are randomly allocated to be either a ﬁrm or a worker. Overall,
there are 12 workers and 12 ﬁrms per session. We employ the strategy method, i.e., ﬁrms
have to submit a binding wage oﬀer for each of the 12 workers such that we obtain the
full wage proﬁle ﬁrms are submitting for all workers in their market.7 After all wage oﬀers
have been submitted, every worker is matched randomly to a single ﬁrm, i.e., every ﬁrm
hires only one worker. Workers learn only the wage oﬀer that their matched ﬁrm has
determined for them before they start working for their ﬁrm. There is no possibility for
workers to be inﬂuenced by oﬀers that the ﬁrm has submitted for other workers or by
oﬀers that other ﬁrms have submitted to them. Subsequently, workers perform the same
real eﬀort task from the ﬁrst part for 90 seconds. The interaction is one-shot to preclude
any eﬀects of repetition over time and to focus in the cleanest possible way on the eﬀects
of information on contracting behavior.
Workers’ performance then determines the payout to the ﬁrm according to the following
formula
ﬁrm payoﬀ = 10 EP · (#correct answers) − wage
7A screenshot of the wage setting screen can be found in Figure A2.3 in the appendix A2.3.
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where # correct answers is given by all solved matches minus all wrong matches. Workers
are paid their predetermined ﬁxed wage and have non-monetary costs of eﬀort from solving
the task:
worker payoﬀ = wage
To avoid that agents can ruin ﬁrms by deliberately giving wrong answers we impose a
lower limit for the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm from the task at 0. This does not preclude ﬁrms from
making losses if the wage exceeds the revenues generated by their worker. Losses had to
be paid from earnings in other parts of the experiment. Given the nature of the task and
the fact that new words and codes are randomly generated for every screen, there should
be virtually no learning possibilities from doing the task a second time. After the real
eﬀort task is completed, there is feedback about the number of correct answers and the
payoﬀ to the ﬁrm and the worker. Both ﬁrms and workers learn only the details from
their interaction, but not from the interaction between any other ﬁrm-worker pair.
Treatments
Our treatment variation consists in the pieces of information elicited in the ﬁrst part from
the experiment that are made available to ﬁrms when submitting their wage proﬁles. In
our main treatment PTB, information about productivity and trustworthiness is available
in a binary way. Information about productivity is given to ﬁrms in the form of whether
a worker has achieved a productivity score in the coding task which is higher than the
mean of all subjects in the respective session, or below the mean. Information about
trustworthiness is given in the form of the binary decision as trustee in the trust game,
i.e., either whether a subject returned trust or not. To preclude framing eﬀects, both pieces
of information were given in a neutral way, i.e., in the trust game the actual information
was labeled “left” or “right” depending on whether subjects opted for the left or the right
branch of the game tree. For the productivity measure, subjects were divided into two
groups labeled “blue” or “yellow” which was explained to subjects.
To control for strategic eﬀects in the elicitation phases of our two measures, we conduct
two control treatments where we make only one piece of information accessible to ﬁrms.
In treatment P, information about productivity only is available and in treatment T
101Worker Characteristics, Contracting, and Wage Differentials
information about trustworthiness only is available.8
In an additional control treatment, we explore the eﬀects of increasing the precision
of information given to subjects. In treatment PT, we give ﬁrms access to the exact
measure of worker productivity (i.e., the number of correct answers) rather than the
binary categorization into workers above or below the productivity mean as in PTB.
We conduct 4 sessions of the main PTB treatment (96 subjects), 2 sessions each (48
subjects) of the two control treatments P and T and 6 sessions (144 subjects) of the PT
treatment.
2.3 Hypotheses
In this section, we sketch a simple agency model for workers who are heterogeneous with
respect to productivity and trustworthiness (assuming stable preferences and productivity
types), which is based on a simpliﬁed version of Englmaier and Leider (2011). A ﬁrm
hires a worker for a ﬁxed wage w which is binding. The interaction is one shot, eﬀort e is
not contractible and there are no contingent contracts. The ﬁrm relies on gift exchange
to elicit performance. Exerting eﬀort has convex costs of eﬀort c(e) for the agent. Output
π is not contractible and assumed to accrue deterministically according to e·p where p is
the worker’s productivity. Firm proﬁts are then π−w = e·p−w and the worker’s utility
u(w) is given by
u(w) = w + η(w − o)(e · p − w) − c(e)
= w + η · w · (e · p − w) − c(e)
= w + η · w · e · p − η · w
2 − c(e)
where η captures the worker’s reciprocal inclination, and o is the outside option which we
normalize to 0. We abstract from explicitly modeling feelings of negative reciprocity but
focus on positive reciprocity between ﬁrms and workers, i.e., η ≥ 0 since in our setting as
8Since the P treatment serves only to exclude strategic concerns in the elicitation phases, we do not
classify subjects into high or low productivity subjects as we do in PTB, but give ﬁrms full information
about workers in the contracting phase.
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a worker there are no possibilities for punishing the ﬁrm other than shirking (e = 0).
In order to elicit a positive eﬀort response the worker has to receive a wage “gift”, i.e.,
a wage exceeding his outside option. When the reciprocal worker receives a positive
wage gift his utility increases in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. From this, and assuming that the ﬁrst
order condition is necessary and suﬃcient for an optimal response, we can determine the
worker’s best response e∗:
∂u(w)
∂e




∗) = η · w · p
The ﬁrst order condition implicitly deﬁnes e∗ and we immediately see that e∗ increases
in w, p and η. The two elicited measures in our experiment are proxying p through the
productivity measure and η through behavior in the trust game. As in treatment PTB
proxies for p and η are available to ﬁrms, we expect according eﬀects on oﬀered wages.
Hypothesis 2.1 In treatment PTB, we expect wage oﬀers and performance in the gift
exchange game to be higher for more productive subjects and for more trustworthy subjects.
For the gift-exchange game, we next look at predictions about the wage-eﬀort relation
from our model for workers classiﬁed in the productivity and trustworthiness dimension.
To do so, we make the further assumption that c(e) = 1
2e2 and can explicitly solve for the
individually rational eﬀort level e∗:
e
∗ = η · w · p.
Now we see that ∀η,p > 0 it holds that ∂e
∂w > 0; for a given level of η and p, a higher wage
induces workers to provide high levels of eﬀort. In particular ∂2e
∂w∂p > 0 and ∂2e
∂w∂η > 0, i.e.,
the wage-eﬀort relation is steeper for more productive and more trustworthy individuals.
Moreover, ∂3e
∂w∂p∂η > 0 implies that productivity and trustworthiness are complementary
in enhancing the eﬃcacy of gift exchange.
Hypothesis 2.2 We expect a positive wage-eﬀort relation that is steeper for more pro-
ductive and more trustworthy subjects.
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As a smaller wage gift is needed to elicit any level of eﬀort, eﬀorts are cheaper to implement
for ﬁrms if workers have high η and p. Hence, we expect ﬁrm proﬁts to increase in those
worker traits and to be highest when interacting with a worker that displays both traits.
Hypothesis 2.3 We expect ﬁrm proﬁts to increase if interacting with more productive
and more trustworthy subjects and to be highest in interactions with subjects that are
productive and trustworthy.
2.4 Experimental Results
2.4.1 Part One: Elicitation of Productivity and Trustworthiness
We start by reporting summary statistics for the coding task performance in part one
from treatments PTB, P and T. Subjects receive three screens with 15 matches each such
that the maximum attainable is 45 correct answers. Only one out of 192 subjects suc-
ceeded in giving all 45 answers within 90 seconds correctly such that time was indeed the
limiting factor and the way productivity was measured does not harm high productivity
subjects. The average number of correct answers given was slightly below 29 with a stan-
dard deviation of about 7 answers. Table 2.1 shows summary statistics and illustrates
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (Real Eﬀort Task)
Treatment Mean S.D. N Median Min Max
PTB 28.64 6.31 96 28.0 9 44
P 28.89 8.08 48 29.5 0 45
T 29.46 6.06 48 29.5 14 41
Total 28.91 6.71 192 29 0 45
Descriptive statistics for coding task performance in part one
that there are no diﬀerences across treatments with all treatments being almost identical
in terms of the main statistics. We particularly do not ﬁnd any evidence that subjects
in the two control treatments (P and T) behave diﬀerently than in our main treatment
PTB. We can therefore exclude that workers behave strategically in the elicitation phases
to signal something to potential future employers as a model of career concerns would
predict. The distribution of correct answers in all treatments is symmetric around the
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mean, but normality is rejected by all conventional tests, see Figure A2.4 in appendix
A2.3. As a further robustness check, we regress the coding outcome on a number of
socio-demographics to see whether there is explanatory power from gender, age, subject
of study or the treatment. We also control for ﬁve character traits in the framework of
the Big Five Personality Test that we elicited in a control questionnaire at the end of the
experiment. Table A2.3 in appendix A2.2 clearly indicates that there is no eﬀect from
gender nor from a quantitative orientation in the subject of study (economics, mathemat-
ics, natural sciences) on the performance in the task. Apart from some negative eﬀect of
age and the character trait “agreableness”, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect from the four other
elicited personality traits from the Big Five Index on coding performance either. More
importantly as the treatment P/T dummies are insigniﬁcant, the regressions conﬁrm that
there is no distortion from strategic concerns between the treatments (and hence diﬀerent
levels of information disclosure) on the outcome of the productivity task.
For the second dimension of information, we let subjects play a binary trust game pre-
sented to them in a neutral frame. Since we employ the strategy method, we have data
on choice behavior in both roles of the trust game for every subject. Table 2.2 displays
the percentage of subjects’ behavior in the trust game per treatment. According to our
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (Trustworthiness)
Treatment no trust trust no trust trust Total
no returntrust no returntrust returntrust returntrust
PTB 43.8% 13.5% 8.3% 34.4% 100%
P 35.4% 14.6% 6.3% 43.8% 100%
T 45.8% 16.7% 18.8% 18.8% 100%
Total 42.2% 14.6% 10.4% 32.8% 100%
Percentage of subjects trusting and returning trust per treatment
measure, about 40 % of all subjects can be considered selﬁsh in the sense that they neither
trust others nor do they return trust as a trustee. In a similar vein, about one third of
subjects appears to have other-regarding concerns such that they both trust and return
trust. The remaining quarter either trusts but does not return trust or vice versa. Al-
though there is some variation across the treatments, these patterns are quite stable in
all three treatments. Subject to the population averages, not to trust is indeed optimal
for selﬁsh subjects and cannot be rationalized by choosing to trust for strategic reasons.
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What is important to note is that about half of all subjects trusted and also about 40
% of all subjects returned trust while about 60 % did not return trust. That is to say
that our design succeeds in creating variation across subjects which makes information
about other subjects valuable for the contracting phase. If in the population our binary
measure of social and reciprocal concerns was distributed less symmetric, the value of the
information would clearly decline - if not vanish - when certain character traits were only
to show up in small minorities of the underlying population.
Since we deem the decision of returning trust as more indicative of an individual’s concern
for reciprocity in the gift-exchange game, we focus in the remainder of the analysis mainly
on the behavior of subjects as a second mover in the described trust game. We control
for the impact of the same socio-demographics on trustworthiness in a probit regression
which can be found in Table A2.4 in appendix A2.2. A similar picture to above emerges
with the absence of a gender, age and treatment eﬀects. A quantitative subject of study
decreases the probability of returning trust and all personality traits are insigniﬁcant with
the exception of ”conscientiousness“. We also control for the number of correct answers
in part one on the propensity to reciprocate trust in part two, but do not ﬁnd any eﬀect
which conﬁrms that there is no relationship between our measure of productivity in part
one and reciprocal behavior in part two, which we summarize in our ﬁrst result.9
Result 2.1 There are no diﬀerences across treatments in personal traits for individual
productivity and reciprocal concerns. The two measures quantify two distinct dimensions
of a person’s characteristics.
2.4.2 Part Two: Gift Exchange Game
We subsequently present the results from the contracting phase, where initially, i.e., before
the measures are elicited, all workers were told which set of information would be disclosed
to ﬁrms. This set of information consisted in
• worker productivity from part one (in treatments PTB and P) and
9The independence of our two measures is also conﬁrmed non-parametrically with a highly insigniﬁ-
cant Spearman rank correlation between the two measures at a signiﬁcance level of p = 0.57.
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• the decision whether to return trust or not in part two (in treatments PTB and T).
Firms do not have any experience or knowledge on how workers behave such that we
consider ﬁrms’ wage policies as the cleanest possible measure of their preferences for
information about workers.
In the analysis of the data from the gift-exchange game, we will focus on the PTB sessions
where both measures about workers were revealed to ﬁrms in a binary way. We will also
comment on the results of the two control treatments P and T, but since the set of
information ﬁrms could condition their wage policy on is smaller, we refrain from directly
comparing decisions in P or T with PTB.
Firm Behavior
We begin by looking at wage oﬀers received by workers. Wages were bounded to be not
negative and not above 250 such that the surplus split under maximum eﬃciency consti-
tuted an interior solution.10 Every worker obtained one oﬀer from each of the 12 ﬁrms,
but just received and saw the relevant wage level for him, which was randomly chosen.
As a consequence, we can analyze all 12 wage oﬀers directed to a worker through the
strategy method, i.e., we have 48∗12 = 576 observations in the PTB treatment. Average
wages that were submitted to one single worker are given in the ﬁrst column of Table 2.3,
whereas the second column lists the average of the actually randomly determined relevant
wage oﬀer. As provided levels of performance by agents are signiﬁcantly lower than the
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for Workers
Treatment Average Actual Average Average Average
wage oﬀer wage oﬀer performance productivity returntrust
PTB 82.3 82.5 20.1 27.8 43.8%
P 108.4 109.2 23.0 29.2 37.5%
T 89.0 87.1 19.4 29.8 20.8%
Total 90.5 90.3 20.6 28.6 36.4%
Obs 1152 96 96 96 96
Summary statistics for workers. The ﬁrst columns show all submitted wage oﬀers to a speciﬁc worker,
the second column only the randomly selected relevant wage. The last column lists the percentage of
workers that returned trust in part two.
10We refer to an outcome where the worker gives the maximum of 45 correct answers and receives a
wage of 225, which would yield a payoﬀ of 225 to both the ﬁrm and the worker.
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elicited productivity measures in part one (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p < 0.01), there
is evidence that agents do not put in unconditionally full eﬀort levels in the contracting
phase.11 Furthermore, we see that the random attribution of roles to workers and ﬁrms
has not distorted our two measures in the sense that the sample means of a session (24
subjects) lie close to the means of the workers (12 subjects). To get a deeper understand-
ing on how ﬁrms set wages in PTB, we run a series of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect regressions on the
wage oﬀer to a speciﬁc worker that we report in Table 2.4. We ﬁnd a positive impact of
Table 2.4: Determinants of Wage Oﬀers in PTB
Dep. Var.: I II
Wage oﬀer PTB PTB
1 if high 27.681***
(2.597)
1 if trustworthy 13.243***
(2.182)
1 if high and trustworthy 41.748***
(3.412)
1 if high and not trustworthy 26.164***
(3.084)






Panel Regressions include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects on wage oﬀers. Standard errors (clustered on the session
level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
being a high productivity and a trustworthy worker on the oﬀered wage level, which is
highly signiﬁcant for both traits in speciﬁcation I. When comparing the relative sizes, it
is immediate to see that employers provide a higher wage premium for the productivity
measure than for the trustworthiness measure. The wage premium is roughly double for
the productivity measure compared to the trustworthiness measure. In speciﬁcation II,
we divide all workers into four categories. To do so, we classify a worker as being of “high
productivity” or “low productivity” as well as being “trustworthy” or “not trustworthy”.
The left out category is a worker who is neither of high productivity nor trustworthy.
We conﬁrm the ﬁndings of speciﬁcation I, i.e., the presence of information about each
dimension of a worker increases the wage a ﬁrm oﬀers in the ﬁrst place. All three co-
11In what follows, we term “performance” the number of correct answers given by workers in the gift
exchange relation with ﬁrms, to draw a clear semantic distinction to the measure of “productivity” in
part one.
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eﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (t-test between two coeﬃcients, all
three tests below p = 0.024) indicating that there is little substitution of the wage premia
between the two dimensions. If a worker moves from the lower to the higher category
in one dimension, this yields a constant wage premium regardless of her position in the
other category.12 The results support Hypothesis 2.1 from section 2.3 for the impact of
information on wage setting behavior by ﬁrms.
Result 2.2 Firms are willing to pay a signiﬁcant wage premium for both characteristics.
The premium for being a high productivity worker amounts to roughly double the premium
for being trustworthy.
In the two control treatments P and T, information about one dimension of worker char-
acteristics is not available to ﬁrms. When we run identical ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects regressions
for these two treatments, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant wage premium for productivity in the P
treatment, but not for trustworthiness. In the T treatment, there is a positive premium
for being trustworthy, but this is not signiﬁcant. As expected, there is no wage premium
for productivity in T. We take this as further evidence that information about workers
matters for wage oﬀers, but more so for the productivity dimension than for the measure
of trustworthiness.13 We next look at worker behavior in terms of eﬀort provision.
Worker Behavior
With respect to eﬀort levels, the question arises what inﬂuences workers most in their
decision to provide eﬀort. Along the lines of the gift exchange literature, one can argue
that the main driving force will be a high wage oﬀer such that agents reciprocate by
exerting high levels of eﬀort. This notwithstanding, the characteristics of a person in
terms of productivity and intrinsic willingness to perform well at a given task can similarly
aﬀect actual eﬀort levels.
12We also explore what is the driving force of ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers in a regression on the average oﬀered
wage, but all ﬁrm characteristics (own coding and behavior in the trust game, expectations, gender, age,
ﬁeld of study, risk proxy, Big Five Index) turn out insigniﬁcant for the average level of wage oﬀered for
all 12 workers by the ﬁrm. We particularly do not ﬁnd an eﬀect of both measures of elicited expectations
on the wage setting behavior.
13See Table A2.5 in appendix A2.2 for the detailed regression results.
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Table 2.5: OLS Regression on Eﬀort




1 if productive -1.065 -1.805
(3.508) (3.908)













OLS Regression on the number of correct choices in the gift exchange game. Standard errors (clustered
on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10
To ﬁnd out more about which of these rationales helps to explain worker behavior in the
contracting phase, we regress the number of correct answers on the oﬀered wage, both
measures of worker characteristics and a set of controls which are reported in Table 2.5. We
ﬁnd that the oﬀered wage has a highly signiﬁcant positive impact on the amount of eﬀort,
which we take as a clear sign that gift-exchange considerations play a role in our real-eﬀort
experiment. Controlling for the wage which already includes information about worker
types, a higher productivity measure from part one does not increase the performance
in the interaction between ﬁrms and workers. Surprisingly, reciprocal concerns among
workers are not predictive for the eﬀort decision. A worker that has returned trust in
part two of the experiment, gives on average the same amount of correct answers more
than a worker who has not returned trust. When we control for interaction eﬀects between
wages and worker types, there are no additional eﬀects on the eﬀort decision either. This
is indicative of wages being set optimally by ﬁrms with all informational value from types
already incorporated in the wage oﬀer. There is no additional eﬀect of individual worker
characteristics on eﬀort that is not yet captured in the wage oﬀer. When we control
for other socio-demographic characteristics of workers, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender,
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age and quantitative dummies in speciﬁcation II. All Big Five measures are insigniﬁcant.
There is no evidence for a relationship between performance and characteristics in excess
of the wage, what we summarize in our next result.
Result 2.3 Only the wage oﬀer has a signiﬁcant impact on performance in the gift ex-
change game. We do not ﬁnd an additional positive impact from worker’s characteristics
on eﬀort choices in excess of the one already embodied in the wage oﬀer.
Performance of Contracts in the Gift Exchange Game
Putting the wage setting decision by ﬁrms and the worker’s eﬀort decision together, we
turn to the analysis of the proﬁtability of ﬁrm’s wage policies given the information they
have about workers. We pool all contracts concluded in the full information treatment
PTB and allocate all workers into the four above mentioned broad categories.14 Table 2.6
Table 2.6: Descriptives for Contracts in PTB
Worker Type
PTB treatment
Eﬀort Wage Firm’s Proﬁts Obs
high productivity & trustworthy 28.9 117.1 171.4 7
high productivity & not trustworthy 19.7 96.4 100.9 11
low productivity & trustworthy 19.4 69.6 123.9 14
low productivity & not trustworthy 17.1 69.0 102.3 16
Total 20.1 82.5 118.35 48
Statistics of all contracts for the four diﬀerent worker types in the PTB treatment.
shows the key summary statistics for all 48 concluded contracts in the PTB treatment. We
ﬁnd that particularly the interaction of both worker characteristics produces high levels of
eﬀort from workers (i.e., the number of correct choices given in the gift-exchange relation).
These workers give close to 10 correct answers more than all other workers which leads
to higher proﬁts for ﬁrms only when they interact with a worker of this type. Wages
are increasing in worker characteristics and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to the worker
type identiﬁed (Kruskal-Wallis-Test on session averages, p = 0.01) whereas there is no
diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ proﬁts (Kruskal-Wallis-Test on session averages, p = 0.15). The two
14All results in this section are identical if we were to include the data from the two control session
P and T, but we want to exclude any possible eﬀect that the absence of one piece of information might
have both on ﬁrms and workers in what follows.
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characteristics act as complements to produce highest levels of eﬃciency and eﬀort only
if they both are present at the same time. We ﬁnd further evidence for the importance of
the trustworthiness characteristic by constructing a variable that compares the amount
of worker eﬀort (i.e., number of correct answers) with worker productivity from part one
and abstracts from the wage. This measure takes on values of 71 % and 76 % for high and
low productivity workers, but increases to 83 % for trustworthy workers and decreases
to 67 % for not trustworthy workers. Trustworthy workers provide the highest levels of
eﬀort compared to their measure of productivity in part one.
Result 2.4 Workers that have both characteristics - high productivity and trustworthiness
- provide signiﬁcantly higher levels of eﬀort which leads to higher ﬁrm proﬁts. In the
absence of at least one of the character trait, eﬀorts and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are substantially
lower in a ﬁrm-worker interaction.
We end this section by presenting evidence about the interaction of the worker types with
the proﬁtability of employment strategies of ﬁrms in PTB. We have seen that ﬁrms’ proﬁts
are considerably increased when they interact with a high productivity and trustworthy
worker. Since ﬁrms cannot actively choose their worker in our design, but are allocated
a worker at random and can only oﬀer diﬀerent wages, we next proceed to analyzing
how the diﬀerent types of workers react to an oﬀered wage. We begin with the eﬀects of
diﬀerent levels of trustworthiness among workers on contracting behavior between ﬁrms
and workers before we proceed to our productivity measure.
Not surprisingly and in line with the literature, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive relationship
between the wage and the provided eﬀort level.15 The slope can be interpreted as the wage
increment required to induce the worker to provide one additional unit of eﬀort. Both
slopes are signiﬁcantly positive at 0.19 (trustworthy workers) and 0.16 (not trustworthy
workers). Since the eﬃciency factor of eﬀort in our design is exogenously ﬁxed at 10, the
wage eﬀort relation must be signiﬁcantly larger than 0.1 to make it proﬁtable for ﬁrms
to pay high wages. Only then additional wage costs are outweighed by an increase in
revenue and hence lead to an increase in proﬁts. For trustworthy workers, the coeﬃcient
15Figure A2.5 in appendix A2.3 displays the scatterplot of the wage-eﬀort relationship for trustworthy
and not trustworthy workers.
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in the wage-eﬀort regression is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.1 at p = 0.03 (t-test), but
not so for not trustworthy workers at p = 0.44 (t-test). It pays to increase the wage
for ﬁrms only to workers that are trustworthy, since proﬁts do not increase signiﬁcantly
when interacting with a not trustworthy worker. In Figure 2.1 we plot a ﬁrm’s proﬁt
against the implemented wage separately for trustworthy and not trustworthy workers
in the PTB treatment. Firm proﬁts are increasing with both worker types, but only
Figure 2.1: PTB: Wage-Proﬁt Relation (Trustworthiness Measure)
Scatterplot of the wage-proﬁt relation of ﬁrms for trustworthy workers (left panel) and not trustworthy
workers (right panel). The shaded areas indicate the 95 % conﬁdence interval around the linear regression
line.
signiﬁcantly so for trustworthy workers. In terms of proﬁts from the gift-exchange with
trustworthy subjects, a wage increment of 1 EP leads to an increase of 0.9 EP in proﬁts,
which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. When ﬁrms interact with a worker that did
not return trust, however, there is a ﬂatter relation between the oﬀered wage and ﬁrms’
proﬁts. An additional increment in the wage oﬀer leads to an increase of 0.3 EP in proﬁts,
which is not diﬀerent from zero. Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients between ﬁrm’s
proﬁt and the wage conﬁrm this ﬁnding: p = 0.03 for trustworthy types and p = 0.25 for
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not trustworthy types. In addition, we ﬁnd a lower proﬁt variance for trustworthy types
which seems prima facie desirable.
We next look at the interaction of the wage and the measure for worker productivity.
There is again a signiﬁcantly positive relationship between wages and eﬀort for high
productivity workers (0.20) and low productivity workers (0.18), both at p < 0.001 in
an OLS regression. Both types of workers react to the wage incentive in a positive way.
The slope for both types of productivity workers is positive but not signiﬁcantly bigger
Figure 2.2: PTB: Wage-Proﬁt Relation (Productivity Measure)
Scatterplot of the wage-proﬁt relation of ﬁrms for high productivity workers (left panel) and low produc-
tivity workers (right panel). The shaded areas indicate the 95 % conﬁdence interval around the linear
regression line.
than 0.1, the threshold needed for a higher wage to induce higher proﬁts for ﬁrms (t-test,
0.24 and 0.15 respectively). We conﬁrm this by Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcients
between wages and proﬁt levels that are positive, but not signiﬁcantly so (p = 0.10
for not productive types and p = 0.33 for productive types). Figure 2.2 reports the
wage-proﬁt relationship in a similar presentation as above, but now for the productivity
measure. Taking the results for both elicited measures together, we ﬁnd evidence in favor
114Worker Characteristics, Contracting, and Wage Differentials
of Hypothesis 2.2 with a particular focus on the trustworthiness measure.
The relationship between proﬁts and wages is important to determine optimal wages for
ﬁrms that want to maximize their proﬁts. The mapping of wages into proﬁts must not
be linear and will depend on the type of the worker in the presence of information about
types. From the relationship between ﬁrm proﬁts π and initially oﬀered wages w, we
estimate the following relationship on the basis of the data from the contracting phase:
π = α · w + β · w
2
We force the wage-proﬁt curve through the origin by omitting the constant and allow
for a quadratic relationship as the simplest non-linear functional form. Standard OLS
regressions for each of the four types separately produce our estimates of α and β. After
solving for the implied optimal wage oﬀer w∗, we calculate implied proﬁts π∗ and compare
this to the actual averages we have from our data. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms optimally should
Table 2.7: Observed and Implied Optimal Wages in PTB
Worker Type
Observed Implied Observed Implied
Wage Optimal Wage Proﬁts Proﬁts
high productivity & trustworthy 117 152 171 185
high productivity & not trustworthy 96 130 101 118
low productivity & trustworthy 70 105 124 164
low productivity & not trustworthy 69 0 102 0
oﬀer wages that are generally higher than those observed in the experiment. Firms could
increase their proﬁts by increasing the wage.16 Optimal wages diﬀer with respect to the
type such that ﬁrms should condition their wage oﬀer on the worker type. The qualitative
order of optimal wages is identical to that observed in the experiment with highest wages
being best for trustworthy workers with high productivity - leading to maximal proﬁts.
A corner solution for the lowest worker category yields implied wages and proﬁts of zero,
i.e., the theory would suggest that it does not pay for ﬁrms to hire these types. The last
column in Table 2.7 provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2.3 and conﬁrms the positive
impact particularly of the trustworthiness measure for ﬁrm proﬁts.
16The wage setting of ﬁrms naturally also interacts with ﬁrms’ individual characteristics e.g. risk
aversion, since there is always the danger that a worker shirks completely. Risk aversion could make
observed wage levels optimal.
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Taken together, the results from the contracting phase suggest that gift-exchange is robust
across all identiﬁed types of workers from the positive wage-eﬀort relations. Regardless of
the information about workers available to ﬁrms in the contracting phase, they can expect
on average a positive wage-eﬀort relation from the interaction with workers. However,
only with trustworthy types gift-exchange is so eﬀective that a higher wage leads to a
signiﬁcant increase in ﬁrm proﬁts. Worker types aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁts and are rightly taken
into account by ﬁrms when writing contracts. Only if information about worker types is
available, ﬁrms can increase their proﬁts by tailoring the corresponding wage level to a
speciﬁc worker. Exploiting complementarities between the incentive scheme and worker
types therefore crucially depends on the amount of information accessible to ﬁrms before
writing contracts.
Result 2.5 Gift exchange is present for all types, but is strongest for trustworthy types.
Optimal wages depend on worker characteristics such that information about workers is
valuable for ﬁrms to tailor incentives to worker types.
Eﬀects of the Mode of Information Presentation
We have seen above that the availability of information helps ﬁrms to adapt contracts to
workers and shapes outcomes in a gift-exchange interaction. In this chapter, we examine
if the exact presentation of information has an impact on contracting and ﬁnal outcomes.
To do so, we run a series of sessions in an additional treatment (PT) where the information
about productivity is given to ﬁrms in a quasi-continuous manner. Instead of the binary
information in PTB that a worker has a higher or lower productivity than the mean, ﬁrms
are now given access to the exact number of correct answers in part one as a measure of
worker productivity. Everything else (including the binary nature of the trustworthiness
measure) is kept identical to the PTB treatment from above. Note that this modiﬁcation
is not a diﬀerent framing of the same piece of information, since ﬁrms have access to more
information which is more precise compared to the binary case. We run 6 additional
sessions of this PT treatment with an additional 144 subjects, i.e., 864 contract oﬀers.
For the elicitation phases of productivity and trustworthiness as well as expectations,
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there are no diﬀerences to the PTB treatment.17 Similar to above, we ﬁrst look at the
wage setting behavior of ﬁrms. Table 2.8 reports a panel regression with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects
where worker productivity is given in a continuous manner. Wage oﬀers are now much
Table 2.8: Determinants of Wage Oﬀers in PT
Dep. Var.: I II III
Wage oﬀer Treatment PT PT+P+T PT+P+T
Worker productivity 3.020*** 2.584*** 2.347***
(0.205) (0.385) (0.497)
1 if trustworthy 3.923 3.933 1.283
(2.868) (2.381) (2.633)
Worker productivity * treatment P 0.854
(0.515)
1 if trustworthy * treatment T 10.892
(7.369)
Constant 4.270 18.479 20.849
(5.752) (11.000) (11.748)
obs 864 1440 1440
R2 0.10 0.12 0.12
Panel Regressions include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects on wage oﬀers in treatments PT, P and T. Standard errors
(clustered on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at
p=0.10.
more focused on information about worker productivity rather than trustworthiness. For
every correct answer in part one, ﬁrms are willing to pay a highly signiﬁcant wage premium
of about 3 EP. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant wage premium for trustworthiness anymore in PT.
We are able to compare the results in PT to our two control treatments P and T since
the precision of information is identical in these three treatments, but pooling yields
identical results. The increased precision of the productivity measure appears to be a
much more important concern for ﬁrms in the wage setting phase compared to the binary
information about trustworthiness. As a consequence, a diﬀerent distribution of wage
oﬀers arises endogenously from a diﬀerent presentation of information.
Figure 2.3 documents this diﬀerence and plots the estimated distributions of all wage
oﬀers in PT and PTB. The binary presentation of information in PTB leads to a decrease
in the mean and the variance of wage oﬀers compared to the PT treatment where ﬁrms
have access to details about worker productivity. Both distributions are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test, p < 0.01). Workers subsequently
respond to this new wage distribution in a diﬀerent way, when we look at eﬀort choices
17Since the instructions for the ﬁrst two parts of the experiment were identical to the PTB treatment,
this is not surprising at all. Thus we omit a detailed comparison of these results between PTB and PT
here. They are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of All Oﬀered Wages
Distribution of all wage oﬀers submitted by ﬁrms in treatments PT and PTB.
of workers in PT. We document a signiﬁcantly positive wage-eﬀort relation across all
workers, but in contrast to the ﬁndings in PTB, there is no positive eﬀect on ﬁrm proﬁts
from the interaction with a trustworthy type in PT. With the wage distribution in PT
being generated under a pronounced focus on the productivity measure by ﬁrms, outcomes
in the gift-exchange games change considerably compared to our main PTB treatment.
Result 2.6 Subtle diﬀerences in the presentation of worker information to ﬁrms matters
a lot for contracting behavior and subsequent outcomes in the gift-exchange game.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We present evidence from a laboratory gift-exchange experiment indicating that ﬁrms con-
dition their wage policies on available information about worker productivity and worker’s
trustworthiness. Firms oﬀer more generous wages to workers who are, according to the
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elicited measures, more productive and more trustworthy. Our results suggest that work-
ers with better productivity skill sets and high levels of trustworthiness earn wage premia
on the labor market.
The channel through which the availability of information has an impact on ﬁnal out-
comes lies in the possibility for ﬁrms to adapt contract oﬀers to speciﬁc worker types in
order to make use of complementarities between wages and types. Our results show that
gift-exchange considerations play a role across all types, but they are strongest for trust-
worthy workers. Only for trustworthy types wage increases translate into an increase in
proﬁts for ﬁrms. Optimal wages for ﬁrms diﬀer with respect to the worker type and induce
maximal ﬁrm proﬁts for high productivity workers that are trustworthy which illustrates
the importance of complementarities also with respect to diﬀerent worker characteristics.
We show that subtle diﬀerences in the information presentation to ﬁrms induce an endoge-
nously diﬀerent distribution of wage oﬀers in our control treatment PT. If given access to
the precise level of worker productivity, ﬁrms are much more focused on the productivity
measure than on trustworthiness.
While moral hazard is an important friction that governs contracts and incentives on labor
markets, we argue in this chapter that there is an important interaction between worker
heterogeneity and the contractual incompleteness of labor markets. The role of a worker’s
individual productivity for contracting outcomes has long been acknowledged. We show
that if a ﬁrm takes heterogeneity with respect to trustworthiness into account, it aﬀects
the eﬀectiveness of gift-exchange and hence its proﬁt levels. Since the interaction between
worker types and the solution to the moral hazard problem matters, the existence of in-
formation about worker characteristics contains an economic value for ﬁrms. Given the
resources spent on information acquisition by ﬁrms for the hiring decision, we consider the
role and the acquisition of information on labor markets a ﬁeld of high economic relevance
and a promising topic for future research to foster our understanding of the functioning
of labor markets under incomplete contracts.
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2.6 Appendix A2
Appendix A2.1: Elicitation of Expectations
In this appendix, we describe in details the elicitation of subjects’ expectations about the
characteristics in the population in an incentivized manner. After the elicitation of the
productivity and the trustworthiness measure, all participants are asked to estimate the
number of correct answers in the productivity task reported before. A correct guess of
the session average is rewarded with a prize of 100 EP, from which 10 points are deducted
for every correct answer that the guess was away from the true value. If the diﬀerence
between the guess and the true value exceeded 10 answers, subjects earned at worst 0
EP from this part.18 In a similar vein, we ask subjects how many of the 24 subjects in
their session have chosen to reciprocate trust. Subjects are rewarded for the precision
of their guesses with a prize of 100 EP if their estimate was correct, and 20 points were
deducted for every subject that their guess was away from the true value. Hence, if
their guess was more than 5 subjects away from the true value, earnings were 0 EP from
this part. Expectations were elicited referring to the current session (24 subjects) of the
experiment, which we consider suﬃciently large that subjects perceive their impact on
the session average small enough to enter their expectation about the whole population.
With no feedback about the choices of other participants, individual expectations about
the population are a likely candidate to explain the decision on contract choices later on.
The resolution of this part took also place at the end of the experiment, such that subjects
entered the gift exchange without any information about the behavior of other subjects
in the experiment.
Table A2.1: Descriptives of Expectations
Treatment # Correct Choices # Correct Choices # Returntrust # Returntrust
realized expected realized (per session) expected (per session)
PTB 28.6 23.8 10.3 9.9
P 28.9 23.9 12 10.5
T 29.5 26.0 9 9.8
Total 28.9 24.4 10.4 10.0
Subjects’ expectations vs. realizations of two elicited measures for both elicited measures.
18Subjects could only enter integer guesses and the average was rounded to an integer.
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We report in Table A2.1 both subjects’ expectations and actual realizations in the three
treatments. As far as the number of correct choices in part one is concerned, subjects
underestimate the average number of correct outcomes by about 4 answers compared to
the true average value. This is conﬁrmed by a highly signiﬁcant Wilcoxon-signed-rank-
test between the own performance and the guess of the average productivity measure
(p < 0.01). Indeed, out of all 192 subjects, 146 give a lower expectation of the average
than their own coding performance in part one, 36 a higher one and 10 subjects consider
themselves to be average. Note however that at this point of the experiment, subjects do
not know their performance in part one explicitly but only implicitly from remembering
how many correct answers they gave.
Table A2.2: OLS Regression on Expectations
Dep. Var.: Dep. Var.:
Expected Average of Correct Choices Expected # Subjects Returning Trust
# Correct Choices 0.431*** -0.101*
(0.058) (0.060)
1 if trust 0.291 2.528***
(0.838) (0.868)






Treatment P 0.208 -0.171
(1.089) (1.129)






OLS Regression on elicited expectations. Coeﬃcients show eﬀects relative to answers in the PTB treat-
ment. trust and returntrust are dummy variables for behavior in part two. Due to a server breakdown
at the end of one P session, we are lacking the socio-demographic variables of one session (24 subjects).
Standard errors in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
When asked about the number of subjects that returned trust in their session, guesses are
more accurate and subjects correctly predict that a bit less than half of the participants
chose to return trust. To gain a deeper understanding of what drives the formation of
expectations, we regress expectations on behavior in part one and include the control
treatments P and T. From Table A2.2 it is immediate to see that subjects are strongly
(positively) inﬂuenced by their past behavior, which is suggestive evidence for the false
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consensus eﬀect. For estimating the average number of correct choices in the elicitation
task, the own result is highly signiﬁcant. In a similar manner, having trusted and returned
trust oneself increases one’s expectation of the number of subjects that return trust within
a session signiﬁcantly. Socio-demographics do not matter for expectations and we ﬁnd
that there are some negative eﬀects from the coding task on expectations of returning
trust, i.e., subjects with a high productivity in part one are susceptible to adapt their
expectations about reciprocal inclinations downward, but not vice versa.
122Worker Characteristics, Contracting, and Wage Differentials
Appendix A2.2: Tables
Table A2.3: OLS Regression on Productivity Measure







Treatment P 0.948 0.748
(1.449) (1.462)
Treatment T 0.881 0.391
(1.112) (1.135)
Big Five (Extraversion) 0.588
(0.426)
Big Five (Agreableness) 0.840*
(0.506)
Big Five (Conscientiousness) -0.587
(0.455)
Big Five (Emotional Stability) -0.221
(0.446)






OLS Regression on the number of correct answers in part one. Coeﬃcients show eﬀects relative to answers
in the PTB treatment. Quant is a dummy for quantitative orientation of studies. All Big Five measures
are on a scale from 1 to 7 indicating the strength of the individual personality trait. Due to a server
breakdown at the end of one P session, we are lacking the socio-demographic variables of one session (24
subjects). Standard Errors in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at
p=0.10.
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Table A2.4: Probit Regression on Trustworthiness
Dep. Var.: 1 if Trustworthy I II III
Female 0.109 0.109 0.295
(0.210) (0.210) (0.255)
Age 0.006 0.007 0.009
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Quant -0.849*** -0.848*** -0.884***
(0.249) (0.249) (0.254)
Treatment P 0.410 0.409 0.513
(0.301) (0.301) (0.312)
Treatment T -0.194 -0.195 -0.256
(0.232) (0.232) (0.239)
Big Five (Extraversion) -0.069
(0.092)
Big Five (Agreableness) 0.096**
(0.107)
Big Five (Conscientiousness) -0.229
(0.098)
Big Five (Emotional Stability) 0.141
(0.096)
Big Five (Openness) 0.069
(0.115)
# Correct Choices 0.001 -0.001
(0.016) (0.017)
Constant -0.188 -0.243 -0.249
(0.641) (0.879) (1.170)
Obs 168 168 168
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.10
Probit Regression on trustworthiness. Coeﬃcients show eﬀects relative to answers in the PTB treatment.
Quant is a dummy for quantitative orientation of studies. All Big Five measures are on a scale from 1
to 7 indicating the strength of the individual personality trait with 1 being very weak and 7 being very
strong. Due to a server breakdown at the end of one P session, we are lacking the socio-demographic
variables of one session (24 subjects). Standard Errors in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01,
** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
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Table A2.5: Determinants of the Wage Oﬀer - Control Treatments P and T
Dep. Var.: I II
Wage oﬀer Treatment P Treatment T
Worker Productivity 3.204*** 0.109
(0.021) (0.022)






Panel Regressions include ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects on wage oﬀers. Productivity from part one is displayed in a
continuous manner to ﬁrms. Return trust is a dummy variable for worker behavior in part two. Standard
errors (clustered on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05
and * at p=0.10.
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Appendix A2.3: Figures
Figure A2.1: Screenshot: Real-eﬀort Task
Screenshot of the real-eﬀort task: The key is shown in the upper half of the screen, the matching is done
in the lower half of the screen. Subjects had 30 seconds for each of the three screens.
126Worker Characteristics, Contracting, and Wage Differentials
Figure A2.2: Trust Game
Presentation of the trust game to subjects. Subjects had to choose as person X (ﬁrst mover) and as person
Y (second mover), where at each point they could choose between ”left“ and ”right“. The corresponding
payoﬀs are given in experimental points (EP) with the ﬁrst mover’s payoﬀ listed ﬁrst.
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Figure A2.3: Screenshot: Wage Entry Screen for Firms
Wage entry screen for ﬁrms: Worker Characteristics are shown in brackets; ﬁrms enter one wage for every
worker.
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Figure A2.4: Histogram of Coding Task
Histogram of the elicitation stage for productivity for all treatments (PT, P, T, PTB) with density of the
number of correct answers.
Figure A2.5: PTB: Wage-eﬀort Relation (Trustworthiness Measure)
Scatterplot of the wage-eﬀort relation for trustworthy types (left panel) and not trustworthy types (right
panel) in PTB. The shaded areas indicate the 95 % conﬁdence interval around the linear regression line.
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Figure A2.6: PTB: Wage-eﬀort Relation (Productivity Measure)
Scatterplot of the wage-eﬀort relation for high productivity types (left panel) and low productivity types
(right panel) in PTB. The shaded areas indicate the 95 % conﬁdence interval around the linear regression
line.
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This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making. In the experiment you and other 
participants
1 of the experiments are asked to make decisions. You can thereby earn money. Your decisions as well 
as the decisions of other participants determine  your earnings from the experiment according to  the  rules 
explained below. 
 
The whole experiment approximately lasts 1 hour and 15 minutes and consists of four parts. First of all, you 
receive the instructions for part I. Instructions for parts II to IV are handed out to you at the beginning of the 
respective parts. For each part you are asked to enter  your decisions into the computer. The parts are not 
independent of each other. This implies that decisions taken in one part of the experiment may sometimes (not 
always) affect other parts of the experiment. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions after reading through the instructions of during the experiment. 
One of the experimenters will then come to you and answer your questions in private.  
 
While making your decisions, there is a clock counting down in the right upper corner of your computer screen. 
This clock serves as a guide for how much time it should take you. You may, of course, exceed the time limits. 
Once time has run out, it is only the pure information screens which will be dismissed as they do not ask you to 
make any decisions. 
 
Payment 
At the beginning of the experiment you receive 4 Euro for arriving on time. During the experiment you can earn 
more money by collecting points. At the end of the experiment, the points get converted into Euro at the exchange 
rate of 
 
1 Point = 0.0125 Euro (1.25 EUROCENT) 
that is 1 Euro = 80 Points 
 
At the end of the experiment the amount of money you earned during the experiment as well as your 4 
Euro starting balance will be paid to you in cash. 
 
Anonymity 
At no point during or after the experiment you will find out with whom you interact and the identity of 
other participants. In turn, other participants will not find out your identity and your earnings at any point 
during or after the experiment. There is a possibility that decisions you took in [PTB/PT: parts I and II] [P: part 
I] [T: part II] are made public to other participants in later parts of the experiment. Please note that your identity 
remains secret all the same. 
 
It is strictly prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Furthermore, please 
note that you may only use the functions of the computer that are part of the experiment. Communication or 
playing around with the computer results in exclusion from the experiment.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For convenience, we only use male terms in the instructions. They should be considered as being gender neutral. 
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Appendix A2.4: Instructions (translated from German)
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Part I 
 
During the first part of the experiment you are asked to link terms to the numerical codes corresponding to them. 






















The upper part of the screen shows a code key that links specific terms to specific codes. The numerical code 
always consists of four digits. In the lower part of the screen,  you have to assign terms to their respective 
numerical codes. For each term there are four possible codes, displayed as options a) to d), but only a single one 
code among the listed one is correct. Please click on the correct numerical code for each of the terms. The order 
of terms as shown in the key code is identical to the order of terms in the assignment task. 
  
There are always 15 terms per screen and you are given 30 seconds per screen. This means that after 30 seconds 
there is a new screen that pops up and contains 15 new terms and codes. In total, you are given 90 seconds for 
the numerical code tasks, i.e. three different screens pop up one after the other. 
The order in which you assign terms to their corresponding codes does not play a role. You may skip terms and 
you may go back to change your old decisions. All terms that you were not able to assign before the screen 
disappears after 30 seconds do not count for your final payment determination.  
 
For every correct answer you receive 10 points. For each wrong answer you get a deduction of 10 points. You 
may not run into a loss however, i.e. it’s not possible to get minus points and in the worst case your earnings 
amount to 0 points in this part of the experiment. The difference between correct and wrong answers is called 
correct assignments.  
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Correct assignments = # correct answers – # wrong answers 
 
You will only find out about your performance and thus about the amount of points you earned in this part of the 
experiment at the very end of the experiment. Your earnings from this part of the experiment correspond to 
the sum of all points that you earned by giving correct answers reduced by the points that got deducted for 
each wrong answer. 
  
Example 1: You achieve 26 correct answers and 2 wrong answers. Your earnings amount to (26-2) * 10 = 240 
points. 
 
Example 2: You achieve 8 correct answers and 12 wrong answers. Your earnings are 0 points. 
  
There will be a 60 second trial run of the numerical code task before the start of the experiment in order to get 
familiar with the computer program. The trail run is not part of the experiment and does not influence your final 
payments. 
 
Part II  
(parts and instructions were presented sequentially to subjects) 
 
During the second part of the experiment you are asked to make two decisions,  both of which refer  to the 
following situation. Numbers correspond to the earnings in points from this part, and they are labelled in a way 













Person X chooses between “left” and “right”. If he decides for “left”, person X himself and person Y receive 120 
points respectively from this part of the experiment. If he decides on “right”, it is person Y who decides on the 
final earning points in this part. If person Y chooses “left”, person X receives 80 points and person Y receives 320 
points. If he  chooses “right”, person X and  person Y receive 200 points respectively  from this part of the 
experiment. 
 
You do not know whether you are person X or person Y. The decision is made by the computer at the end 
of the experiment only. You thus have to make two decisions: The first decision is implemented if you end up 
becoming person X (“left” or “right”). The second decision is implemented if you end up becoming person Y 
(“left“ or “right”). At the end of the experiment the type of person (X or Y) is randomly assigned to you. Also, 
there is another participant who is randomly assigned to you and who takes on the respective other type of person. 
X 
Y  (120/120) 
(80/320)  (200/200) 
left  right 
left
   
right 
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It is only your decision of your randomly assigned person type that is relevant for your final earnings. This 
means that if you end up being person X (or Y), the decision that you took as person X (or Y) is relevant 
only.  The final earnings from this part of the experiments are therefore not found out until the end of the 
experiment. 
  
Please type your decisions into the computer and confirm by clicking OK. As long as you haven’t used the OK 




During the third part of  the experiment you are asked for  your assessment concerning all participants’  past 
behaviour in parts I and II. The better your estimates for the average outcomes in the first two parts, the 
more money you earn in part III. You are asked to estimate two outcomes. 
  
Estimate 1: How did the participants in part I of this experiment perform on average? As a reminder, part I dealt 
with the numerical code task. Please enter your estimate for the average number of correct assignments of all 
participants in part I on your screen. As defined in part I, the number of „correct assignments“ refers to the 
number of correct answers net of the number of wrong answers. 
  
If your estimate is correct, you receive 100 points. Points will be reduced in case your estimate deviates 
from the true value. 10 points are taken away for each assignment that your estimate deviates from the true 
average of all participants.  For example, in case your estimate deviates from the true value by one correct 
assignment, you receive 90 points. In case your estimate deviates from the true value by two correct assignments, 
you receive 80 points, etc. In case your estimate deviates by 10 or more correct assignments, you receive 0 points. 
You are informed on the true average and on your earnings from this part of the experiment only at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Example 1: You estimate the average to be 20 correct assignments. The true average is 17 correct assignments. 
Your estimate thus deviates from the true average by 3 correct assignments. Consequently, you earn 100 – 3*10 = 
70 points.  
 
Example 2: You estimate the average to be 9 correct assignments. The true average is 22 correct assignments. 
Your estimate thus deviates from the true average by 13 correct assignments. Consequently, you earn 0 points.  
  
Estimation 2: How many of the 24 participants of this experiment chose "right“ being person Y in part II? Please 
enter your estimate for the average number of correct assignments of all participants in part I on your screen. If 
your estimate is correct, you receive 100 points. 20 points are taken away for each participant that your estimate 
deviates from the true number of participants choosing “right”. For example, in case your estimate deviates from 
the true number of participants by one participant, you receive 80 points. In case your estimate deviates from the 
true number by two participants, you receive 60 points,  etc.  In case your estimate deviates by 5 or more 
participants, you receive 0 points.  
You are informed on the true number of participants and on your earnings from this part of the experiment only at 
the end of the experiment. 
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Example 1: You estimate the number of participants that chose “right” being person Y to be 16. The true number 
is 14 participants. Your estimate thus deviates from the true number by 2 participants. Consequently, you earn 
100 – 2*20 = 60 points. 
  
Example 2: You estimate the number of participants that chose “right” being person Y to be 5. The true number is 
12 participants. Your estimate thus deviates from the true number by 7 participants. Consequently, you earn 0 
points. 
 
Please note: The decision that participants took being person X does not play a role for this part. Your estimate 
merely concerns the decision that all 24 participants took being person Y. The type of person that is randomly 
assigned to the participants at the end of the experiment is irrelevant to this part. Your estimate should refer to all 




During the fourth part of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns a type of person to you. There are two 
types of persons, employers and employees. 
  
Brief overview of part IV of the experiment: 
Part IV of the experiment consists of two stages. The stages are structured as following: 
 
1.  Employers and employees sign an employment contract. In the first stage employers thus state which 
wage level they are willing to pay to which employee. 
2.  In the second stage of this part, each employer is randomly assigned to an employee who, once again, is 
given 90 seconds to solve the numerical code task of part I for the employer. The number of correct 




There are 24 participants in this room, i.e. there are exactly 12 employers and 12 employees. On the first screen of 




Y  (120/120) 
(80/320)  (200/200) 
left  right 
left  right 
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1.  Determination of wages 
 
In a first step, employers state which wage level they are willing to pay to which of the 12 employees in return for 
them solving the numerical code task in stage 2 of this part. For this purpose, employers get two pieces of 
information about each employee: The number of correct assignments (# correct answers – # wrong answers) 
from part I of the experiment, and the decision of the employees that he took being person Y in the decision 
situation of part II of the experiment. 
 






















The order of listed employees is random. Information on each employee’s behaviour in [PTB/PT: parts I and 
II] [P: part I] [T: part II] of the experiment are provided in brackets to the employers.  
[PTB:  If an employee  achieved more correct assignments than the average in part one, he belongs to 
“group yellow”. If he achieved less than the average in part one, he belongs to “group blue”.] [PT: The 
number of correct assignments in part one and the decision in part two is given in brackets] [P: The 
number of correct assignments in part one is given in brackets] [T: The decision in part two is given in 
brackets] 
 
For example, the employee [PTB: (group yellow, right), PT: (5, right), P: (5), T: (right)] [PTB: achieved more 
correct assignments than the average in part I] [PT/P: achieved 5 correct assignments in part I] and [PT/T decided 
on “right” in the decision scenario of part II]. Correspondingly, the employee [PTB: (group blue, left), PT: (13, 
left), P: (13), T: (left)] [PTB: achieved less correct assignments than the average in part I] [PT/P: achieved 13 
correct assignments in part I] and [PT/T decided on “left” in the decision scenario of part II]. 
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Wage levels should be entered in the box labelled “Your wage offer“. The offer may not be smaller than 0 and 
exceed 250: 
0 ≤ wage offer ≤ 250 
 
Employers may enter a different wage level in each box or the same wage level for everyone or for some of the 
employees.  Employers have to fill in every box, i.e. they are required to make a wage offer to every 
employee.  
Employers find out which employee is allocated to them only in the second stage of this part. The allocation is 
done by the computer. An employer can get allocated to any employee. 
  
Example: An employer offers a wage of 70 to the employee [PTB: (group yellow, right), PT: (5, right), P: (5), T: 
(right)] and a wage of 130 to the employee [PTB: (group blue, left), PT: (13, left), P: (13), T: (left)]. In case the 
employer gets allocated to the employee [PTB:  (group  yellow, right), PT: (5, right), P: (5), T: (right)], the 
employer is required to pay him a wage of 70 in return for the employee performing the numerical code task.. In 
case the employer gets allocated to the employee [PTB: (group blue, left), PT: (13, left), P: (13), T: (left)], the 
employer is required to pay a wage of 130. 
  
While employers enter their wage offers, employees are asked to state their wage expectations and how certain 
they are on their expectations. 
 
2.  Task stage 
 
One employee gets allocated to one employer for each task stage. The employee receives a wage in return 
for performing the numerical code task. Again, employees are given 90 seconds to this end. 
 
In this setting, the wage corresponds to the one level offered by an employer to the respective employee in 
the previous stage. Earnings of an employer are determined by the number of correct answers net of wrong 
answers which is achieved by the employee in the numerical code task. 
 
Employees do not find out to which employer they are allocated. Before starting the  numerical code task, 
employees only find out the wage that they get paid.  
Employers are shown the information on the employees that got allocated to them on their screens.  
 
While employees work on the numerical code task, employers are asked to state their expectations on the number 
of correct answers of their employee and how certain they are on their expectations.  
 
How are earnings determined? 
Earnings of employers: 
•  Earnings of employers depend on the number of correct answers of their respective employee (net of wrong 
answers) as well as on  the  wage  they offered to pay to their employee. Earnings are determined in the 
following way:  
 
Earnings of an employer =  
10 points * (# correct answers – # wrong answers) – wage 
 
The employer receives 10 points for each correct answer of their employee (net of wrong answers). He is required 
to pay the wage to the employee from this revenue. Earnings of employers are thus higher the more correct 
assignments their employee scores. Earnings of employers are lower the fewer correct assignments their employee 
score.  
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In case the employee has given more wrong answers than correct ones, revenues of the employer amount to 
0 points in the worst case. But in any case, the employer is required to pay the wage to the employee. 
 
Earnings of employees 
•  Earnings of  employees  are  the wages that they receive  from their  respective  employer. Earnings are 
determined in the following way:  
 
Earnings of an employee = wage 
 
Earnings of employees are thus independent of the number of correct and wrong answers in the numerical code 
task. 
 
Earnings of all employers and employees are determined in the same way. Consequently, every employee is able 
to compute the earnings of the employer he works for.  
Please note, that, in principle, it is possible to incur losses. You are required to settle losses using your show-up 
fee or earnings from other parts of the experiment.  
 
Example 1: An employer offers a wage of 110 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. 
If the employee achieves 21 correct and 2 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (21 – 2) – 110 = 10 * 19 – 110 = 190 – 110 = 80 
The employee receives his wage of 110 points. 
 
Example 2 An employer offers a wage of 80 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. If 
the employee achieves 35 correct and 0 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (35 – 0) – 80 = 10 * 35 – 80 = 350 – 80 = 270 
The employee receives his wage of 80 points. 
 
Example 3: An employer offers a wage of 200 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. 
If the employee achieves 15 correct and 4 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (15 – 4) – 200 = 10 * 11 – 200 = 110 – 200 = – 90 
This loss has to be settled with earnings from other parts of the experiment or the starting balance. The employee 
receives his wage of 200 points 
 
You are informed on your earnings as well as the earnings of your partner at the end of part IV on a particular 
screen showing your earnings: 
 
This screen contains the following information: 
  Information on the employee from parts I and II of the experiment 
  Number of correct assignments (# of correct answers – # wrong answers) of the employee 
  Earnings of the employee (wage) 
  Earnings of the employer 
 
The experiment does not start until all participants have become familiar with the exact calculations of earnings. 
For this purpose, we kindly ask you to solve several practice exercises on your screens beforehand. Please raise 
your hand in case you have any questions. 
 
At the very end of the experiment, the computer calculates your final earnings from parts I to IV and provides you 
with detailed earning information for each part of the experiment on the screen. 





Imagine you are a researcher in economics and about to enter the job market in the near
future. You are currently working on two projects and have to decide between the two
which one to work on. Both papers still need some work, but you do not have the time
to work on both of them at the moment. The ﬁrst one, however, is co-authored with a
colleague that you could work together and the second one is a single-authored paper.
Which paper do you decide to work on?
The trade-oﬀ you are facing in this decision is to allocate resources between a cooperative
and a non-cooperative activity (i.e., putting eﬀort in your joint project or in your own
project) given that you are measured against others in a competition with the product of
the activity you undertake (i.e., the imminent job market or academic output in general
when applying for positions). The cooperative activity in a group is characterized by
both your eﬀort having a positive externality on others and their eﬀort having a positive
externality on you. This leads to the classical problem of a social dilemma where it is
individually rational not to provide eﬀort but socially optimal to do so. In the example,
this would be the co-authored paper where it is individually rational for you to let your
co-author do all the work, but which would end up being a much better paper if both
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of you actively collaborated on it. Alternatively, you can allocate resources to a non-
cooperative activity, which amounts to working on your own paper.
The proceeds of any activity you undertake (cooperative or not) determine your position
in a competition to other people who are in a similar situation. In particular, the proceeds
of the (non-)cooperative activity decide about whether you win a prize as the winner of a
tournament with other persons that are facing the same trade-oﬀ. Referring to our initial
example, the ﬁnal papers will be evaluated against all other papers in your ﬁeld and only
if they are suﬃciently well published, you will end up obtaining the position you applied
for.
The underlying conﬂict is one between cooperation (i.e., to defect or not to defect) and
competition at the individual level. Competition provides an additional incentive to coop-
erate if you think that the others in your group will cooperate as well, but keeps freeriding
still as a dominant strategy. The marginal incentive to contribute under competition is
smaller since contributing now also lowers your chances to win the tournament. The deci-
sion in the aforementioned situation ultimately also depends on your general willingness to
engage in the cooperative activity (in the presence of competition), i.e., your preferences
over outcomes to members in your group and to those not in your group against whom
you are competing. Since preferences are heterogenous in the population, it is unclear
whether the impact of competition is the same for every individual.
In this chapter, we directly test the impact of competition on cooperative behavior by
making two distinct contributions. Our ﬁrst contribution is to assess the impact of indi-
vidual competition on behavior and outcomes in social dilemma situations. We thereby
refer to a situation where the individual incentives of a social dilemma situation are aug-
mented by the possibility to win an exogenously ﬁxed prize if the product of cooperation
exceeds that of a competitor. To the best of our knowledge, little is known about the ef-
fects of individual tournament incentives on cooperative behavior and whether this fosters
or inhibits cooperation. Individual competition may have ambiguous eﬀects on coopera-
tive behavior: On the one hand, competition may result in an in-group eﬀect (or team
spirit) that fosters collaboration in a group and leads to higher contribution levels than
in the absence of competition. On the other hand, the marginal incentive to contribute
is smaller in the presence of competition since every contribution ceteris paribus deterio-
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rates one’s position in a tournament against a competitor outside the group. Our second
contribution is to analyze the impact of competition on the distribution of diﬀerent types
of preferences in the population. There is substantial evidence that individuals diﬀer sys-
tematically in their contribution preference in social dilemma situations. Our hypothesis
is that diﬀerent types of contributors will react diﬀerently to the presence of competition
in the form of a rank-order tournament. The experiments which we conduct allow us to
assess the reactions of the diﬀerent types to competition both in one-shot and in repeated
interactions. With respect to the latter we are particularly interested in the eﬀects of
competition on the incentive to build a strategic reputation.
The workhorse of our analysis is a standard linear public goods game. We extend it by the
possibility to win an exogenously ﬁxed prize if an individual’s payoﬀ exceeds the payoﬀ
of another player from a diﬀerent group.1 In a ﬁrst experiment, subjects are classiﬁed
according to the methodology from Fischbacher et al. (2001) with respect to their cooper-
ative preferences and interact repeatedly in a linear public goods game. Their cumulated
earnings determine if they win a tournament against somebody from another group. In
a second experiment on one-shot behavior, the classiﬁcation exercise from Fischbacher
et al. (2001) itself is augmented by the possibility to win a bonus if an individual’s payoﬀ
exceeds that of another subject from a diﬀerent group. In both experiments, we draw
special attention to the identiﬁcation of contribution types and the impact of the tourna-
ment on changes in contribution behavior for the respective types identiﬁed.
There are numerous attempts to identify diﬀerent types of contribution behavior in public
good environments, from e.g. actual behavior in the game (Weimann, 1994), a test of ”So-
cial Value Orientation“ (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand and McClintock, 1988; Oﬀerman et al.,
1996; Park, 2000; van Dĳk et al., 2002) and the contribution function approach (Brandts
and Schram, 2001). (Fischbacher et al., 2001) introduce the concept of conditional co-
operation which is now standard in the literature. They employ the strategy method for
every possible level of average contribution by all other group members. It is now widely
acknowledged that heterogeneity in contribution preferences is a persistent phenomenon
and hence has attracted a lot of attention in the literature, especially to explain the typ-
1Ledyard (1995), Zelmer (2003) and Chaudhuri (2011) provide surveys on the major ﬁndings from
the experimental public goods literature.
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ical decay in contributions under repetition.2 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) study how
preference heterogeneity and beliefs interact to explain the widely observed decay in con-
tributions over several rounds by subjects acting as ”imperfect conditional cooperators“.
Closest to our study is a paper by Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) who study the validity
of the strategy method in public good experiments. They establish a direct link between
the preferences elicited in a conditional cooperation exercise and the subsequent behavior
in a repeated social dilemma situation to ﬁnd strong evidence for heterogeneity of types
and high levels of consistency of behavior within subjects. We extend their analysis by
looking at the eﬀects of strategic behavior in a partner setting and by looking at the
(possibly diﬀerent) reactions of the diﬀerent types identiﬁed on a treatment variation.
All of these studies, however, take preference heterogeneity as given and report the con-
sequences on aggregate outcomes, but draw little attention to how contribution behavior
is aﬀected by diﬀerent institutions and incentives. Furthermore and to the best of our
knowledge, there is no paper that explicitly examines the impact of a treatment variation
on the speciﬁc contribution types identiﬁed, i.e., whether the various types identiﬁed ac-
tually react diﬀerently to an exogenously imposed change in the strategic environment.
This link between types and institutions has important consequences for setting the right
incentives in organizations. If the same incentives have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent types,
eliciting information especially about other-regarding concerns at the individual level
would be a crucial ingredient for optimal incentive design, see Englmaier and Wambach
(2010) and Englmaier et al. (2011). In this chapter, we concentrate on the introduction
of competition as the change in the strategic environment since we consider competition
an important and omnipresent feature in the interaction of two or more individuals.
The interaction of social preferences and their role in competitive environments has at-
tracted a lot of attention in the literature, see e.g. Schmidt (2010) and Dufwenberg et al.
(2011). It is argued that the strategic environment in general and more precisely to
what extent individuals can aﬀect the ﬁnal allocation of payoﬀs is a crucial ingredient of
whether other-regarding preferences have an impact on ﬁnal outcomes or not, see Fehr and
Schmidt (1999). What remains unclear, however, is how individuals with heterogeneous
2See e.g. Burlando and Guala (2005); Kurzban and Houser (2005); Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport
(2006); Bardsley and Moﬀatt (2007); Kocher et al. (2008); Muller et al. (2008); Herrmann and Thöni
(2009); Ambrus and Pathak (2011); Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011).
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other-regarding concerns react in diﬀerent strategic environments. Particularly assuming
that competition has identical eﬀects across all identiﬁed types of other-regarding pref-
erences has a clearly ad-hoc ﬂavor. In the context of a social dilemma, we thus expose
individuals to an individual rank-order tournament to assess how diﬀerent types individ-
ually cope with the trade-oﬀ between cooperation and competition.
In the framework of public goods games, there are numerous studies that focus on the
eﬀects of competition between teams on cooperation and eﬀorts3. Competition between
sales teams or research groups are examples of tournaments between groups to elicit high
levels of eﬀorts and cooperation within the team. Common to these tournaments is that
the winning team is rewarded with a prize which is then shared between all members.
There are numerous instances, however, where individuals while being in a social dilemma
within a group are subject to a competition as individuals themselves with the proceeds
from the team work. They have to decide how many resources they allocate to an individ-
ual and a cooperative activity knowing that the proceeds from collaboration are higher
than those from the individual activity if the other group members collaborate and lower
if others fail to cooperate.
Despite the prevalence of competitive incentives through rank-order tournaments (Lazear
and Rosen, 1981) in the real world for individuals (e.g. promotion tournaments in ﬁrms,
grade performance in class), the eﬀects of competition at the individual level have not
received much attention in the public goods literature up to now. Experimental methods
seem particularly appropriate for the analysis, as clean empirical evidence which is able
to exogenously control for the presence of competition is scarce and hard to obtain in the
ﬁeld.
We have two main results: In a repeated setting, we ﬁnd that competition has a detrimen-
tal eﬀect on the incentives of freeriders to build a strategic reputation, but has no impact
on the behavior of conditional cooperators. For aggregate levels compared to a standard
social dilemma, competition between individuals does not foster or inhibit cooperation
unlike in settings with competition within teams. We present evidence that competition
in a one-shot public goods game à la Fischbacher et al. (2001) leads to a shift of the un-
3See e.g. Bornstein et al. (1990); Bornstein (1992); Erev et al. (1993); Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994); Bornstein et al. (2002); Bornstein (2003); Tan and Bolle (2007); Sutter and Strassmair (2009);
Reuben and Tyran (2010).
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derlying distribution of types from conditional cooperators towards more freeriders, but
leaves the self-serving bias of the remaining conditional cooperators unaﬀected.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the experimental design before
section 3.3 lays out the hypotheses. Section 3.4 contains the main results and section 3.5
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Experimental Design
The core mechanism in our experiments is a standard linear public goods game played in
a group of four subjects. Each subject has an intial endowment E that she can decide to
either contribute to the public good or keep for herself. The monetary payoﬀ from the
baseline public goods game (PGG) πb
i to subject i is given by
π
b




where ci is the individual contribution. The return of every token contributed to the
public good is 0.5, thus leading to a clear prediction of free riding. Under standard
assumptions, rational subjects put the entire endowment on the private account. The
social dilemma arises from full contribution levels being socially eﬃcient.
3.2.1 Implementation of Competition
The way we model competition in both experiments is in the form of a two-player tour-
nament with an exogenously ﬁxed prize. Two subjects from diﬀerent groups compete for
this prize and the competition is implemented through a comparison of their ﬁnal wealths
after having played the public good game described above. If both subjects are tied, a
coin ﬂip determines the winner of the prize. The payoﬀ in a one-shot interaction under
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competition πc
i is then given by
π
c















where p(·) is the probability of obtaining the bonus B and ck the contribution of the com-
petitor from the other group with aggregate contribution of
P4
l=1 cl. As a consequence,
subjects are exposed to a ”twofold“ incentive in addition to the standard set of incentives
arising from the public good game: On the one hand, the marginal incentive to contribute
in a symmetric equilibrium with selﬁsh agents holding other’s contributions ﬁxed is de-
creased since every token invested into the public good decreases the individual likelihood
of obtaining the bonus. More formally, the marginal incentive to contribute to the public












On the other hand, the beneﬁts of high levels of cooperation in the group are increased
since winning the bonus becomes more likely the higher one’s ﬁnal wealth in a group that
cooperates well. Furthermore, if subjects have other-regarding concerns towards members
of their own group and a team spirit prevails, the presence of the bonus induces contribu-
tions which improve the chances of members of one’s own group to be awarded the prize.
Compared to the standard public goods game with selﬁsh agents, the tournament against
outside group members yields an additional mechanism to sustain high levels of cooper-
ation within a group in the presence of non-selﬁsh preferences. A team spirit emerges
when other-regarding preferences relate only towards the own group.
It is important to note that the competitor is always member of another group such that
a subject’s contribution to the public account within her own group does not directly in-
crease the payoﬀ of her competitor and hence does not increase the competitor’s chance to
obtain the bonus per se. The procedure is common knowledge and it is explicitly pointed
out in the instructions that every competitor is taking decisions under the exact same
conditions than oneself. It is this trade-oﬀ between the (possibly) weakening or strength-
ening eﬀects of competition that we are interested in. We identify cooperation types in the
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population through the methodology proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001). Two diﬀer-
ent experiments are designed to assess the impact of competition both on the (strategic)
behavior in a repeated game setting (Experiment 1) and on the preferences elicited under
the method of conditional cooperation by Fischbacher et al. (2001) (Experiment 2). We
describe the design of both experiments in the next two subsections.
3.2.2 Experiment 1: Competition & Strategic Behavior
The experiment consists of two parts, where subjects receive instructions for the second
part only after the ﬁrst part is over and hence do not know what follows in the later part.
1. In the ﬁrst part of Experiment 1, subjects’ contribution types are elicited in groups
of four along the protocol from Fischbacher et al. (2001). Subjects are endowed with
20 experimental tokens that they can allocate to either a public or a private account
with the parameter speciﬁcation from above, i.e., a marginal per capita return of
0.5.4 Everybody in the group is asked to submit an unconditional contribution and
thereafter a contribution table where entries have to be made conditional on the av-
erage rounded contribution of all three other group members.5 Both contributions
are made incentive compatible in the following way: one randomly selected subject
in every group is given the role of a conditional contributor, the three other sub-
jects in the group are allocated the role of unconditional contributors. The average
contribution of the three latter subjects is used to determine the payoﬀ relevant con-
tribution of the one conditional contributor per group from her contribution tables.
Subjects earn the payoﬀ of the public goods game in part one, but do not learn
the result from this part until the end of the experiment. As is standard in the
literature, see Fischbacher et al. (2001), subjects are classiﬁed into four categories
according to their pattern of conditional contribution:
• Freeriders: These subjects never contribute anything to the public good,
regardless of the contributions of other group members.
4One experimental token is converted at an exchange rate of 0.10 €.
5Since contributions are made from an endowment of 20 experimental tokens, 21 choices have to be
made.
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• Conditional Cooperators: These subjects display a positive correlation be-
tween their own contribution levels and the average contribution of others in
their group.6
• Hump-shaped (or Triangle) Contributors: Subjects in this category
(weakly) increase their contribution up to a certain level of average contri-
butions from which on they decrease it.7
• Others: The residual category
The conditional cooperation exercise is particularly useful in eliciting underlying
preferences from subjects in the absence of strategic uncertainty. Even in a one-
shot interaction, an unconditional contribution of a subject is aﬀected by both the
preferences and the beliefs of a subject about other group member’s contributions,
see Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). The conditional contribution, however, com-
pletely abstracts from beliefs about behavior of others since the contribution is
entered taking the others’ action as given. As a consequence, the conditional con-
tribution table gives a close picture of a subject’s underlying preferences over ﬁnal
outcome distributions.
2. In the second part of the experiment, the same groups of four subjects repeatedly
interact in a partner design for 10 rounds. In every round, subjects enter their
unconditional contribution to the public good. Full feedback is given after every
round, i.e., subjects learn about the contributions of the other group members,
albeit in a way that precludes identiﬁcation of subjects across rounds.
We conduct 2 treatments, (COMP) and (BASE). In the competition treatment
(COMP) the ﬁnal wealth of subjects after 10 rounds decides about the allocation
of the prize. More precisely, every subject is randomly matched with a subject
from a diﬀerent group such that no rivalry between two distinct groups emerges.
6We take the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient as a criterion to classify a subject to be a condi-
tional cooperator, i.e., positive and p < 0.01. For a robustness check, we also take the somewhat more
restrictive ”weak monotonicity rule“ rule as a criterion according to which a subject is classiﬁed as a con-
ditional cooperator if her contributions are weakly increasing (and never decreasing) in the contributions
of all other team members. This yields identical results.
7Note that in the classiﬁcation method through the Spearman rank correlation, it can happen that
subjects get classiﬁed as conditional cooperators and hump-shaped contributors at the same time. In
that case, we classify them in the former category, but this applied to only 4 out of 192 subjects.
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After 10 rounds, the ﬁnal wealths of the two subjects are compared with each other
and the subject who has earned more in accumulated earnings is awarded a prize
of 70 experimental tokens (equivalent to 7 €).8 Subjects do not get any feedback
about contributions or earnings of their competitor from the other group during the
course of the experiment. In the baseline treatment (BASE), everything is identical
to COMP except that the prize is awarded randomly through the public roll of a
dice between two subjects from two diﬀerent groups.
In addition to the contribution decision, we elicit subjects’ expectations about their
position in the competition against their competitor every round. To do so, subjects
have to answer the following question every round by entering a percentage number
on the screen: ”How likely is it that you have higher accumulated earnings than
your competitor up to the current round?“. There is no feedback given about the
performance of the competitor in the other group within rounds. Payoﬀs to subjects





(probability entered) · 40EP if cumulated earnings until t are higher
(100 − probability entered) · 40EP if cumulated earnings until t are lower
One period is drawn at random for payoﬀ and within that period, either the contri-
bution decision or the expectation elicitation is paid out with a 50 % chance. If the
contribution decision is selected, subjects earn the proceedings from the public good
game in that round; if the expectation elicitation is selected in round t, correctness
of expectations is rewarded according to the above mechanism. Hence, subjects can
at most earn 40 experimental tokens if they enter 100 % (or 0 %) and they indeed
have higher (lower) cumulated earnings than their competitor in that speciﬁc round.
The way payments are implemented for part two is done to discourage subjects from
hedging between the contribution decision and the elicitation of expectations. To
keep everything identical between treatments, subjects are asked to indicate their
expecations about the comparison to their matched subject also in BASE, even if
the prize is allocated randomly at the end of the 10 periods. At the end of the ex-
8This is done to keep marginal incentives from competition high over all ten periods thus prohibiting
a ”dilution“ eﬀect of the bonus incentive if a smaller prize is attributed every period.
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periment, subjects are told their earnings and whether they are awarded the bonus
or not. In the BASE treatment, a dice is publicly rolled to determine the winner
of the prize whereas in COMP cumulated payoﬀs of their competitor are shown to
subjects on the computer screen.
It is important to note that the elicitation of types in part one is identical across the
two treatments, since subjects learn only afterwards about part two. At the end of
the experiment, subjects have to answer a socio-demographic questionnaire. Overall,
192 subjects participated in the experiments, i.e., 24 groups of four subjects in every
treatment. The experiments were run between September and November 2010 in the
MELESSA laboratory of the University of Munich and were computerized via z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The sessions
lasted roughly 45 minutes and subjects received 12.7 € on average including a show-up
fee of 4 €.
3.2.3 Experiment 2: Competition & Conditional Cooperation
From part one of the experiments on repeated interactions (Experiment 1), we have a
classiﬁcation of participants into types according to the classiﬁcation proposed by Fis-
chbacher et al. (2001). This classiﬁcation does not tell us anything about the impact of
competition on the distribution of types since subjects learn only about the competition
in part two of the experiment and can adjust their behavior. Hence, we take the clas-
siﬁcation of an individual in part one of Experiment 1 as the baseline behavior in the
outlined public goods game and conduct an additional one-shot experiment to control for
the impact of competition at the individual level on conditional cooperation. To do so,
we expose participants to the same form of competition as in Experiment 1 also in the
conditional cooperation exercise. Two subjects from two diﬀerent groups are matched
and their payoﬀs after the conditional contribution tables are compared to determine who
is awarded the additional prize of 70 experimental tokens. If the payoﬀ to one subject
exceeds the payoﬀ to her competitor, she is awarded the bonus. For the payoﬀs from
the public good mechanism, one subject is chosen at random for whom the contribution
tables are payoﬀ relevant, whereas for the three others in a group the unconditional con-
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tribution is relevant. The overall payoﬀ from the conditional cooperation exercise under
competition is therefore given by
πi =

       
       
20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj if 20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj < 20 − ck + 0.5
P4
l=1 cl
20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj + 0.5 · 70 if 20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj = 20 − ck + 0.5
P4
l=1 cl
20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj + 70 if 20 − ci + 0.5
P4
j=1 cj > 20 − ck + 0.5
P4
l=1 cl
where a coin ﬂip decides about the allocation of the bonus in case of a tie. The procedure
is again made common knowledge to all subjects such that we can compare the results
to parts one of the experiments in the repeated game described above. An additional 48
subjects that earned on average 10.1 € (including a show-up fee of 4 €) participated in
these experiments which took roughly 30 minutes.
3.3 Hypotheses
In this section, we assess theoretically how diﬀerent types in the population react diﬀer-
ently to the introduction of competition at the individual level. We sketch a very simple
model of the eﬀects from the introduction of a competitive rank-order tournament on
two diﬀerent types of subjects, selﬁsh and non-selﬁsh individuals. In line with the simple
linear altruism model of Ledyard (1995), we assume an individual’s utility ui to take the
following form in the context of the one-shot standard linear public goods game outlined
above:
ui = πi + αg(πj)
πi denotes the material payoﬀ to player i and α is a parameter that captures other-
regarding concerns in the form of simple altruism. α is zero for selﬁsh subjects and strictly
positive for individuals with other-regarding concerns. πj is the representative monetary
payoﬀ of another group member j and g(·) some generic utility function over monetary
payoﬀs of this member with
∂g
∂πj > 0. We consider this representative group member as
the only social reference towards which a player exhibits other-regarding concerns and
disregard such feelings for all subject outside the own group, including the competitor
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in the tournament. An interpretation would be some sort of team spirit within the
own group. To assess the eﬀect of competition, we compare the marginal incentive to
contribute in both treatments. For α = 0 and our parameters for the public goods game,




In the competition treatment, we have
∂ui
∂ci
= −0.5 + p
0
i(ci)B
where p(·) denotes the probability of obtaining the bonus of size B. The marginal incentive
to contribute for an individual with selﬁsh preferences is lower under competition since
p0
i(ci) < 0. For individuals with α > 0, the marginal incentive to contribute in the BASE
treatment is given by
∂ui
∂ci





= −0.5 + 0.5α
∂g
∂πj
and in the COMP treatment
∂ui
∂ci







= −0.5 + p
0





Ceteris paribus a contribution from player i decreases her probability to win the prize,
but increases the probability of the representative group member as player j to obtain a
bonus in his respective tournament, i.e., p0
j(ci) > 0. We can now establish a condition
for α where the decrease in the marginal incentive to contribute through competition is









For α∗, the marginal incentive to contribute for a subject with other-regarding preferences
is identical between the two treatments. As an example, if |p0
i(ci)| = |p0
j(ci)| an α of 1
∂g
∂πj
leaves a non-selﬁsh subject to have identical marginal incentives to contribute in both
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treatments. Given the increase in utility from the chances a contribution creates for
another group member to win the prize from the team spirit eﬀect, we expect less of
a diﬀerence in contribution levels for individuals with other-regarding concerns than for
selﬁsh subjects.
Hypothesis 3.1 (General Eﬀects of Competition) Competition has a detrimental
eﬀect on the marginal willingness to cooperate for subjects classiﬁed as selﬁsh, but in-
duces less change in the marginal incentive to contribute for non-selﬁsh individuals.
The outlined mechanism refers to a one-shot standard linear public goods game but is
agnostic about both the incentives in a repeated setting (as in Experiment 1) and in a
conditional cooperation exercise (as in Experiment 2). We therefore further elaborate on
the relevant eﬀects of competition in both of our Experiments 1 and 2 in turn.
With respect to repetition in a partner design as in Experiment 1, there is both theoreti-
cal and experimental evidence that especially selﬁsh subjects have an incentive to mimic
cooperative types by initially providing high levels of contributions before revealing their
type towards the end of the game, see e.g. Kreps et al. (1982) and Roe and Wu (2009).
So even if the argument laid out above would rationalize diﬀerences in the marginal will-
ingness to contribute for selﬁsh subjects in the presence or absence of competition, it still
leaves freeriding the dominant strategy in one-shot games for selﬁsh types, regardless of
the strategic environment. If, however, the propensity to contribute is increased through
a mechanism to build up a strategic reputation for selﬁsh types, contribution levels may
well be positive also for freeriders. Most importantly, if the incentive to contribute for
strategic reasons is identical across the two treatments, we should observe higher contribu-
tion levels in the BASE treatment than in COMP for selﬁsh individuals. However, we are
agnostic about the size of the reputation eﬀect such that we cannot make a prediction for
non-selﬁsh subjects about potential absolute levels of contributions. Since absolute con-
tribution levels of non-selﬁsh individuals depend on α and they are not in need of building
up a reputation, we conjecture no diﬀerence in contribution behavior across treatments
for them in Experiment 1.
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Hypothesis 3.2 (Competition and Strategic Behavior) Competition hampers the
incentive to build up a strategic reputation for selﬁsh individuals in a repeated interac-
tion, but leaves contribution levels unchanged for non-selﬁsh subjects.
Concerning the predictions of our Experiment 2, we refer to an argument brought forward
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) on the eﬀects of social preferences under competition. In
line with their reasoning and as a general ﬁnding, other-regarding concerns of individuals
matter if they have the possibility to inﬂuence the ﬁnal payoﬀ allocation, but play less of
a role when the ultimate outcomes are beyond their control.9 This explains why models
of social preferences may yield powerful predictions when agents, e.g., bargain over an
outcome, but less so when competition exempts subjects from the possibility to inﬂuence
the ultimate payoﬀ distribution as e.g. on competitive markets, see also Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Schmidt (2010).
As we have argued above and with respect to Experiment 2, the classic elicitation method
for conditional cooperation measures underlying preferences independent of beliefs about
behavior of others in the group. Adding competition, this does not hold anymore since
conditional contributions now depend on the beliefs about what the competitor for the
prize does and more generally what the contribution levels in the rival’s group are. Put
diﬀerently, the introduction of competition implies for a subject that by entering condi-
tional contributions she does not have full control over ﬁnal payoﬀ distributions anymore
as would be the case in the absence of competition. Our experiment can therefore be
interpreted as an experimental test of this hypothesis with an identiﬁcation of the eﬀect
what happens when decision makers lose the possibility of deciding over ﬁnal outcomes
with certainty. We therefore argue that this loss of control over ﬁnal outcome allocations
under competition promotes selﬁsh behavior on behalf of subjects.
Hypothesis 3.3 (Competition and Conditional Cooperation) Competition pro-
motes selﬁsh inclinations in the conditional cooperation exercise compared to the elicitation
task from Fischbacher et al. (2001).
We have little guidance from economic theory, however, as to how the increased selﬁshness
under competition is documented at the individual level, which hence remains an empirical
9see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), p. 856
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question that we tackle in Experiment 2. There are two possible ways competition can
aﬀect subjects: First, the distribution of types in the population can be aﬀected by the
presence of competition. More precisely, the chance of obtaining the prize may promote
egoistic inclinations among subjects. Second, conditional cooperators may increase their
self-serving bias that is usually found in experiments.10
3.4 Results
We ﬁrst look at the results from the repeated interaction from Experiment 1, before
moving to the eﬀects of competition on conditional cooperation in Experiment 2.
3.4.1 Competition & Strategic Behavior (Experiment 1)
Aggregate Behavior We start by reporting the aggregate results from the repeated
public goods game. In terms of average contributions, the left panel of Figure 3.1 clearly
shows that there are no discernible diﬀerences between the two treatments with and
without competition. This is conﬁrmed by non-parametric tests for averages across all
periods and for contributions in each period separately (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p > 0.33).
We observe the standard decay in contributions over the 10 periods in both treatments,
BASE and COMP. Subjects learn about the institutional environment (competition vs.
no competition) before they enter their contribution level in the ﬁrst period, but there
is clearly no diﬀerence in the contribution levels for period one on the subject level
(Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.86). Subjects start on average with contributing about 50
% of their endowment in both treatments, which is consistent with the ﬁndings in the
literature11. On the aggregate level, the introduction of competition for the prize hence
has neither a positive nor a negative eﬀect on contribution levels. Generally speaking, the
decrease in the marginal incentive to contribute seems to be outweighed by an increased
incentive to behave cooperatively within the group to enhance every member’s chances
to win the prize. In contrast to competition between teams which generally increases
10The self-serving bias in this context refers to the fact that many subjects classiﬁed as conditional
cooperators contribute a little less than the perfect match of the average contribution of others.
11See Marwell and Ames (1981), Isaac et al. (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988).
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Figure 3.1: Contribution Levels and Beliefs in BASE and COMP
Average Contribution Levels and Beliefs in treatments BASE and COMP across all subjects
the level of cooperation (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994), competition at the individual
level does not foster cooperation. As far as expectations are concerned, we ask subjects
about the assessment of their chances in % whether they have a higher cumulated wealth
than their competitor. The average guess is plotted in the right panel of Figure 3.1. Note
that if beliefs are correct, the average of all beliefs should be exactly 50 %. All subjects’
assessment starts out at roughly 50 % before their guess declines to about 40 % at the
end of the 10 periods. This holds true for both treatments where the decline is highly sig-
niﬁcant over the 10 periods (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p < 0.01 for both treatments)12.
The decline in expectations sheds an interesting light on the decay of contributions. Even
if subjects are aware of the fact that the payoﬀs in their group decrease over time, they
on average think that the decline in contributions is not happening in the group of their
12Group averages in period 1 and 10 as tested variable. All p-values in this chapter are two-sided
unless otherwise indicated.
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competitor and hence lower their beliefs, i.e., the competitive assessment. This piece of
evidence characterizes a certain confession that a more cooperative strategy would have
been possible in the group, but did not materialize. Since the presence of the prize does
not aﬀect aggregate contribution levels across treatments, the competitive assessments
do not diﬀer either (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.58), which leads us to our ﬁrst result.
Result 3.1 Competition does not aﬀect aggregate contribution levels and the competitive
assessment of subjects.
The results on aggregate behavior above rely on the behavior of groups of four subjects,
such that they do not tell us anything about the diﬀerent impact of competition on the
various types of contribution types identiﬁed, which is what we turn to in the next section.
Individual Behavior We are particularly interested in the eﬀects competition has
on the diﬀerent types of contributors identiﬁed. In section 3.3 we particularly conjec-
tured that there is an asymmetric reaction to competition from the diﬀerent types of
subjects identiﬁed from the conditional cooperation exercise à la Fischbacher et al. (2001)
conducted before the repeated interaction. When there is scope for strategic interaction
over more than one period, the introduction of competition may have adverse eﬀects on
the diﬀerent types through the mechanism to strategically build a reputation for self-
ish agents. We present contribution levels for freeriders and conditional cooperators in
Figure 3.2.13 Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) have shown that the preferences elicited
in a conditional contribution exercise have high predictive power for the behavior in a
repeated interaction of a standard public goods mechanism. What remains unclear is
to what extent the diﬀerent types alter their behavior when the strategic environment
changes, i.e., competition for the prize is introduced and there is scope for reputation.
For subjects classiﬁed as conditional cooperators in the right panel, contribution levels
are almost identical between the two treatments. As far as freeriders are concerned (left
13We ﬁnd about 74 % of all subjects to be conditional cooperators, about 10 % to be freeriders, 7
% to be triangle contributors and 9 % to be in the residual category. In absolute numbers across both
treatments, we have 20 freeriders, 142 conditional cooperators, 13 triangle contributors and 17 subjects
in the residual category.
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Figure 3.2: Contribution Levels for Freeriders and Conditional Cooperators
Average Contribution levels for freeriders (left panel) and conditional cooperators (right panel) in
treatments BASE and COMP
panel), competition leads to a severe drop in contribution levels by 50 %. There is also
clear evidence for the presence of freeriders building a reputation of being cooperative as
their contribution drops to zero in the last round, see Kreps et al. (1982). However, the
incentive to build a cooperative reputation for freeriders is considerably reduced in the
presence of competition which conﬁrms Hypothesis 3.2.14 This further qualiﬁes the ﬁrst
result: Since the proportion of conditional cooperators is very high at 74 % and their
behavior does not chance across the two treatments, we do not ﬁnd an eﬀect on aggregate
contribution levels.
As conjectured in section 3.3, competition has thus diﬀerent eﬀects on the diﬀerent types
identiﬁed which is conﬁrmed by a series of regressions in Table 3.1. We do not ﬁnd any
simple eﬀect on the contribution level neither from being a conditional cooperator nor
14When we pool all subjects that are not classiﬁed as conditional cooperators (see Figure A3.4 in
appendix A3.3) we equivalently observe decreased contributions under competition.
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Table 3.1: Random Eﬀects Panel Regression on Contributions
Dep. Var.:
I II III IV V
Contribution
Period -0.713*** -0.713*** -0.661*** -0.758*** -0.703***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.068) (0.069) (0.075)
COMP -0.429 -2.839 -2.699* -4.923 -4.256
(1.166) (1.792) (1.499) (3.288) (2.859)
Cond Cooperator 1.167 -0.504 -0.412 -1.791 -1.424
(0.721) (1.028) (0.819) (2.724) (1.693)
COMP * Cond Cooperator 3.258** 3.103*** 5.342** 4.664*
(1.304) (1.112) (2.724) (2.393)
Proﬁts (t-1) 0.187*** 0.211***
(0.042) (0.047)
Beliefs (t-1) -0.010 -0.008
(0.007) (0.008)
Constant 10.225*** 11.478*** 6.496*** 13.012*** 7.011***
(1.252) (1.529) (1.281) (1.282) (1.994)
Obs 1920 1920 1728 1620 1458
R2 0.10 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.22
Random Eﬀects Panel Regression on contributions. COMP and Cond Cooperator are dummy variables,
Proﬁts (t-1) are taken from the previous period. Clustering on the group level. Speciﬁcations IV and V
only for subjects classiﬁed as conditional cooperators and freeriders. Standard errors in brackets. ***
represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
from the competition treatment. The highly signiﬁcant interaction term between the two
illustrates the diﬀerent eﬀects competition has on the preference types identiﬁed. Con-
ditional cooperators contribute about three tokens more than all other preference types
under competition. This is robust to controlling for beliefs in the form of the competitive
assessment and for past proﬁts which have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the level of
subsequent contributions.15. The signiﬁcant interaction term in speciﬁcations II and III
conﬁrms the asymmetric impact of competition on the diﬀerent types in the population
with conditional cooperators contributing signiﬁcantly more compared to all other sub-
jects. In particular when we restrict the sample to only those subjects classiﬁed as either
conditional cooperators or freeriders (speciﬁcation IV and V), we ﬁnd that the incentives
for freeriders to build a strategic reputation of being non-selﬁsh is negatively aﬀected by
the presence of competition.16 When we look at ﬁrst round contributions of freeriders and
15Even if freeriders have somewhat higher beliefs about their chances to win the bonus than conditional
cooperators (COMP vs. BASE: 61 % vs 51 % for freeriders, 43 % vs 45 % for conditional cooperators),
beliefs do not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on contribution levels, see Figure A3.2 in appendix A3.3 for
the evolution of beliefs of the two types per treatment.
16Panel tobit regressions yield similar results and are hence relegated to appendix A3.2.
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compare them with the unconditional contribution level of the preference elicitation task
in part one of the experiments, we can document this decreased incentive to build a repu-
tation for freeriders also non-parametrically. There is no diﬀerence in contributions under
competition (Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p = 0.32), but we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase
in ﬁrst round contributions through the reputation mechanism in the BASE treatment
(Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test, p = 0.03).17 We summarize these ﬁndings in our next result.
Result 3.2 Competition asymmetrically aﬀects contribution types in the population. It
particularly weakens the incentive to build a cooperative reputation for freeriders, but leaves
conditional cooperators unaﬀected.
We next take a look at whether contributing less for strategic reasons under competition
is a proﬁtable strategy for freeriders. Since all other group members react to a group
member contributing little by also lowering their contributions, contributing less is not
necessarily a proﬁt increasing strategy. Figure A3.3 in appendix A3.3 reports that there
are no diﬀerent proﬁt levels in the COMP treatment between types. In the BASE
treatment, conditional cooperators earn somewhat less than all other subjects, which is
signiﬁcant at the 10 % level. This is conﬁrmed by a random eﬀects panel regression on
proﬁts in the public goods game (reported in Table A3.4 in appendix A3.2) where we
do not ﬁnd a treatment eﬀect on proﬁts and especially no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the proﬁt
levels of conditional cooperators in the COMP treatment. This holds similarly also for
freeriders such that even though they reduce their contributions under competition, this
does not have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on their earnings. Accordingly, there is
no signﬁcant diﬀerence in overall eﬃciency in the public goods game between the two
treatments (Mann-Whitney-U-test on cumulated average earnings per group, p = 0.82).
In a probit regression on the likelihood to obtain the bonus, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
for diﬀerences between types. The treatment dummy, the conditional cooperator dummy
and the interaction are jointly not signiﬁcant (p = 0.56). When we restrict ourselves
to only subjects that have been classiﬁed as conditional cooperators or freeriders, the
17When comparing contribution levels between subjects in round one between the diﬀerent treatments,
we clearly ﬁnd no diﬀerence for conditional cooperators (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p = 0.67). For freeriders,
we also fail to reach signiﬁcance at p = 0.15, which is likely to be due to the small sample size for between
subject comparisons for freeriders only.
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interaction of the three dummies becomes marginally signiﬁcant (p = 0.06) indicating a
slightly higher chance for freeriders to be awarded the prize under competition.
To further illustrate our ﬁnding that the incentive to build a reputation is weakened for
freeriders in the presence of competition, we display our results next to those of Fis-
chbacher and Gächter (2009) who conduct an experiment similar to ours that aims at
assessing the consistency of subjects between the preference elicitation task (conditional
cooperation) and behavior in a repeated public goods game. They also elicit contribution
types through the method by Fischbacher et al. (2001), but have a MPCR of 0.4 (com-
pared to 0.5 in our experiments) and conduct the repeated game in a random matching
setting (compared to a partner matching in our case).18 Their main ﬁnding is a robust
Table 3.2: Mean Contributions for Diﬀerent Types
Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) BASE COMP
(random matching, MPCR = 0.4, (partner matching, MPCR = 0.5, (partner matching, MPCR = 0.5,
no competition) no competition) competition)
Period 1 Period 10 All Periods Period 1 Period 10 All Periods Period 1 Period 10 All Periods
Freeriders 4.88 0.88 2.49 11.54 0.09 8.84 5.56 0.00 3.92
Conditional
8.61 2.81 5.64 9.79 2.58 7.05 10.19 3.12 7.47
Cooperators
Hump-Shape 9.06 1.29 4.88 4.00 4.00 5.36 10.80 0.80 6.07
Others 9.43 3.36 5.66 7.10 4.70 6.80 6.57 3.42 3.81
Mean Contributions for the four types identiﬁed in Period 1, Period 10 and across all periods. Listed for
the results from Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) and the two treatments BASE and COMP.
relationship between the preferences elicited through the strategy method and subsequent
behavior in the public goods game in the sense that freeriders contribute signiﬁcantly less
than conditional cooperators and all other types of contributors, see Table 3.2.19 Since
their experiments are run in a stranger design, reputational concerns are absent for sub-
jects. When we compare their results with our BASE treatment, we immediately see the
impact of the partner design for freeriders who contribute on average 8.84 tokens com-
pared to 2.49 tokens in the Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) experiments. The behavior of
conditional cooperators is not aﬀected. Adding competition in COMP, the contribution
18As a further diﬀerence, we also disclose all contribution levels of every group member in every round,
whereas Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) only report the group average every period.
19Brandts and Charness (2011) survey the literature and compare the strategy method and the direct
response method to ﬁnd that there are no diﬀerences between the results from both methods.
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level of freeriders is decreased to a level very similar to that under the stranger treatment
of Fischbacher and Gächter (2009). In addition, all four types under competition almost
identically match the contribution behavior of the four types from the Fischbacher and
Gächter (2009) experiment without reputation. We take this as a further piece of evidence
that the introduction of competition has detrimental eﬀects on the strategic incentives to
build a reputation, which is particularly an issue for freeriders. The absence of reputation
mechanisms in the framework of public goods has therefore similar eﬀects as the intro-
duction of competition on the diﬀerent types.
As a consequence, the predictive power of the type elicitation procedure by employing
the strategy method crucially depends on the strategic and institutional environment of
players in the respective public goods game. As Fischbacher and Gächter (2009) have
shown, in the absence of reputation type elicitation procedures have a high behavioral
validity. If strategic concerns matter as in our BASE treatment, this validity vanishes
completely, most notably for the distinction between freeriders and conditional coopera-
tors. The comparison of our results and the results from Fischbacher and Gächter (2009)
shows that in environments as in our COMP treatment with tournament incentives, the
presence of strategic concerns aﬀects the diﬀerent types asymmetrically and produces
behavior that is at ﬁrst sight identical to a setting without reputational concerns. For
certain types of preferences (like freeriders in our case), a strategic incentive may therefore
be counterbalanced by the impact of the institutional environment.
As a consequence, when considering type heterogeneity for setting the right incentives, it
is essential to take into account the interaction between identiﬁed types and the institu-
tional framework to predict behavior. We sum this up in our next result:
Result 3.3 The predictive power of type elicitation procedures for observed behavior cru-
cially hinges on types and incentives from institutional environments being substitutes or
complements.
The main elicitation procedure in the framework of social dilemmas to identify types and
preferences is the outlined method by Fischbacher et al. (2001). We have seen in a repeated
environment that competition has diverse eﬀects on diﬀerent types from this method, but
are agnostic about the impact of competition when strategic considerations are absent,
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i.e., on the elicitation method itself. We therefore turn to the eﬀects of competition on
subjects’ underlying preferences in the form of conditional cooperation, i.e., on behavior
in a one-shot game in the absence of strategic concerns.
3.4.2 Competition & Conditional Cooperation (Experiment 2)
First, we analyze the results from the classiﬁcation of subjects into types from the condi-
tional cooperation exercise. To do so, we compare the contribution behavior of subjects
in the conditional cooperation exercise with competition (from Experiment 2, treatment
COMP-OS for one-shot) and without competition (part one from Experiment 1, treat-
ment BASE-OS). For the analysis on one-shot interactions, we have 192 observations in
BASE-OS from part one of Experiment 1 as described above and 96 observations from
another experiment that was identical in the structure to Experiment 1 but did not have
a modiﬁcation until part two, such that we can use the data in exactly the same way as
the data from Experiment 1.20 In total, we thus have 288 independent observations in
the BASE-OS treatment and 48 in the COMP-OS treatment.
Preferences for types identiﬁed When we look at aggregate contribution levels
for all subjects, we ﬁnd - not surprisingly and consistent with the literature - a positive
slope of the conditional contribution function in the BASE-OS treatment (see left panel of
Figure 3.3). In the COMP-OS treatment this slope is considerably reduced compared to
the base treatment. For all average contribution levels by the other group members which
are higher than 3 EP, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two treatments (p < 0.01,
Mann-Whitney-U-test). This diﬀerence can stem either from a diﬀerent contribution
behavior in every identiﬁed type group or from a shift in the distribution of types. To
further explore the issue, we display the contribution functions for every type group
separately for the two treatments in the middle and right panel of Figure 3.3. The
classiﬁcation of types is done as described in section 3.2. We compare contribution levels
between the two treatments at the individual level with a Mann-Whitney-U-test for each
20Results from later parts of this additional experiment are not reported in this chapter. To exclude
any eﬀect from including the additional data in the analysis, we report in appendix A3.1 all analyses
also without the additional 96 observations. In short, there are no diﬀerences in the reduced dataset
compared to the results we report here.
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Figure 3.3: Conditional Contribution
Aggregate levels of conditional contribution for all subjects (left panel) and contribution patterns for
determined types in treatments BASE-OS and COMP-OS (middle and right panel)
type group. Table 3.3 lists the signiﬁcance levels of these pairwise tests. For conditional
cooperators, we cannot identify major changes in behavior and especially no increase or
decrease of the self-serving bias at the 5% level.21 In a similar vein, subjects classiﬁed
as humpshape contributors or ”others“ do not contribute more or less under competition
than in the control treatment.
The elicited contribution patterns within all four groups of diﬀerent types identiﬁed are
robust to the introduction of competition. The fact that contribution patterns of those
subjects classiﬁed as conditional cooperators are not aﬀected by the possibility to win the
prize is strong evidence that the classiﬁcation method yields indeed a stable picture of
subjects’ underlying preferences. We sum this up in the next result:
21We also do the same exercise for the classiﬁcation of conditional cooperators according to the weak
monotonicity rule and ﬁnd identical results. We take this as evidence that our results do not rely on the
way subjects are classiﬁed into diﬀerent type groups.
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0 - - - -
1 - - - -
2 - - - -
3 ** - - -
4 *** - - -
5 *** - - -
6 *** * - ***
7 *** * - *
8 *** * - **
9 *** * - **
10 *** - - *
11 *** * - -
12 *** - - *
13 *** - - -
14 *** - - *
15 *** - - -
16 *** - - -
17 *** - - -
18 *** - - -
19 *** - - -
20 *** - - -
obs Total 336 237 20 38
obs BASE-OS 288 212 17 31
obs COMP-OS 48 25 3 7
Signiﬁcance Levels of Mann-Whitney-U-tests on individual conditional contribution diﬀerences between
BASE-OS and COMP-OS for every average contribution level of the other group members. *** represents
signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10. Classiﬁcation of Conditional Cooperators according
to the Spearman correlation.
Result 3.4 There is no change in preferences from competition within a classiﬁed con-
tribution type group. Especially, competition does not amplify the self-serving bias of
conditional cooperators.
Distribution of types We ﬁnd a decrease in average levels of conditional contribu-
tion across all subjects between the two treatments, but since we are not able to explain
this diﬀerence with altered behavior within the identiﬁed groups of types, we next take a
look at the frequencies of types in the population. Table 3.4 lists the absolute numbers and
the frequencies for both treatments, BASE-OS and COMP-OS. In the BASE-OS treat-
ment, there is a clear majority of about 74 % of the subjects (212 out of 288) classiﬁed as
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conditional cooperators with the Spearman method.22 10 % of the subjects (28 out of 288)
do not contribute positive amounts and are classiﬁed as freeriders. The two remaining
categories comprise 6 % (triangle contributors) and 11 % (not classiﬁable) respectively.
The heterogeneity of types in the population is in line with the literature, the exact dis-
tribution of types, however, is somewhat diﬀerent from the ﬁndings of Fischbacher et al.
(2001) or Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) who ﬁnd roughly 50 % of subjects to be con-
ditional cooperators and up to 30 % to be freeriders. This is likely to be partly due to
diﬀerences in the subject pool and partly to a diﬀerent MPCR of 0.4 compared to 0.5 in
our experiments.






13 25 3 7 48
27.1% 52.1% 6.3% 14.6% 100%
BASE-OS
28 212 17 31 288
9.7% 73.6% 5.9% 10.8% 100%
Total
41 237 20 38 336
12.2% 70.5% 6.0% 11.3% 100%
Number of observations and treatment frequencies of the observed types. Classiﬁcation of Conditional
Cooperators according to the Spearman correlation.
Introducing competition has a strong eﬀect on the proportion of freeriders and conditional
cooperators in the population. The share of freeriders increases from below 10 % to more
than 27 % and the percentage of conditional cooperators is decreased from about 74 %
to 52 %. The diﬀerence between the distribution of the four types in the population is
highly signiﬁcant (Fisher exact test and χ2 test, p < 0.01). Tests on diﬀerent frequencies
of each speciﬁc type in the two treatments conﬁrm that the proportions of freeriders and
conditional cooperators are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (χ2 test, p < 0.01), but not for hump-
shape contributors and the residual category (χ2 test, p > 0.46).
The introduction of competition leads to a signiﬁcant change of the distribution of contri-
bution types according to Fischbacher et al. (2001) in the population towards more selﬁsh
subjects. We therefore ﬁnd evidence for Hypothesis 3.3 that the loss of control over ﬁnal
payoﬀ allocations through competition is at the heart of a weakening of other-regarding
22Using the stricter weak monotonicity rule as a classiﬁcation methodology for conditional cooperators,
185 subjects (i.e., 64 %) fall into this category.
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preference in the population. Our results show that a substantial part of the population
is ”shifting“ from pro-social behavior in the form of conditional cooperation to the free-
riding behavior. Rather than ”reducing“ their other-regarding concerns, subjects cease to
behave pro-socially altogether what we summarize in our next result.23
Result 3.5 The introduction of competition leads to a signiﬁcant shift in the distribution
of the diﬀerent contribution types away from conditional cooperators to more freeriders in
the population.
We can explain the decrease in average conditional contributions caused by the intro-
duction of competition through a change in the distribution of underlying types in the
population but not through changed preferences within an identiﬁed type of contribu-
tion behavior. Standard classiﬁcation exercises of subjects into types may thus have only
limited predictive power when the strategic environment becomes more competitive.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of competition on cooperation behavior of sub-
jects with heterogeneous other-regarding preferences. In the context of a social dilemma,
we show that competition at the individual level alters the distribution of types in the
population as measured in the conditional cooperation exercise and weakens incentives to
build up a strategic reputation for selﬁsh individuals in repeated interactions.
Our study is among the ﬁrst to account for the diﬀerences in behavior between heteroge-
neous types in the population to an exogenous intervention. Our results shed an inter-
esting light on the interpretation of experimental results on other-regarding preferences
as they underline the importance of controlling for individual preferences when analyzing
an aggregate treatment eﬀect. The impact of an intervention through modiﬁed incentives
may thus have a diﬀerent impact on diﬀerent types identiﬁed. For the implementation
of e.g. a policy or a change in incentives within a ﬁrm, it is crucial to have information
23We do not have data on this, but the results suggest that in our setup the size of the bonus determines
the extent to which conditional cooperators convert into freeriders, i.e., the share of the population that
”gives up“ social concerns to act as selﬁsh.
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about types ex-ante in order to induce the desired change in behavior ex-post. The imple-
mentation of behaviorally optimal contracts thus hinges on the availability of information
on the precise nature of type heterogeneity and the knowledge about the eﬀects of the
policies on types.
In this context it is important to note that our results may underestimate the eﬀect of
diﬀerent incentive schemes on diﬀerent people since there is no selection of individuals
of similar preferences into groups in our laboratory experiment. If preferences are ho-
mogeneous within a group through selection into tasks or professions (Dohmen and Falk
(2011)), the discrepancy between the change in behavior of two groups from an identical
intervention may be considerable which constitutes a promising ﬁeld of research that we
leave for future investigation.
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3.6 Appendix A3
Appendix A3.1: Reduced Sample
In the text, we claim that the results do not change when we omit the additional 96
observations of subjects that are classiﬁed according to the methodology by Fischbacher
et al. (2001). We report here all analyses from the text for the reduced sample to show
that there is no eﬀect from adding the 96 observations in the BASE treatment in the
classiﬁcation exercise. As one can see from the two left panels, there is no diﬀerence to
those reported in the text. The contribution patterns within every type identiﬁed lie very
Figure A3.1: Conditional Contribution - Reduced Sample
Aggregate levels of conditional contribution for all subjects (left panel) and contribution patterns for
determined types in treatments BASE-OS and COMP-OS (middle and right panel). Reduced dataset
without additional data for BASE-OS treatment.
close to those from the complete dataset in the text. The same applies to the comparisons
between the BASE and the COMP treatment for every type separately which is reported
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in the following table. Also in the reduced sample, we ﬁnd the same signiﬁcance levels
for the Mann-Whitney-U-test that we reported in the text.




0 - - - -
1 - - - -
2 - - - -
3 ** - - -
4 ** - - -
5 *** - - *
6 *** * - ***
7 *** ** - **
8 *** * - *
9 *** * - ***
10 *** - - *
11 *** * - -
12 *** - - *
13 *** - - -
14 *** - - *
15 *** - - -
16 *** - - -
17 *** - - -
18 *** - - -
19 *** - - -
20 *** - - -
obs Total 240 167 16 24
obs BASE-OS 192 142 13 17
obs COMP-OS 48 25 3 7
Signiﬁcance Levels of Mann-Whitney-U-tests on individual conditional contribution diﬀerences between
BASE and CAMP for every average contribution level of the other group members. *** represents
signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10. Classiﬁcation of Conditional Cooperators according
to the Spearman correlation. Reduced dataset without additional data for BASE-OS treatment.
The distribution of types in the BASE treatment is also identical to that reported in the
text from the full sample. All non-parametric tests that control for diﬀerences in the
distributions between BASE and COMP produce identical levels of signiﬁcance.






13 25 3 7 48
27.1% 52.1% 6.3% 14.6% 100%
BASE-OS
20 142 13 17 192
10.4% 74.0% 6.8% 8.9% 100%
Total
33 167 16 24 240
13.8% 69.6% 6.7% 10.0% 100%
Number of observations and treatment frequencies of the observed types. Classiﬁcation of Conditional
Cooperators according to Spearman correlation. Reduced dataset without additional data for BASE-OS.
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Appendix A3.2: Tables
We report below the results from Panel Tobit regressions on the level of contributions
which yield similar results as the Random Eﬀects regressions reported in the text.
Table A3.3: Panel Tobit Regressions on Contributions
Dep. Var.:
I II III IV
Contribution
Period -1.148*** -1.148*** -1.209*** -1.209***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062)
COMP -0.715 -4.393* -0.593 -9.342**
(1.150) (2.256) (1.295) (3.765)
Cond Cooperator 2.632** 0.100 2.960 -1.453
(1.312) (1.868) (2.021) (2.652)
COMP * Cond Cooperator 4.932* 9.884**
(2.613) (4.000)
Constant 10.192*** 12.106*** 10.136*** 13.990***
(1.312) (1.649) (2.005) (2.497)
Obs 1920 1920 1620 1620
Wald χ2 400.6 403.6 381.3 386.0
Panel Tobit Regressions on contributions. COMP and Cond Cooperator are dummy variables. Speciﬁ-
cations III and IV only for subjects classiﬁed as conditional cooperators and freeriders. Standard errors
in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
Table A3.4: Random Eﬀects Panel Regression on Proﬁts per Round
Dep. Var.:
I II III IV
Proﬁts
Period -0.713*** -0.713*** -0.713*** -0.689***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.069)
COMP -0.453 -0.472 -1.696 -1.913
(1.161) (1.171) (1.633) (2.193)
Cond Cooperator -0.908 -1.757* -2.049
(0.646) (1.018) (1.428)
COMP * Cond Cooperator 1.654 1.871
(1.264) (1.692)
constant 31.100*** 31.781*** 32.418*** 32.580***
(0.923) (1.222) (1.492) (1.782)
Obs 1920 1920 1920 1620
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Random Eﬀects Panel Regression on proﬁts per round. COMP and Cond Cooperator are dummy vari-
ables. Speciﬁcation IV is restricted to subjects classiﬁed as conditional cooperators or freeriders. Standard
errors in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05 and * at p=0.10.
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Appendix A3.3: Figures
Figure A3.2: Average Beliefs
Beliefs about likelihood to have higher cumulative earnings up to current round for freeriders (left
panel) and conditional cooperators (right panel) in treatments BASE and COMP
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Figure A3.3: Proﬁt Levels
Proﬁt levels for freeriders, all subjects not classiﬁed as conditional cooperators (NoCC) and conditional
cooperators in treatments COMP (left panels) and BASE (right panels)
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Figure A3.4: Contributions Levels - No Conditional Cooperators
Contributions levels (left panel) and beliefs about likelihood to have higher cumulative earnings up to
current round (right panel) for all subjects not classiﬁed as conditional cooperators in treatments
COMP and BASE.
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The purpose of this experiment is to study decision making. In the course of the experiment, you as well as the 
other participants are going to make decisions. By making these decisions it is possible to earn some money. 
Your payoff is determined by your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants according to the 
rules defined on the following pages. 
 
Anonymity 
During the experiment you will be interacting with other participants. Neither during nor after the experiment, 
will you be informed about the identity of the participants you interacted with. The other participants will 
neither during nor after the experiment be informed about your role or your earnings in the experiment. 
During the whole experiment it is strictly forbidden to communicate. Furthermore you are only allowed to 
use those functions of the computer that are  designed for progressing with the experiment.  Should you 
nonetheless try to communicate or tamper with the computer, you will be excluded from the experiment. 
 
Payoff 
For showing up on time you will receive 4 €, which you will keep in any case. During the course of the 
experiment you can earn money according to the rules explained below. After conclusion of the experiment 
you will receive your guaranteed 4 € as well as the amount of money, that you earned during the course of the 
experiment. This will be paid in private and in cash. During the experiment we do not speak of Euros but of 
tokens. Every token you earned in the experiment will be converted to Euros according to the following rate: 
 
1 token = 0.10 Euro (10 tokens = 1 Euro) 
 
In your cubicle you will find a pen. Please transmit your decisions to the computer. While making your 
decisions there will be a countdown at the upper right of the computer screen. The purpose of this countdown 
is to give you an orientation about how much time you should need to come to a decision. However, the 
countdown will not be enforced in the case that you need more time to come to a decision. This will most 
probably be the case in the beginning. Only informational screens which do not require any decisions to be 
made will be removed after the countdown reaches zero. 
 
Time 
The duration of this three-part-experiment is approximately one hour and 15 minutes. You will receive the 
instructions for parts II and III after conclusion of part I. Should you have any questions or find anything 




At the beginning of this part participants will randomly be assigned to groups of 4. Neither during nor after 
the experiment will you learn about the identities of the other members of your group. Similarly the other 
participants will neither during nor after the experiment be informed with whom were they interacting in a 
group. 
 
You have to make two kinds of decisions that are both made in the following setting: 
First every participant receives an endowment of 20 tokens. You can assign those 20 tokens to the two 
alternatives, X and Y: 
 
1.  You can assign 0 to 20 tokens to box X. The sum of all group members’ contributions to box X will 
be multiplied by 2 of which one quarter will be allocated to every group member. Thus for every 
token in box X you will receive 0.5 (=2*1/4) tokens. If, for example, the sum of all tokens in box X is 
equal to 60, every group member receives 60*0.5 = 30 tokens out of box X. If the group members in 
sum allocate 10 tokens to box X, you and all other group members receive 10*0.5 = 5 tokens out of 
box X.  
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2.  Of the 20 tokens, the amount you do not allocate to box X is automatically allocated to box Y. These 
tokens directly contribute to your payoff in this period. For example if you allocate 6 tokens to box Y, 
exactly 6 tokens out of box Y are added to the payoff of the period. 
 
Your total payoff is the sum of your payoff out of box X and your payoff out of box Y. 
 
Your payoff is thus calculated by: 
 
Your Payoff =           
X box of out Payoff Y box of out Payoff
S x ) 5 , 0 ( ) 20 ( ⋅ + −  
x = Your contribution to box X 
S = Sum of the contributions of all group members to box X 
 
To clarify here is another example: You assign 12 tokens to box X and thus 8 tokens to box Y. The other 
group members’ contributions are 4 tokens by participant A, 9 tokens by participant B and 15 tokens by 
participant C. The overall amount in box X thus is 12 + 4 + 9 + 15 = 40 tokens. 
  
Your payoff then amounts to (20 – 12) + (0.5 * 40) = 8 + 20 = 28 tokens. 
Participant A’s payoff amounts to (20 – 4) + (0.5 * 40) = 16 + 20 = 36 tokens. 
Participant B’s payoff amounts to (20 – 9) + (0.5 * 40) = 11 + 20 = 31 tokens. 
Participant C’s payoff amounts to (20 – 15) + (0.5 * 40) = 5 + 20 = 25 tokens. 
 
As mentioned above every group member makes two kinds of contribution decisions. We distinguish between 
the unconditional contribution and the contribution table. 
 
•  On the first screen you are asked to select your unconditional contribution to box X, i.e. you select how 
many of the 20 tokens you want to assign to box X. The remainder of the 20 tokens is automatically 
allocated to box Y. You can select any integer between 0 and 20 (including 0 and 20). Just type your 
unconditional contribution in the input box on your screen and confirm this amount by clicking „OK“. As 
long as the OK button has not been clicked you can change the amount of your contribution. 
 
•  On the second screen you are asked to fill out a contribution table. In this contribution table you select for 
every possible  (rounded) average contribution of the other group members to box X,  how many 
tokens you want to contribute to box X. This means you select your contribution dependent on the 
average contribution of the others. The contribution table is illustrated in the picture below. 
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The numbers in the left columns are all possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group members 
to box X, i.e. the amount that every other group member on average contributes to box X. You type into every 
input box, how many tokens you  –  given that the other group members on average contribute the 
respective amount – want to contribute to box X. You determine how much you are going to contribute if the 
other group members contribute on average 0 tokens to box X; how much you contribute if the other group 
members contribute on average 1, or 2, or 3 tokens. Into every input box you can type any integer between 0 
and 20 (i.e., you can also type in the same amount into several or all input boxes). You have to type a 
number into every box. Once you have filled out every box on the screen please click the “OK”-button. As 
long as the “OK”-button has not been clicked you can still revise your decision.  
 
After all participants have decided about their unconditional contribution and filled out their contribution table 
the computer chooses one group member out of every group by a random draw. For the randomly chosen 
group member only the filled out contribution table is relevant for calculating your final payoff. For the 
remaining three group members only the unconditional contribution is relevant for calculating the payoff. 
While you decide on your unconditional contribution and fill out your contribution table you do not know 
whether you will be randomly chosen or not. Thus you should contemplate both contribution decisions as 
both can become relevant to your payoff. 
 
Example 1: Assume that you have been randomly chosen, i.e. your contribution table is payoff relevant. For 
the other three group members thus the unconditional contribution decision is relevant. Assume these to be 4, 
9 and 16 tokens. The rounded average contribution of the other group members thus is 10 tokens 
([4+9+16]/3=9.66).  
If you specified in your contribution table that you contribute 13 tokens to box X if the others contribute on 
average 10 tokens, the total contribution to box X amounts to 4+9+13+16 tokens = 42 tokens.  
Your payoff in part I then amounts to (20-13)+0.5*42 = 7+21 = 28 tokens. 
  
Example 2: Assume that you have not been randomly chosen, i.e. for you and two other group members the 
unconditional contribution decision is payoff relevant. Assume your unconditional contribution to box X to 
be 8 tokens, the others’ contributions to be 10 and 16 tokens. The average unconditional contribution of the 
three of you then amounts to 11 tokens ([8+10+16]/3=11,33). 
If the randomly chosen group member specified that she contributes 15 tokens to box X if the average 
contribution of the other three group members amounts to 11 tokens,  the total contribution to box X is 
8+10+15+16=49 tokens.  
Your payoff in part I then amounts to (20-8)+0.5*49=12+24.5=36.5 tokens. 
  
The result of part I will be disclosed after conclusion of the whole experiment. You will then be informed 
which decision (the unconditional contribution or the contribution table) is relevant to your payoff, the 
contributions of the other group members and your resulting payoff of part I. You will be paid at the end of the 
experiment. 
Part II  
(parts and instructions were presented sequentially to subjects) 
Time structure 
This part consists of 10 identical periods. In every period you are again a member of a group of 4. This is 
exactly the same group as in part I. The group stays the same over the whole course of part II, i.e. you are 
interacting with the same persons over all periods.  
Additionally you will be randomly assigned to another participant in this room, who is not a member of 
your 4-person-group whom you have to assess in part II. In part III a prize of 70 tokens will be given 
either to you or this assigned participant from another group. Whether you or your partner receives the 
prize depends on the decisions in part II.  
 
In every period you will make two decisions, a contribution decision and an assessment decision. The 
contribution decision is equivalent to the unconditional contribution decision in part I. The assessment 
decision asks you to assess whether the participant from a different group who has been randomly 
assigned to you has earned more or less than you up to (including) this period.  
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Both decisions determine your payoff in part II: After conclusion of the experiment one of the 10 periods is 
randomly drawn; this period is relevant to your payoff. Another random draw determines whether your 
contribution decision or your assessment decision is relevant to your payoff.  
 
As you do not know which period and which decision will be relevant to your payoff, it is in your own interest 
to consider every decision carefully as every decision in every period could be relevant to your payoff. 
1. Contribution decisions in every period 
The setting is identical to period I. You are endowed with 20 tokens in every period and decide 
how many of these 20 tokens you are contributing to box X and how many you are contributing to 
box Y. The payoff is calculated identical to part I. 
The only difference is that you only decide on your unconditional contribution and do not fill out a 
contribution table. 
 
The periodical earnings of all group members are calculated the same way, depending on the 
unconditional contributions of all four group members. On the screen you will be asked how 
many tokens you want to contribute to box X. The remainder of the 20 tokens automatically is 
contributed to box Y. Saving tokens for the next periods is not possible. You can only specify 
integers between 0 and 20 (including 0 and 20). Please type your contribution to box X into the input 
box and confirm your decision by clicking „OK“. As long as you have not clicked the “OK”-button 
you can still revise your decision. 
 
Then you are informed about the other group members’ contributions, the total contribution of 
all group members to box X and your payoff in this period. The order in which the contributions 
of the other group members appear is random. Thus you cannot derive a specific group member’s 
contributions over several periods.  
 
After you have made contribution decisions in every of the 10 periods, the computer – after 
conclusion of the experiment – randomly chooses one payoff-relevant period and whether your 
contribution decision or your assessment decision in the chosen period is payoff-relevant.  
2. Assessment decisions in every period 
Concluding each period you have to assess the participant from a different group that has been randomly 
assigned to you. You can earn up to 40 tokens. The better your assessment, the higher your payoff.   
In every period you specify an integer probability between 0 and 100 which you believe is the probability 
that you have higher total earnings than the participant that has been randomly assigned to you. The 
total sum of earnings that have been accumulated by you or the participant assigned to you in part II, 
including this period, are relevant. Note that the randomly assigned participant makes his decision subject to 
exactly the same rules as you. Which period is later randomly chosen to be payoff relevant is not important; 
every period up to and including the current period are relevant to the assessment decision. The earnings in 
part I are irrelevant. 
 
If the assessment decision is randomly determined to be payoff-relevant, your payoff in period II depends 
on whether you or the participant randomly assigned to you accumulated a higher total amount of earning up 
to and including the randomly chosen period. 
 
Case 1 (Your accumulated earnings are higher):  
Your Payoff = ((Your Probability in %) / 100 ) * 40 Tokens 
 
Case 2 (The accumulated earnings of your randomly assigned participant are higher):  
Your Payoff = ((100 - Your Probability in %) / 100) * 40 Tokens 
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If the accumulated earnings of both of you are equivalent the computer randomly chooses with probability 




The stronger your belief that your earnings are higher, the higher is the probability you should specify. 
The more you think that your earnings are lower, the lower the probability you should specify. 
 
Example 1: Your relevant assessment for part II specified that with 70% probability your earnings are higher 
than those of the participant randomly assigned to you. There are three possible cases: If your total earnings 
are indeed higher, you receive 70/100 * 40 = 28 tokens. If the total earnings of the participant randomly 
assigned to you are higher, you receive (100 – 70)/100 * 40 = 12 tokens. If your earnings are equivalent the 
computer randomly determines with a probability of 50% if you receive 28 tokens (as if your earnings were 
higher) or 12 tokens (as if your earnings were lower). 
  
Example 2: Your relevant assessment for part II specified that with 20% probability your earnings are higher 
than those of the participant randomly assigned to you. There are again three possible cases: If your total 
earnings are indeed higher, you receive 20/100 * 40 = 8 tokens. If the total earnings of the participant 
randomly assigned to you are higher, you receive (100 – 20)/100 * 40 =32 tokens. If your earnings are 
equivalent the computer randomly determines with a probability of 50% if you receive 8 tokens (as if your 
earnings were higher) or 32 tokens (as if your earnings were lower).  
 
Please type your assessment in % between 0 and 100 into the input box and confirm your assessment by 
clicking the „OK“-button. As long as the “OK”-button has not been clicked you can still revise your decision.  
 
Afterwards the next period commences. After 10 identical periods this part of the experiment ends.  
 
Your payoff is determined after completion  of the experiment.  A period is randomly determined; 
another random draw determines whether the contribution decision or the assessment decision is 
relevant to your payoff. While you either decide on your unconditional contribution or assess the participant 
randomly assigned to you, you neither know whether this period nor whether the contribution decision or the 
assessment decision is relevant to your payoff. Thus you should carefully consider both decisions in every 
period as both can become relevant to your payoff.  
 
Part III  
 
In this part of the experiment you can – as mentioned above – in addition to your payoff in part I and part II 
receive a prize. The prize amounts to 70 tokens. You are guaranteed to keep your payoff from both parts; 
you cannot suffer any losses in part III.  
 
[COMP: Whether you win the prize of 70 tokens depends on the total sum of earnings you and the 
participant randomly assigned to you accumulated through the contribution decisions in part II over 
the whole 10 periods. Your total earnings from the contribution decisions in all periods as well as the 
total earnings from the contribution decisions in all periods of the participant randomly assigned to you 
determine who of you two receives the prize. Neither the assessment decision nor your earnings from part I 
are relevant.  
 
To determine who receives the prize of 70 tokens your total sum of earnings you accumulated through 
the contribution decisions in part II over the whole 10 periods is compared to the  total sum of earnings 
the participant randomly assigned to you accumulated through the contribution decisions in part II 
over the whole 10 periods. The person who accumulated a higher total sum of earnings receives the 
prize  of 70 tokens. If you both accumulated the exact same total sum of earnings the computer 
randomly draws a winner with probability of 70 tokens. Some examples for clarification: 
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Example 1: Your earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II amount to 310 tokens and 
the earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II of the participant randomly assigned to 
you amount to 240 tokens. Thus you receive the prize. The participant randomly assigned to you does not 
receive any payoff from part III.  
 
Example 2: Your earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II amount to 240 tokens and 
the earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II of the participant randomly assigned to 
you amount to 280 tokens. Thus the participant randomly assigned to you receives the prize. You do not 
receive any payoff from part III. 
 
Example 3: Your earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II amount to 270 tokens and 
the earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II of the participant randomly assigned to 
you amount to 270 tokens. Thus the computer randomly determines with 50% probability who receives the 
prize. 
 
Your earnings from all contribution decisions in all periods of part II as well as the earnings from all 
contribution decisions in all periods of part II of the participant randomly assigned to you are shown to 
you on the screen. You are then informed whether you or the participant randomly assigned to you 
receive the prize. The payoff from part I is irrelevant to this, as is the actual payoff from part II (contribution 
decision or assessment decision).] 
 
[BASE: Whether you win the prize of 70 tokens depends on the throw of a dice. Your chances are 50 %. 
The computer allocates “Lucky numbers” between 1 and 6 to both you and the participant randomly 
assigned to you. The computer randomly decides about whether you obtain the low (1-3) and the low (4-6) 
figures.  
 
To determine who wins the prize in part III, a dice is publicly rolled to determine a “Lucky Number” between 
1 and 6. If this “Lucky Number” is part of your lucky numbers, you win the prize of 70 tokens. If it is not, the 
participant randomly allocated to you obtains the prize. 
 
Please note: The above described procedure ensures that every figure between 1 and 6 is chosen with equal 
probability, i.e. your chance to win the prize is exactly 50 %. Who is allocated the high or the low “Lucky 
Numbers” does not matter.] 
  
Your payoff from part III is shown to you at the end of part III on the screen. You do not have to make any 
decision in part II.  
 
At the end of the experiment your payoff from part I and part II is determined and are shown to you in 
conjunction with your total payoff from the whole experiment on the screen. 
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Economic situations in which an agent takes decisions that aﬀect others’ outcomes as
well as her own constitute a common class of phenomena. For instance, they represent
situations in which a decision maker’s choices aﬀect not only her own outcomes, but those
of her family as well. Another common instance of such decision problems is the one of
ﬁnancial agency contracts in which the incentive structure of the agent coincides with the
one of the principal. An example may be the one of executives that are compensated
through company shares, or the one of a stock broker whose payoﬀs are determined by
the outcomes of the investments she undertakes.
There is an extensive literature on individual decision making under risk and uncertainty
(Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Post et al., 2008), as well as a substantial literature on risk
attitude in agency problems and how to inﬂuence it through performance-contingent pay
(Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). What is missing, however, is a direct comparison
of risk attitudes when decisions are individual to situations of responsibility. Indeed, to
the extent that decisions under responsibility diﬀer from decisions commonly found in
the individual decision making literature, ﬁndings from the latter will only constitute an
0
This chapter is based on joint work with Julius Pahlke and Ferdinand Vieider.
180Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk
imperfect predictor of attitudes under responsibility. Given that the latter constitute an
economically important class of decision situations-and indeed one that in its economic
importance may even surpass individual decisions-additional evidence on any diﬀerences
can provide important insights for descriptive as well as prescriptive and policy purposes.
We thus explore the diﬀerence in risk attitudes between situations of decision-making
for oneself and in situations of responsibility, i.e., situations in which the decision maker
decides for others as well as herself. We explore such decisions for situations in which
an anonymous other (the recipient) is aﬀected by any outcomes in exactly the same way
as the decision maker herself. This allows us to study possible changes in behavior in a
clean way, excluding issues deriving e.g. from preferences over outcome distributions that
may cause inequality concerns. Also, by making both the decision maker’s outcome and
the recipient’s outcome dependent on the decision makers’ choice, the latter will bear an
actual cost in terms of her own preferences by accommodating any presumed preferences
of the recipient or by following some social norm. Any ﬁndings should thus constitute a
lower bound on the eﬀects we want to investigate.
To our best knowledge, the only paper that reports results about this issue under equal
payoﬀ assumptions in a non-strategic setting is Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), although
the authors report these results as an afterthought to their main results about inequality
concerns and do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant results due to their small sample size.
They also discuss only the case of decisions in the gain domain. We explore the issue
systematically for risky choices in the gain domain, the loss domain, and the mixed
domain. Individual risk attitudes have been found to diﬀer systematically in the diﬀerent
domains (Abdellaoui, 2000; Booĳ et al., 2010; Schoemaker, 1990). To the extent that
individual risk attitudes have been found to diﬀer systematically across the probability
and outcome spaces, responsibility may well have diﬀerent eﬀects across those dimensions.
While we adopt a theory-neutral approach in our exploratory eﬀorts, the inclusion of
diﬀerent decision domains will allow us to capture any richness in behavior as predicted
by descriptively more complex theories such as prospect theory.
We ﬁnd that in the gain domain, being responsible for others as well as oneself does indeed
increase risk aversion for medium to large probabilities, thus showing that the intuition of
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) was correct. In addition, we show that for pure loss prospects,
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subjects become more risk seeking when responsible for others. Loss aversion on the other
hand, being already very strong in individual decisions, does not seem to increase when
subjects are responsible for others. In a second experiment aimed at exploring social
norms on risk taking in the gain domain in more detail, we replicate the ﬁnding that
risk aversion increases under responsibility for large probabilities. When choices regard
small probability prospects, however, we ﬁnd increased risk seeking under conditions of
responsibility. Overall thus our results point to an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of
risk attitudes typically found in individual decision making when subjects are responsible.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses risk attitudes and how they may
be inﬂuenced by social contexts. Section 4.3 describes the ﬁrst experiment, with section
4.3.1 describing the methodology and section 4.3.2 presenting the results; section 4.3.3
discusses the result of experiment 1 and derives hypotheses for experiment 2. Section 4.4
introduces experiment 2, with section 4.4.1 describing the methodology and section 4.4.2
presenting the results. Section 4.4.3 discusses the results of experiment 2 as well as the
overall results. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Risk Attitudes in Social Contexts
In recent years, there has been a growing interest by economists in how social factors may
inﬂuence decision making under risk (Bohnet et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010;
Goeree and Yariv, 2007). Such ”social factors“ could take various forms, ranging from
whether a decision is observed by somebody else or whether the decision maker observes
somebody else’s decision, to whether one’s outcome depends on somebody else or whether
one’s decision inﬂuences the outcome of somebody else (Trautmann and Vieider, 2010).
We are interested in the latter category: do preferences over risky choices change when the
decision inﬂuences somebody else’s outcomes as well as the ones of the decision maker?
And if so, how?
To date there is very little evidence on this issue, with the existing evidence appearing
inconclusive. Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) hypothesize that risk aversion will increase
under responsibility. However, their result fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance. Indeed,
their main results concern the eﬀect of social comparison, so that they mainly examine
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choice behavior when outcomes may diﬀer between the decision maker and the recipient.
They ﬁnd an increase in risk taking under conditions of responsibility when the safe op-
tion yields unequal payoﬀs, and particularly when such payoﬀ asymmetry is unfavorable
to the decision maker. In contrast, they ﬁnd that under responsibility risk taking does
not depend on whether the risky option yields unequal payoﬀs.
In a somewhat related study from the game-theoretic literature, Charness and Jackson
(2009) have subjects play Rousseau’s stag hunting game against each other. They com-
pare conditions in which one subject simply plays against another, to one in which a
second, passive, subject depends on each player. They ﬁnd that under responsibility for
someone else the eﬃcient equilibrium obtains less frequently. While this may again be an
indication for increased risk aversion under responsibility, it is not clear where such a risk
may actually come from since it is not in the interest of any of the players to deviate from
the eﬃcient equilibrium unless they think the other player may deviate. Furthermore,
the setup of the study again creates issues of inequality aversion. Even if the recipient
obtains the same payoﬀs as the decision maker, the strategic nature of the game implies
that the decision maker can inﬂuence the payoﬀs of her opponent and the latter’s passive
recipient, which may aﬀect her choices ex-ante.
We aim to speciﬁcally exclude inequality concerns to ﬁlter out the pure eﬀect of being
responsible for somebody else’s payoﬀs. In order to achieve this, the exact choice that
determines the decision maker’s payoﬀ also determines the recipient’s payoﬀ, resulting
in exactly the same outcome for the decision maker and the recipient. This design thus
allows us to isolate the eﬀect of being responsible for somebody else as well as for oneself
from any distributional issues (Rohde and Rohde, 2010). Furthermore, there are costs for
the decision maker in adapting her preferences under conditions of responsibility in terms
of sacriﬁcing her own preferences. In this sense, we believe that our design constitutes
a lower bound on any eﬀects of responsibility that could be found employing alternative
designs, such as e.g. salaried agents.
Given the lack of conclusive evidence to date, we propose to systematically explore the
eﬀect of responsibility on risk preferences throughout the outcome and probability do-
mains. In order to facilitate that task, in what follows we will adopt a behavioral, and
hence theory-neutral, deﬁnition of risk aversion. A decision maker will be deﬁned as risk
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averse whenever she prefers the expected value of a prospect to the prospect itself; con-
versely, she will be deﬁned as risk seeking whenever she prefers the prospect to a sure
amount equivalent to the prospect in terms of expected value (Wakker, 2010, p.52). Risk
aversion and risk seeking are thus relative terms, such that a decrease in risk aversion
can be seen as equivalent to an increase in risk seeking, regardless of absolute levels of
risk taking.1 In our presentation of the results we recur to prospect theory-the prevalent
descriptive theory of choice under risk and uncertainty today (Starmer, 2000; Wakker,
2010). Under prospect theory, risk attitudes are described by utility curvature, loss aver-
sion, and probability weighting (Köbberling and Wakker, 2005). Since prospect theory is
more general than other theories of decisions under risk such as expected utility theory,
we can thus capture richer risk attitudes if present, without however imposing a theory
on our data a priori. In individual decision making under risk, the typical ﬁnding is a
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes: risk aversion for medium to large probabilities of gains;
risk seeking for small probability gains; risk aversion for small probability losses; and risk
seeking for medium to large probability losses (Abdellaoui, 2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2010;
Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). In addition to this fourfold
pattern, for mixed prospects involving both gains and losses, risk attitudes are signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuenced by loss aversion-the phenomenon according to which monetary losses
are usually attributed greater weights than equivalent monetary gains (Abdellaoui et al.,
2007; Schmidt and Zank, 2005; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
The question of whether and how being responsible for others changes choice behavior also
raises interesting questions about rationality concepts, social norms on risk taking and the
perceived acceptability of attitudes towards risks. This has implications for ’debiasing’,
or simply changing risk attitudes in ways that may seem socially desirable. By comparing
situations of individual decisions to situations of responsibility for diﬀerent probabilities
and in diﬀerent domains, we are able to examine the perceived acceptability of common
individual decision making patterns under risk. To the extent that responsibility for oth-
ers acts as a cognitive motivator for a more careful consideration of the decision, we can
draw conclusions about the perceived acceptability of a type of behavior by observing if
1This means that saying that choices under condition A are more risk averse than under condition B
is taken as equivalent to saying that they are less risk seeking under A than under B, regardless of the
absolute level of risky or safe choices (i.e, regardless of whether safe choices are more or less than 50% in
both cases, or whether they cross the 50% mark).
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and how people move from the individual baseline when responsible for others.
4.3 Experiment 1: Responsibility for Gains, Losses
and Mixed Prospects
4.3.1 Experimental Design
We designed a laboratory experiment in which we asked subjects to take binary decisions
between two alternatives, that are presented to them on a computer screen. Payoﬀs
always aﬀect the decision maker and the recipient in a perfectly parallel manner in the
responsibility treatment, so as to avoid issues of payoﬀ inequality (Bolton and Ockenfels,
2010; Rohde and Rohde, 2010).
Subjects. Overall, 144 subjects were recruited from a subject pool of the experimen-
tal laboratory MELESSA at Ludwig-Maximilian’s University in Munich, Germany, via
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The experiment took roughly 1.5 hours, and average earnings
were 22.5 €. The experiments were run on computers using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007).
46% of subjects were female, and the average age was 24.07 years.
Task. Subjects were asked to choose between a safe prospect and a risky prospect.
The safe prospect usually consisted in a sure amount of money, and sometimes in a
prospect with lower volatility compared to the risky prospect. The risky prospect always
gave a 50-50 chance to obtain one of two outcomes. The prospects could comprise only
positive amounts, only negative amounts, or both positive and negative amounts (see
below). Overall, subjects had to make 40 choices, with the order of presentation as well
as the position of the two prospects randomized for each subject. Subjects took decisions
sequentially and had no opportunity to return to an earlier decision to revise it. All of
the above was explained in the instructions.
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Prospects. The 40 choices to be made by all subjects in the experiment were con-
structed systematically in the following way: We chose ﬁve diﬀerent stake levels that we
denote henceforth by b where b ∈ {2,4,6,8,10}. For every stake level, we had subjects
chose between the following eight diﬀerent prospect pairs:
• Base Case: These prospect pairs oﬀered a choice between the safe payment b and a
prospect providing a 50% chance to win twice the safe amount b or zero otherwise.
• Sensitivity up: Compared to the basic choice pair, the safe payment is increased by
25% to assess subjects’ the degree of risk aversion. The risky option is unchanged.
• Sensitivity down: Similar to ”Sensitivity up“, but the safe payment is reduced by
25%, again in order to measure risk aversion. The risky option is unchanged.
• Positive shift: Every amount is increased by 50% of the safe payment in the base
category. These choices were included to see how choices changed when shifting
away from the 0 € outcome.
• Lottery choice: The risky prospect now remains identical to the basic case, but the
safe payment is replaced by a prospect with a lower variance (0.5b and 1.5b) than
the risky prospect (0 and 2b).
• Mixed prospects: To obtain these prospects, the safe amount in the base case was
subtracted from all outcomes, thus obtaining a prospect with an expected value of
0 €. The safe amount was always 0, the prospect a lottery between −b and b.
• Mean-preserving spread: The two risky outcomes of the base case were respectively
increased and decreased by 50% of the sure amount. The expected value of the
prospect thus remains the same; however, the variance of the prospect increases,
and a loss equal to 50% of the sure amount is introduced into the prospect.
• Loss Shift: The mirror image of the base case where every amount was negative
instead of positive. These prospects were inserted to directly compare risk taking
behavior for gains and losses.2
2Additional prospects in the gain domain were not mirrored for ethical reasons. Indeed, replicating
all gain prospects for losses would have resulted in a high chance of overall losses during the experiment.
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The following table gives an overview of the eight diﬀerent prospect pairs as a function
of the stake level b.
Table 4.1: Overview of Lotteries
Choice Type Option A (”Safe“) Option B (”Risky“)
Base b 0 2 b
Sensitivity Up 1.25 b 0 2 b
Sensitivity Down 0.75 b 0 2 b
Positive Shift 1.5 b 0.5 b 2.5 b
Lottery Choice 0.5 b 1.5 b 0 2b
Mixed Prospect 0 -b b
MPS b -0.5 b 2.5 b
Loss Shift -b -2 b 0
For a complete overview of all prospect pairs, see Table A4.2 in appendix A4.2.
Treatments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the indi-
vidual treatment, subjects took their decisions only for themselves. In the responsibility
treatment, half of the subjects were randomly assigned the role of decision maker and the
other half to the role of passive recipient. The decision maker was told that she had to
take the decision on behalf of herself and another subject sitting in the laboratory, whose
identity was not disclosed. All other subjects were told that they were in a passive role
and that somebody else in the laboratory would take the decisions on their behalf. With
a lag of one period, recipients were shown the decision problem and the choice of their
corresponding decision maker. They could then indicate whether they were ”satisﬁed“ or
”not satisﬁed“ with the decision, but this did not aﬀect payoﬀs nor was it shown to the
decision maker.
Incentives. 3 out of the 40 decisions were randomly drawn for every subject to be
payoﬀ relevant once the experiment was over. Subjects did not learn about any payoﬀs
or extractions before the very end of the experiment. The random incentive system was
chosen in order to avoid possible income eﬀects, and because it is the standard procedure
used in this kind of tasks. We extracted 3 out of the 40 choices in order to reduce the
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probability that subjects would actually lose money in the experiment. To make the
random mechanism behind lotteries as transparent as possible, we had one participant
throw a dice for every lottery that determined what outcome of the lottery is obtained.
In the responsibility treatment, we implemented the payout procedure such that always
three identical decisions were randomly chosen for the two paired subjects - a decision
maker and her passive recipient would thus always obtain the same payoﬀ from a choice.
Subjects were told that it was possible - though unlikely - that they would lose money in
the experiment. They could either pay such losses directly or work them oﬀ in the lab for
a wage of 5 € per half hour.
4.3.2 Results
Prospect Choices: Overview Before discussing treatment eﬀects, it seems desirable
to discuss general risk attitudes and how they change for the diﬀerent types of prospects
employed when we look at the individual treatment only. In the base case we ﬁnd a
considerable degree of risk aversion across all stake levels, with about 73% of subjects
choosing the sure amount over the prospect with equal expected value (p < 0.001)3. As
one would expect, choices of the sure amount further increase when the sure amount is
higher than the expected value of the prospect (Sensitivity Up), and decrease when the
sure amount is lower (Sensitivity Down) in which case we observe a majority of choices
for the prospect (p < 0.01). When compared to the base case all outcomes are moved
upward by 50% of the sure amount (Positive Shift), we observe increased choices of the
prospect, although choices still display signiﬁcant risk aversion (p < 0.01). This can be
explained by aspiration level theory, whereby subjects aspire to win at least some money,
thus making a prospect with a non-zero minimal outcome more attractive (Payne et al.,
1980, 1981).
When the choice is between two non-degenerate prospects (Lottery Choice), choice
frequencies of the safe prospect are further increased relative to the base case, indicating
a similar heuristic, since the safe choice now provides a combination between a safe
minimum amount and a potentially higher outcome. For mixed prospects, the choice
3p-values reported are two-sided and refer to binomial tests for intermediate stakes, with a safe
amount of b = 6, unless speciﬁed otherwise.
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frequency of safe choices is only slightly increased compared to the base case (this
however underestimates the eﬀect given the lowering of the stake levels: see below as
well as appendix A4.1 for a more nuanced discussion). For the mean-preserving spread,
choices of the risky prospect increase, but risk aversion remains the dominant pattern
(p < 0.001). This may indicate that the increase in the good outcome more than makes
up for the slight loss that has been introduced in the bad outcome. Finally, for pure loss
choices, subjects are considerably more risk seeking than for gains, and in absolute terms
risk neutrality cannot be rejected (p = 0.19). It is also commonly found in the literature
Figure 4.1: Stake Eﬀects for Gains and Losses
Choice frequency of the safe prospect for basic prospect and loss shift across stake levels
that risk attitudes are inﬂuenced by stake levels (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Binswanger,
1980; Holt and Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992). We thus take a look at
the inﬂuence of the diﬀerent stake levels on decisions. Figure 4.1 shows choices for the
safe alternative separately for the basic prospect pairs and the pure loss pairs. The
stake eﬀect is clearly visible for the basic gain prospects, with increasing expected values
resulting in increased levels of risk aversion. Indeed, we cannot reject risk neutrality for
the lowest stakes (p = 0.47), with risk aversion increasing with stake levels and being
highly signiﬁcant for the highest stake level (p < 0.001). For losses, on the other hand,
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there is no clear trend and risk aversion has only a very slight (and non-signiﬁcant:
p = 0.31 for the highest stake level) tendency to increase with absolute stake values.4 A
parametric analysis of these descriptive results can be found in appendix A4.1. We next
turn to the diﬀerences between the individual and the responsibility treatment.
Individual Decisions versus Responsibility Figure 4.2 shows choice frequencies
for the safe prospect by treatment, for males and females respectively.5 One can clearly
see how for the base case subjects are more risk averse under responsibility than in the
individual decisions - this holds both for males and females.
Figure 4.2: Choice Frequency of the Safe Prospect for Diﬀerent Prospect Pairs
Frequency of choosing the safe prospect for diﬀerent prospect pairs, by treatment and gender
4The Spearman correlation coeﬃcient between the stake size b and choice for the safe option in the
individual treatment is indeed signiﬁcantly positive for the base lotteries (p < 0.001), but not diﬀerent
from zero for losses (p = 0.57).
5We display the eﬀects by gender because of the large gender eﬀects in risk taking typically found in
the literature (Donkers et al., 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2008), which are also present in our data.
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The same tendency is visible in almost all other positive prospect pairs, except for the
upward sensitivity prospect pair, in which there is no diﬀerence. There is only a very
slight indication of responsibility inducing more risk aversion in the mixed prospect pair,
while this tendency is again more pronounced for the mean-preserving spread (MPS) pair.
For pure loss choices, however, the tendency is inverted, with responsibility decreasing
risk aversion. Table 4.2 presents a random eﬀects Probit model regressing choices for
the safe prospect on a variety of explanatory variables. Regression I regresses choices on
the treatment dummy, a dummy variable indicating the pure loss prospects, a dummy
indicating mixed prospects, and two interaction terms between the latter two and the
treatment dummy.
Table 4.2: Experiment 1: Choice of Safe Prospect
Dep. Var.: choice of safe prospect I II III
responsibility 0.070** 0.080** 0.099**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.049)
pure loss -0.043** -0.067** -0.067**
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
responsibility × pure loss -0.098** -0.106** -0.106**
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
mixed prospect 0.131*** 0.112*** 0.112***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
responsibility × mixed prospect -0.024 -0.032 -0.032
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
EV diﬀerence 0.196*** 0.197***
(0.012) (0.012)
SD diﬀerence 0.022*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002)
female 0.083** 0.086** 0.107**
(0.033) (0.036) (0.049)
responsibility × female -0.046
(0.076)
Constant X X X
Obs 3840 3840 3840
Subjects 96 96 96
Wald χ2 64.43 417.03 417.27
Random eﬀects Probit Regression. Coeﬃcients show marginal eﬀects relative to choices in the individual
treatment. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05, * at p=0.10
Being responsible for somebody else’s payoﬀs as well as one’s own increases risk aversion
relative to aﬀecting only one’s own payoﬀs; the latter is a simple main eﬀect, indicating
the eﬀect of responsibility for all prospects except the pure loss prospects (i.e., with the
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pure loss dummy held constant at zero) and the mixed prospect (i.e., with the mixed
dummy held constant at zero). The eﬀect of the pure loss dummy indicates that for pure
loss prospects subjects are more risk seeking compared to all other gain prospects. The
interaction between the treatment dummy and the one identifying pure loss prospects
indicates that for pure loss prospects the eﬀect of responsibility goes in the opposite
direction compared to pure gain prospects, and thus shows that subjects in the responsi-
bility treatment are more risk seeking (or less risk averse) for losses compared to subjects
in the individual treatment. The signiﬁcant eﬀect of the mixed-prospect dummy shows
that subjects choose the safe option signiﬁcantly more often for the mixed prospect than
for pure gain prospects. The insigniﬁcant interaction between the treatment dummy and
the mixed dummy on the other hand indicates that there is no signiﬁcant treatment
eﬀects for mixed prospects, with the eﬀect thus going in the same direction as for gains.
Finally, we also ﬁnd that females are signiﬁcantly more risk averse than males. Such an
eﬀect is commonly found for decision making under risk (Donkers et al., 2001; Eckel and
Grossman, 2008).
Regression II keeps the same independent variables as regression I, and adds the dif-
ference in expected value (deﬁned as the expected value of the safe prospect minus the
expected value of the risky prospect) and the diﬀerence in standard deviations (deﬁned
as the standard deviation of the risky prospect minus the standard deviation of the safe
prospect, which is thus always positive). The higher the diﬀerence between the safe
prospect and the risky prospect in terms of expected value, the more likely subjects will
choose the safe prospect. Also, the larger the diﬀerence in terms of standard deviation,
the more likely subjects are to choose the safer alternative. The main treatment eﬀects
discussed above are stable, indicating increased risk aversion under responsibility in the
gain domain, increased risk seeking in the loss domain, and no treatment eﬀect in the
mixed domain.
Regression III further adds an interaction term between the gender dummy and the treat-
ment dummy. The eﬀect is not signiﬁcant, which goes to show that being responsible
for somebody else does aﬀect males and females in the same way. Once again, all the
eﬀects previously discussed remain stable. We next turn to the analysis of the satisfaction
ratings of recipients in the responsibility treatment.
192Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk
Choice Satisfaction of Recipients In the responsibility treatment, recipients saw
the decision maker’s choice with one period lag and indicated whether they were satisﬁed
with the decision or not. Although this rating was not incentivized, it may nevertheless
give an indication of the extent to which decision makers adapted their decision to the
commonly acceptable one, or correctly intuited which decision would be deemed more ac-
ceptable while doing so. Since satisfaction ratings were not communicated to the decision
maker and had no inﬂuence on payoﬀs whatsoever, recipients had indeed no reasons to
systematically misrepresent their preferences. Also, the fact that providing such ratings
was the only occupation of recipients during the experiments leads us to suspect that
they took this task seriously. Table 4.3 shows a random eﬀects Probit model regressing
Table 4.3: Experiment 1: Satisfaction Ratings
Dep. Var.: Satisﬁed with Decision I II
Safe prospect chosen 0.346*** 0.208***
(0.028) (0.038)
Pure loss 0.046 -0.002
(0.036) (0.040)















Wald χ2 196.08 230.93
Random Eﬀects Probit Regression. Coeﬃcients indicate marginal changes in satisfaction levels relative
to a choice of the risky prospect; *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05, * at p=0.10
the recipients’ satisfaction with each choice on a number of independent variables. The
highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the safe prospect being chosen by the decision maker shows
that safe choices are deemed more satisfactory in the gain domain (this being a simple
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main eﬀect measuring the eﬀect of safe choices with the pure-loss dummy held constant
at zero). While the fact that a prospect oﬀers only negative outcomes per se does not
aﬀect satisfaction ratings, choosing the safe amount in pure loss prospects is generally
not perceived as satisfactory by recipients, as shown by the highly signiﬁcant interaction
eﬀects of the pure loss and safe choice dummies. This ﬁnding conﬁrms that risk seeking
is deemed more acceptable than safe choices in the loss domain. There is no main gender
eﬀect for satisfaction ratings.
Regression II conﬁrms the stability of the ﬁndings we have just discussed, and adds some
more variables. The signiﬁcantly negative main eﬀect of the mixed prospect dummy indi-
cates that choices of the prospect are considered even less satisfactory in the mixed domain
as compared to the gain domain. In a parallel fashion, satisfaction increases relative to
the pure gain domain when a safe amount is chosen, giving again an indication of loss
aversion on the side of recipients. Choices are deemed more satisfactory the higher the
diﬀerence in expected value, providing an indication that higher diﬀerences in expected
value increase the agreement between decision makers and recipients on which choice is
the best one. Finally, in keeping with previous ﬁndings on gender eﬀects, women generally
deem choices of the safe prospect as more satisfactory than choices of the risky prospect.
At the end of the experiment we asked subjects to rate their degree of risk aversion on
a scale from being very risk seeking (1) to being very risk averse (6). This self-declared
risk aversion correlates strongly with the number of safe choices taken in non-negative
prospect pairs during the experiment itself on the basis of the Spearman correlation coef-
ﬁcient (p = 0.01) across both treatments. Self-declared risk attitudes are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between the two treatments (p = 0.26; Mann-Whitney-U-test, two-sided), nor is
there a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between decision makers and recipients in the responsibility
treatment (p = 0.72; Mann-Whitney-U-test, two-sided). Finally, we also asked subjects
to rate themselves according to their risk aversion relative to other participants in the
experiment. The rating went from 1 (indicating that a subject considered herself to be
amongst the four most risk-loving participants in the session of 24) to 6 (indicating that
a subject considered herself to be amongst the four most risk averse participants in the
session). On average, decision makers in the responsibility treatment had a rating of 4.17,
indicating that they considered themselves more risk averse than the median participant
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in the experiment, and thus ruling out that they may have considered recipients on aver-
age to be more risk averse than they are themselves. This ﬁnding corresponds to existing
evidence according to which subjects generally consider others as more risk loving than
themselves (Hsee and Weber, 1997).
4.3.3 Discussion
For gain prospects, we ﬁnd that responsibility increases risk aversion. An account based
on the assumption that decision makers consider others to be more risk averse than they
are themselves seems to be ruled out by the answers to the relative risk attitude ranking
questions discussed above. Also, Hsee and Weber (1997) found that in a series of diﬀerent
experimental designs subjects systematically predicted others to be less risk averse than
themselves. We can thus conclude that subjects do not simply try to adapt their decisions
to what they think may be others’ risk attitudes.
A diﬀerent possibility is that subjects comply to an implicit social rule dictating increased
caution when responsible for somebody else as well as oneself, thus increasing their risk
aversion when responsible for somebody else. This explanation is distinct from the argu-
ment discussed in the last paragraph, inasmuch as such a social norm may push subjects
to be more risk averse when deciding for others even in cases where they expect that
others would be more risk loving than themselves if left to decide for themselves. Such
a cautious shift explanation however cannot explain our increased risk seeking for loss
prospects. Arguably, diﬀerent social rules dictating a cautious shift for gains and a ’risky
shift’ for losses could well exist, but such a hypothesis does have a distinctly ad hoc ﬂa-
vor. Given that individual risk attitudes have been established to be much richer than
the simple risk-aversion/risk-seeking dichotomy implicit in such explanations (Abdellaoui,
2000; Abdellaoui et al., 2010; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2000), we rather hypothesize that risk
attitudes typically found in individual decision making are accentuated under conditions
of responsibility.
Prospect theory would predict risk aversion to prevail both for medium to large probabil-
ities, so that a theory based on the ampliﬁcation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
predicted by prospect theory cannot be separated from an account based on a social rule
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favoring increased risk aversion under responsibility based only on the evidence collected
for gain prospects. Risk seeking, however, seems to appear more acceptable than risk aver-
sion in the loss domain for the medium probabilities used in our experiment. Evidence
in this direction comes both from the behavior of decision makers, who under conditions
of responsibility in the loss domain are induced to become more risk seeking rather than
more risk averse; and from recipients, who are much more likely to be dissatisﬁed with a
decision in the loss domain when the decision maker chose the sure loss rather than the
prospect. This, in turn, cannot be explained by a uniform social norm dictating increased
caution under conditions of responsibility.
We thus propose as an alternative hypothesis that the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
predicted by prospect theory-risk aversion for medium to large probability gains and small
probability losses, risk seeking for medium to large probability losses and small probabil-
ity gains-is ampliﬁed by responsibility. At this point, the hypothesis that responsibility
accentuates the fourfold pattern may be no more plausible than the already discussed
hypothesis of diﬀerent social norms for decisions under gains and under losses. Luckily
however, there is a possibility to disentangle such diﬀerent explanations. The hypothesis
of an accentuated fourfold pattern of risk attitudes as found in prospect theory and the
social norm argument make very diﬀerent predictions for diﬀerent probability levels in the
gain domain, which makes it easy to test them against each other. For large probabilities,
both prospect theory and the social norm argument predict an increase in risk aversion
under conditions of responsibility. For small probabilities, on the other hand, the social
norm hypothesis still predicts an increase in risk aversion; quite to the contrary, however,
prospect theory and the argument of an ampliﬁcation of the fourfold pattern laid out
above now predict an increase in risk seeking under conditions of responsibility.
The same test can also be adopted to rule out yet another alternative explanation that
we cannot rule out on the basis of the results from above. When deciding for others
as well as themselves-so the objection goes-decision makers eﬀectively decide over twice
the amount of money. Given the common ﬁnding that risk aversion increases in stake
levels, the increased amounts over which decisions are taken may thus well be the factor
underlying the ﬁnding of increased risk aversion in the responsibility treatment, rather
than the responsibility eﬀect itself. This explanation is indeed plausible for the medium
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probability gains used in experiment 1 (although it cannot account for the ﬁndings for
loss prospects). Notice, however, how this explanation would again predict increased risk
aversion for small probability gains under higher stakes, which has been found repeatedly
(Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992; Lefebvre et al., 2010). We thus now proceed to testing
the eﬀect of responsibility on decisions for diﬀerent probability levels in the gain domain.
4.4 Experiment 2: Disentangling Social Norm and
Ampliﬁcation Accounts
4.4.1 Experimental Design
Subjects. 180 subjects were recruited from a subject pool of the experimental labora-
tory MELESSA at Ludwig-Maximilian’s University in Munich, Germany, using ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). The experiment was run together with another, unrelated, experiment.
59% of subjects were female, and the average age was 23.88 years.
Task. This task was run after another, unrelated experiment.6 Subjects were asked
to choose between a safe option and a risky option in a fashion similar to experiment
1. However, we now only looked at choices in the gain domain. The safe option always
consisted in a sure amount of money, while the prospect providing a chance of either
10% or 90% to win 10 €. Overall, subjects had to make 10 choices where the order of
presentation was randomized for every subject. Subjects took decisions sequentially and
had no opportunity to return to an earlier decision to revise it.
Prospects. The choice was always between a sure amount of money and a prospect.
There were two prospects, one providing a 10% chance to win 10 € and zero otherwise;
and one providing a 90% chance to win 10 € and zero otherwise. The sure amount could
take one of ﬁve diﬀerent amounts for each prospect: 0.8, 1, 1.2, 1.5 and 2 € for the 10%
6Although the preceding experiment was unrelated, care was taken to distribute the treatments of
this experiment orthogonally to the treatments in the other experiment.
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prospect, and 7, 8, 8.5, 9, and 9.5 € for the 90% prospect.
Treatments. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments that exactly
replicated those of experiment 1: an individual treatment in which subjects took their
decisions only for themselves; or a responsibility treatment, in which half of the subjects
were randomly assigned the role of decision maker and half the subjects were assigned
the role of passive recipient.
Incentives. One decision was randomly extracted to be played for real pay. Since
in the unrelated experiment subjects could obtain at least an approximate knowledge
about their payoﬀs, we decided to fully reveal earnings from the experiment in order to
be able to control for the exact income eﬀect in a regression (rather than having unknown
perceptions of earnings).
4.4.2 Results
Figure 4.3 displays the choice frequencies by treatment separately for small and large
probabilities. On average we ﬁnd the typical pattern of risk seeking for small proba-
bilities and risk aversion for large probabilities. Indeed, when the subjects face a choice
between a prospect and a sure amount of equal expected value, only about 27% of subjects
choose the sure amount for the 10% probability (p < 0.001, binomial test), while 99% of
subjects do so for the 90% probability (p < 0.001, binomial test). For the 10% probability,
subjects who are responsible for somebody else choose the sure amount less often for all
but the smallest two certain amounts, where choices of the safe amount are generally low.
For the 90% probability, responsible subjects always choose the sure amount at least as
often as subjects who only decide for themselves.
Table 4.4 presents a random eﬀects Probit model regressing choices of the safe alternative
on a variety of explanatory variables. The eﬀect of the responsibility treatment dummy
now indicates the simple main eﬀect of being responsible when probabilities are large
(Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). Subjects are thus more likely to choose the sure amount
for a 90% probability of winning when responsible compared to the individual treatment.
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Figure 4.3: Individual Decisions versus Decisions under Responsibility
Choices of Safe Amount by Treatment for p = 0.1 (left) and for p = 0.9 (right)
Under small probabilities, subjects are signiﬁcantly more risk seeking than under large
probabilities, as indicated by the highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of the small probability dummy.
More importantly, the interaction of the small-probability dummy with the treatment
dummy indicates that this risk-seeking tendency is further enhanced relative to the indi-
vidual treatment when subjects are responsible for somebody else. As may be expected,
the diﬀerence in expected value between the sure amount and the prospect (deﬁned as
in experiment 1) is also highly signiﬁcant. Finally, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, if small, income
eﬀect, which goes as expected in the direction of increased risk seeking by subjects who
have realized higher earnings from the previous experiment.
Regression II adds two further interaction terms. Almost all eﬀects can be seen to
be stable. The gender eﬀect, which had not been signiﬁcant in regression I, is now
also signiﬁcant: since this is a simple eﬀect, the positive eﬀect of the female dummy
now indicates increased risk aversion by females relative to males for large probability
prospects. This eﬀect is qualiﬁed by the interaction of the female dummy with the
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Table 4.4: Experiment 2: Choice of Safe Prospect
Dep. Var.: Choice of Safe Prospect I II
Responsibility 0.107* 0.148*
(0.058) (0.086)
Small probability -0.666*** -0.589***
(0.036) (0.047)
Small probability × responsibility -0.135** -0.133**
(0.068) (0.068)




Past proﬁt -0.008*** -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003)
Female × small probability -0.209**
(0.068)





Wald χ2 264.55 263.57
Random Eﬀects Probit Regression. Coeﬃcients show marginal eﬀects relative to choices in the individual
treatment; *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05, * at p=0.10
small-probability dummy. The negative eﬀect of that interaction shows that females
are signiﬁcantly more risk seeking relative to males for small probabilities. Past proﬁts
remain signiﬁcant, though less so than in regression I. Most importantly, however, there
is no interaction eﬀect between past proﬁts from the preceding experiment and our
treatment manipulation, showing that this is not interfering with our results.
Satisfaction ratings Exactly as in experiment 1, recipients in experiment 2 saw the
decisions of their assigned decision maker with a lag of one period, and had to indicate
whether they were satisﬁed with the decision or not. Table 4.5 reports the results of a ran-
dom eﬀects Probit model regressing the satisfaction dummy on a number of explanatory
variables. The ﬁrst dummy shows the simple main eﬀect of choosing the safe amounts over
the large probability prospect: choosing the safe amount for large probability prospects
is deemed much more satisfactory in general than choosing the prospect. The dummy
indicating the simple main eﬀect of a small probability choice is also positive, indicating
200Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk
Table 4.5: Experiment 2: Satisfaction Ratings
Dep. Var.: Satisﬁed with Choice I II
Safe Choice 0.530*** 0.458***
(0.119) (0.129)
Small probability (10%) 0.226** 0.238**
(0.113) (0.113)
Safe choice × small probability -0.658*** -0.680***
(0.130) (0.126)
EV diﬀerence -0.228*** -0.233***
(0.064) (0.064)











Wald χ2 61.7 64.59
Random Eﬀects Probit Regression. Coeﬃcients indicate marginal changes in satisfaction levels relative
to a choice of the risky prospect. *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05, * at p=0.10
considerable agreement with choices of the prospect in this instance.7 Choosing however
the safe amount for small probability prospects is considered to be very dissatisfying, as
shown by the large negative coeﬃcient of the interaction eﬀect. Recipients are in general
less satisﬁed with choices of the prospect the closer the safe amount is to the expected
value of the prospect, which is indicated by the simple eﬀect of the relative dummy. They
are however more satisﬁed with a choice of the safe alternative for relatively small de-
viations in expected value than for small probabilities. Females tend to be much more
satisﬁed when the safe amount is chosen for the large probability prospects, while past
proﬁts of the recipients have no inﬂuence on satisfaction ratings.
7Indeed, the dummy indicates the satisfaction levels for small probabilities with all interactions that
include that dummy held constant at zero (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). This in turn means that the
safe-choice dummy must be zero, thus resulting in the interpretation that the eﬀect indicates satisfaction
with choices of the prospect; this satisfaction in turn is measured relative to the (much fewer) choices of
the prospect for the large probability prospect.
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4.4.3 Discussion
The social norm hypothesis and the ampliﬁcation of fourfold pattern hypothesis make
very diﬀerent predictions on behavior for small probabilities in the gain domain. While
for large probabilities both theories predict an increase in risk aversion under responsi-
bility, for small probabilities the social norm argument predicts a cautious shift towards
increased risk aversion (or reduced risk seeking), whereas the ampliﬁcation argument pre-
dicts increased risk seeking. Having directly tested these contradictory predictions in
experiment 2, we conclude that the social norm dictating a cautious shift under condi-
tions of responsibility has been discredited as an explanation of the results: an increased
fourfold pattern of risk attitudes explains our results well. At the same time, this ﬁnding
also excludes explanations based on which our initial eﬀects could have been due to stake
eﬀects rather than responsibility.
While an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is a good ﬁt for our results,
we have not fully proven that such an accentuation takes place. Indeed, we miss results
for small probability losses. While such an additional result may seem desirable, our
experiment was designed with the explicit purpose of testing two diﬀerent predictions in
the gain domain against each-other. While the fourfold-pattern hypothesis ﬁnds strong
evidence in our data, it is not impossible that a diﬀerent explanation could exist for our
results. Indeed, even if the interpretation of an increase in the fourfold pattern of risk
attitudes prevails-or at least an increase in typical risk attitudes found at the individual
level-such an interpretation is merely descriptive in nature. The more fundamental ques-
tion remains why we observe such a shift in risk attitudes under responsibility.
We can only speculate about the answer at this point. One possibility is to examine the
ﬁnding in the light of Wegener and Petty (1995) ﬂexible self-correction model. The model
postulates that people may shift away from their ’natural’ or spontaneous behavior when
motivated to do so. The extent to which they correct their behavior, however, as well as
the direction in which they correct it, will fundamentally depend on their naïve theory
of the bias. This explanation appears however highly unsatisfying, given that there is
no way of determining what such unconsciously determined naïve theories of bias may
be-with the consequence that such an account could be used to ex-post justify any kind of
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behavior that one may ﬁnd. The fact that typical individual risk attitudes are accentuated
under conditions of responsibility provides an indication that increased responsibility does
by no means push decisions closer to expected utility maximization-generally held to be
normative-but rather farther away from it. There seems however to be general agreement
on this tendency, as indicated by our satisfaction rating patterns. Indeed in experiment
1, we found recipients to be generally satisﬁed with safe choices in the gain domain, but
dissatisﬁed with such choices in the loss domain. Given that safe choices have already
been found to decrease under conditions of responsibility in the loss domain, this is indeed
a strong indication for the perceived social acceptance (or at least desirability) of such
choices. A similar pattern can be seen in experiment 2, where safe choices were deemed
satisfactory for the large probability prospect, but very unsatisfactory for the small prob-
ability prospect.
Whatever the psychological reasons behind our ﬁndings may be, the mere economic fact
of more extreme patterns under responsibility remains. Such factors may have important
consequences for economic predictions and for policy design. Probability weighting-from
which the fourfold pattern is thought to derive to a large extent-has been used to explain
the simultaneous take-up of insurance and lottery play (Wakker, 2010). The fourfold pat-
tern of risk attitudes has also been used to explain reference point eﬀects that have been
observed in ﬁnancial markets (Baucells et al., 2011; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998)
and for investment behavior by ﬁrms (Fiegenbaum, 1990; Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988).
Our results provide a further indication that typical risk attitudes found for individuals
may not only generalize to professional agents or ﬁrms, but even be reinforced to some
extent. Given that these patterns seem very resilient to debiasing, explicit rules may be
needed to rein in excessive risk taking in certain conditions, or special training programs
for managers may seem desirable in order for them not to fall prey to automatic decision
making patterns that may be suboptimal from the point of view of the company that they
manage.
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4.5 Conclusion
We systematically explored decision situations in which a decision maker bears responsi-
bility for somebody else’s outcomes as well as for her own. In the gain domain, and for
medium to large probabilities, we conﬁrmed the intuition that being responsible for some-
body else’s payoﬀs increases risk aversion. Looking at risk attitudes in the loss domain,
however, we found an increase in risk seeking under conditions of responsibility.
This raises issues about the extent to which changed behavior under responsibility may
depend on a social norm of caution in situations of responsibility, or to what extent
pre-existing risk attitudes found at the individual level may simply be enhanced under
responsibility. To further explore this issue, we designed a second experiment to explore
risk-taking behavior for gain prospects oﬀering very small or very large probabilities of
winning. For large probabilities, we found increased risk aversion, thus conﬁrming our
earlier ﬁnding. For small probabilities, on the other hand, we found an increase of risk
seeking under conditions of responsibility. The latter ﬁnding thus discredits hypotheses
of a social rule dictating caution under responsibility, and points towards an ampliﬁcation
in the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes found for individual decisions.
At the present point we can only speculate on what may underlie such an ampliﬁcation of
individual risk attitudes. Additional evidence - possibly from neighboring disciplines such
as neuroscience - will probably be needed to fully understand the underlying dynamics.
Nevertheless, our ﬁndings point out how important and resilient to debiasing these risk
attitudes are, and hence the importance of considering them in policy design or for the
training and supervising of decision makers.
204Responsibility Effects in Decision Making under Risk
4.6 Appendix A4
Appendix A4.1: Prospect Type Regression
Table A4.1: Regressions on Prospect Types
Dep. Var: Choice of Safe Prospect I II III
Sensitivity up 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.185***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Sensitivity down -0.465*** -0.465*** -0.485***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Positive shift -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.170***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Lottery choice 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.098***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Mixed Lottery 0.059** 0.059** 0.060**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Mean-preserving -0.065** -0.65** -0.069**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033)








Obs 3840 3840 3840
Subjects 96 96 96
Wald Chi2 510.8 515.91 608.33
Random Eﬀects Probit Regression. Coeﬃcients show marginal eﬀects relative to choices in the basic
prospect pair; *** represents signiﬁcance at p=0.01, ** at p=0.05, * at p=0.10.
Table A4.1 shows a random eﬀects Probit model, with coeﬃcients indicating the deviation
of choices with respect to the basic prospect pair. In addition to the eﬀects already
discussed in the main text, it shows that females are on average signiﬁcantly more risk
averse than males. Also, risk aversion increases with age. Both ﬁndings are commonly
found in decision making under risk (Donkers et al., 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2008).
More interestingly, we ﬁnd an eﬀect of stake size, represented by the expected value of
the prospect (taken in absolute terms for the pure loss prospect). The higher the stakes
of the decision, the more risk averse subjects become on average. This is in agreement
with general ﬁndings in the literature (Binswanger, 1980; Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992;
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Lefebvre et al., 2010). Controlling for stake eﬀects also makes the eﬀect of the mixed
prospects much more signiﬁcant. This increased eﬀect derives from the fact that the
mixed prospects are obtained by adjusting the expected value of the prospect downward
from the basic prospect pair. Since subjects tend to be less risk averse for lower stakes,
the increased risk aversion found for mixed prospects appears more relevant once one
controls for the decreased stakes in those choice pairs.
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Appendix A4.2: Tables
Option A (Safe) Option B (Risky)
Lottery Prob Amount Prob Amount Prob Amount Prob Amount Category
Number Left Left Right Right Left Left Right Right
1 1 2 0 0 0.5 4 0.5 0 Base
2 1 2.5 0 0 0.5 4 0.5 0 Sensitivity Up
3 1 1.5 0 0 0.5 4 0.5 0 Sensitivity Down
4 1 3 0 0 0.5 5 0.5 1 Positive Shift
5 0.5 3 0.5 1 0.5 4 0.5 0 Lottery Choice
6 1 0 0 0 0.5 2 0.5 -2 Mixed Prospect
7 1 2 0 0 0.5 5 0.5 -1 MPS
8 0 0 1 -2 0.5 0 0.5 -4 Loss shift
9 1 4 0 0 0.5 8 0.5 0 Base
10 1 5 0 0 0.5 8 0.5 0 Sensitivity Up
11 1 3 0 0 0.5 8 0.5 0 Sensitivity Down
12 1 6 0 0 0.5 10 0.5 2 Positive Shift
13 0.5 6 0.5 2 0.5 8 0.5 0 Lottery Choice
14 1 0 0 0 0.5 4 0.5 -4 Mixed Prospect
15 1 4 0 0 0.5 10 0.5 -2 MPS
16 0 0 1 -4 0.5 0 0.5 -8 Loss shift
17 1 6 0 0 0.5 12 0.5 0 Base
18 1 7.5 0 0 0.5 12 0.5 0 Sensitivity Up
19 1 4.5 0 0 0.5 12 0.5 0 Sensitivity Down
20 1 9 0 0 0.5 15 0.5 3 Positive Shift
21 0.5 9 0.5 3 0.5 12 0.5 0 Lottery Choice
22 1 0 0 0 0.5 6 0.5 -6 Mixed Prospect
23 1 6 0 0 0.5 15 0.5 -3 MPS
24 0 0 1 -6 0.5 0 0.5 -12 Loss shift
25 1 8 0 0 0.5 16 0.5 0 Base
26 1 10 0 0 0.5 16 0.5 0 Sensitivity Up
27 1 6 0 0 0.5 16 0.5 0 Sensitivity Down
28 1 12 0 0 0.5 20 0.5 4 Positive Shift
29 0.5 12 0.5 4 0.5 16 0.5 0 Lottery Choice
30 1 0 0 0 0.5 8 0.5 -8 Mixed Prospect
31 1 8 0 0 0.5 20 0.5 -4 MPS
32 0 0 1 -8 0.5 0 0.5 -16 Loss shift
33 1 10 0 0 0.5 20 0.5 0 Base
34 1 12.5 0 0 0.5 20 0.5 0 Sensitivity Up
35 1 7.5 0 0 0.5 20 0.5 0 Sensitivity Down
36 1 15 0 0 0.5 25 0.5 5 Positive Shift
37 0.5 15 0.5 5 0.5 20 0.5 0 Lottery Choice
38 1 0 0 0 0.5 10 0.5 -10 Mixed Prospect
39 1 10 0 0 0.5 25 0.5 -5 MPS
40 0 0 1 -10 0.5 0 0.5 -20 Loss shift
Table A4.2: List of all 40 used Lotteries
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Appendix A4.3: Figures
Figure A4.1: Gain Lottery
Figure A4.2: Loss Lottery
208IND / RESP 





This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making. You can earn money which will be 
paid to you in cash after the experiment. During the experiment you and all other participants will be asked to 
make decisions. In total, the experiment lasts for approximately 1 hour and 15 minutes. Please raise your 
hand in case you have any questions during the experiment. One of the experimenters will then come to you 
and answer your questions in private. In the interest of clarity, we use male terms only in the instructions. 
 
Payment 
You receive 4 Euro for arriving in time in addition to your earnings from the experiment. There is a possibility 
that you suffer losses from specific decisions. Possible losses must be offset with your earnings from other 
decision situations and/or with your 4 Euro starting balance. 
In (the very unlikely) case of an overall loss from the experiment, you may choose between paying it back in 
cash or by working as an assistant in the laboratory (5 Euro per half an hour). 
 
Support 
You are provided with a pen on your desk. Please type your decisions into the computer. While making your 
decisions, there is a clock counting down in the right upper corner of your computer screen. This clock serves 
as a guide for how much time it should take for you to make your decisions. Of course, you are allowed to 
exceed the time; particularly in the beginning, this may be happening quite frequently. Once time has run out, 
it is only the pure information screens, which do not ask you to make any decisions that will be dismissed. 
 
 
Lottery decision making 
 
[IND: You do not interact with other participants of the experiment at any point during the experiment. Your 
final payment is determined exclusively by your own decisions and according to the rules explained in the 
following. Other participants do not find out about your decisions and about how much you have earned at any 
point during or after the experiment. In the same manner, you do not learn about other participants’ decisions 
and their earnings at any point during or after the experiment.] 
[RESP: You will be matched with another participant of the experiment. Your decisions or the decisions of the 
other participant determine your payment according to the rules explained in the following. At no point during 
or after the experiment other participants in the experiment learn your identity. In the same manner, you do not 
find out the identity of other participants at any point during or after the experiment.] 
 
Task 
[RESP: There are two types of participants, type A and type B. The matching is such that a type A person is 
always matched with a type B person. At the beginning your computer screen will tell you which type you are. 
The decision on which type you are is made randomly by the computer. You will remain the same type 
throughout the experiment. 
 
Decisions are made by type A only. Participants of type A make their decision for themselves and at the 
same time for their matching partner of type B. This means that every decision that applies for type A 
applies to his matching partner of type B in exactly the same way.] 
 
In total, there are 40 periods. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A persons] have to make one decision per period 
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A representative decision scenario may look like the following: 
 
In the above example, [IND: you have] [RESP: type A player has] a choice between alternative X, that yields 
4 Euro with a probability of 50% and 0 Euro with the complementary probability of 50% [IND: to you] 
[RESP: to him and to his matching partner of type B], and alternative Y, that yields 2 Euro with a probability 
of 100% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and to his matching partner of type B]. [IND: You decide] [RESP: 
Type A player decides] on one of the two alternatives by clicking on either the button “Alternative X” or the 
button “Alternative Y” below the pie charts. 
An alternative such as alternative Y from the above example is called a “certain payment” since it is paid out 
with a probability of 100%. An alternative such as alternative X is called “lottery” since one amount is paid 
out with a probability of 50 % and another amount is paid out with a probability of 50%. 
The alternatives between which [IND: you have] [RESP: type A has] to choose in each period either represent 
a choice between a certain payment and a lottery, or a choice between two different lotteries. In both 
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In this example, [IND: you have] [RESP: type A player has] a choice between alternative X, that yields -2 
Euro (a loss of 2 Euro) with a probability of 100% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and to his matching partner 
of type B], and alternative Y, that yields 0 Euro with a probability of 50% and -4 Euro (a loss of 4 Euro) 
with a complementary probability of 50% [IND: to you] [RESP: to him and his matching partner of type B]. 
 
[RESP: Type B players are provided with the information on the decisions of their type A partner with a 
lag of one period. This means that type B players see the decision scenario on their screens with which their 
type A partner was confronted in the previous period and are told the alternative which their type A partner 
chose. Finally, type B players can indicate whether they were “content” with the decision or “not content”. 
The statements of contentment do not influence type B’s earnings or the earnings of his type A partner. The 
statements of contentment do not get passed on to type A.] 
 
Payment 
[IND: It is in your interest  to think thoroughly about each decision because  each single decision may 
determine your payment at the end of the experiment.] 
[RESP: If you are a type A player, it is in your interest to think thoroughly about each decision because 
each single decision may determine your payment as well as the payment of your type B partner at the 
end of the experiment.]  
This happens as follows: 
 
To determine final payments the computer randomly selects three different periods that are relevant for the 
payment at the end of the experiment. Each period is equally likely to be selected by the computer. The 
sum of the earnings from the three selected periods determines [IND: your final payment] [RESP: the final 
payment for type A as well as for this type B partner]. 
[IND: On your screen you get told which periods got selected at random and how you chose in these periods.] 
[RESP: All participants are told on their screens which periods got selected at random and how type A chose 
in these periods.] 
 
In case [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose a certain payment in a selected decision period, [IND: you] [RESP: 
type A and his type B partner] receive the amount of the certain payment as [IND: your] [RESP: their] earning 
from this selected period. 
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In case [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose a lottery, the outcome of the lottery has to be determined first. To 
this end, lottery numbers from 1 to 6 get assigned to the possible earning amounts. As there are only lotteries 
involving probabilities of 50%, lottery numbers 1, 2 and 3 get assigned to one amount and lottery numbers 4, 5 
and 6 get assigned to the other amount. The computer randomly determines which amount gets assigned to the 
low numbers and which amount gets assigned to the high numbers. Finally, a randomly chosen participant is 
asked to roll a 6-sided die in public. The amount corresponding to the lottery number that was rolled is then 
paid out for the selected period. 
 
Example 1: The computer selects a period in which [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose alternative X which 
yields 4 Euro with a probability of 50% and 0 Euro with a probability of 50%. Lottery numbers 1, 2 and 3 
were assigned to the amount of 4 Euro and numbers 4, 5 and 6 were assigned to the amount of 0 Euro by 
the computer. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A and his type B partner] thus have a 50% chance to receive 4 Euro 
and a 50% chance to receive 0 Euro. If, for example, the lottery number 1 is rolled, the earnings from this 
period amount to 4 Euro [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and for his type B partner]. If, for example, the 
lottery number 5 is rolled, the earnings from this period amount to 0 Euro [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A 
and for his type B partner]. 
 
Example 2: The computer selects a period in which [IND: you] [RESP: type A] chose alternative Y which 
yields -4 Euro (a loss of 4 Euro) with a probability of 50% and 0 Euro with a probability of 50%. Lottery 
numbers 1, 2 and 3 were assigned to the amount of -4 Euro and numbers 4, 5 and 6 were assigned to the 
amount of 0 Euro by the computer. [IND: You] [RESP: Type A and his type B partner] thus have a 50% 
chance to receive 0 Euro and a 50% chance to receive -4 Euro (a loss of 4 Euro). If, for example, the lottery 
number 4 is rolled, the earnings from this period amount to 0 Euro [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and for 
his type B partner]. If, for example, the lottery number 3 is rolled, the earnings from this period amount to -4 
Euro [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A and for his type B partner]. This loss must be offset with earnings 
from other decisions and/or with your starting balance of 4 Euro. 
 
Your payment is formed by the sum of your earnings in the three selected periods.  
 
[RESP: Two participants that are matched with each other (type A and his type B partner) always have 
identical earnings and thus final payments.] 
 
Please note that it is optimal [IND: for you] [RESP: for type A] to choose the alternative that [IND: you prefer 
for yourself] [RESP: he prefers for himself and for his type B partner].  
 
There is no possibility to increase the final payment by adopting a different behavior.  
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